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1Part I
Introduction
1 Overview and structure
You cannot avoid the inevitable: there is absolutely no chance that one is going to write a
dissertation on corporate investment and nancing decisions without mentioning the famous
Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller, or MM, as they have come to be known. The two
authors have shown in their seminal 1958 paper that corporate nancing decisions do not
matter, in that corporate value is una¤ected by them when capital markets are perfect.
Regardless of whether a rm completely relies on equity or is nanced by 99:9% debt in its
capital structure (or any proportion in between), rm value is always the same for a given
corporate investment scheme. This does not only apply to common equity and straight debt,
but to every mix of securities conceivable. Financing simply does not matter. The economic
intuition is simple, equivalent to asserting that in a perfect-market supermarket, the value of
a pizza does not depend on how it is sliced(Myers, 2001, p. 85). The reason is quite simple:
in perfect markets, changes in the corporate capital structure can simply be undone on the
investors individual level by adjusting their personal portfolios.1 The irrelevance theorem
was later on shown to be quite robust in that it holds in more general settings, too. For
example, Stiglitz (1974) discards the corporate risk classes (that rms belong to) used in the
original model and accommodates dividend payout ratios, di¤ering bond maturity structures
and leverage ratios. The author shows that irrelevance is upheld under a set of certain weak
assumptions.
Nowadays, there is broad agreement that the MM theorem holds only in the perfect, highly
stylized model world envisaged by the authors at the time they were formulating the irrel-
evance propositions. It does not, however, hold in the real world, where numerous frictions
are most certainly present. But that is not the point. What is most important to understand
when considering the irrelevance theorem is that its signicance is not so much due to the
1 In the unlikely event that some readers are unfamiliar with MM, we recommend to skip the original paper
from 1958. Rather, some few years later, Modigliani and Miller (1969) provide a much shorter, much clearer,
more intuitive and more general version of their irrelevance theorem.
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actual result or the ingenuity required to produce such a theory. Rather, it has proven to
be of such enormous value over the years because it sparked the tremendous lot of subse-
quent research produced by scholars to this date. It serves as the basic research for past
and future developments in corporate nancing, so to speak. More precisely, it does so by
telling researchers where to look for determinants of corporate nancing policy. In the words
of Miller (1988, p. 100): showing what doesnt matter can also show, by implication, what
does [emphasis in the original]. An obvious way to overcome MM is to deviate from
the assumptions of perfect capital markets. We believe capital markets are generally well-
functioning, but they are not 100 per cent perfect 100 per cent of the time. Therefore, MM
must be wrong some times in some places(Brealey et al., 2003, p. 504). In reality, a great
variety of market frictions exist that justify relaxing the assumptions of MM. A classication
of di¤erent frictions is provided by DeGennaro and Robotti (2007). For example, di¤erent
securities come with di¤erent transaction costs. Managers take them into consideration when
deciding on raising new funds via the issue of new securities. Cost considerations may mo-
tivate them to prefer one type of security over the other, so that nancing matters. Taxes
are another frequently mentioned friction. Debt nancing can increase rm value because
interest payments are tax deductible from corporate taxable income by law and, thus, create
valuable interest tax shields. At the same time, debt creates the risk of default. When costs
of nancial distress are introduced (yet another deviation from perfect markets), nancing
matters in that the value of a levered rm is depressed by the (expected) value of these costs.
Thus, managers must carefully trade o¤ the advantages and disadvantages of leverage in de-
ciding on corporate capital structure because this choice a¤ects the rms value. There are
many more imperfections that make nancing matter. One that we will be concerned with
in the rst part of this dissertation is asymmetric information. Akerlof (1970) and Stiglitz
and Weiss (1981) have prominently shown that capital markets can break down and can be
characterized by credit rationing, respectively, in the presence of asymmetric information.
But there are various other distortions that matter in this regard. We examine how asym-
metric information between di¤erent market participants inuences nancing decisions and,
thus, rm value. Specically, if outsiders cannot verify the value of the rm, the choice of
a certain type of security to be issued sends a signal to the market that it uses to update
its estimate of the rms value. Management, aware of these valuation e¤ects, may thus be
biased towards a certain type of security.
In the second and third part of this dissertation, we elaborate on the possibility of nancing
relevance even when nancial markets are assumed perfect. In an ideal world with no taxes,
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transaction costs or other market imperfections, only investment decisions would a¤ect rm
value (Brealey et al., 2003, p. 592). Thus, if nancing decisions alter a rms investment
decisions, then the capital structure matters and MM does not hold (yet again). Specically,
we will consider a model setup (Myers, 1977) where shareholders (as the owners of the rm)
refuse to invest in a protable project that would increase the rms value, but not the value
of their own claims. Hence, they will rationally decide to pass up an investment opportunity
that would be undertaken if the rm had only equity in its capital structure. In other words,
the rms investment decision is inuenced by corporate debt.
All the above examples of imperfections that prevail in the real world point out that nancing
matters. To put it in the words of Myers (2001, p. 85): [A]fter all, the values of pizzas do
depend on how they are sliced[emphasis in the original].
The dissertation is structured as follows. In the rst part, we consider the consequences of a
deviation from the notion of perfect markets à la MM induced by the presence of asymmetric
information between market participants. Specically, we present in detail the much-quoted
model of Myers and Majluf (1984) that assumes that corporate managers are better informed
about the value of the company than outside investors. The latter consider purchasing fresh
equity to be issued by the company for reasons of nancing an investment that is known to
have a non-negative net present value [NPV]. As we will see, managers, who are assumed to
act exclusively in the interest of the original shareholders, pass up a protable investment
opportunity in some circumstances, for it would harm the original owners otherwise. This
is because the market may misprice a particular issue due to the informational asymmetry
such that the old stockholders would be forced to give up too big of a part of the rm
by issuing shares so as to still make the investment project a protable venture for them.
Not undertaking a worthwhile investment opportunity is what we will be referring to as
underinvestment throughout this dissertation. Once alternative modes of nancing (e.g.,
debt) are introduced, we will come to know that capital structure does matter in the model
of Myers and Majluf (1984). Di¤erent securities have di¤erent value implications in that
the announcement of their issue causes share price reactions of varying degree, thus either
exacerbating or alleviating the mispricing. Furthermore, we will consider the inuence of
negative-NPV investments on the conclusions of the model. As we will see, managers may
rationally decide to undertake a (seemingly) bad project.
The theory leads to several testable hypotheses. We provide an extensive literature overview
that presents the major empirical results. While the model does exceptionally well at ex-
plaining share price movements upon the announcement of a new security issue (depending
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on the kind of security), its performance is unsatisfactory when it comes to explaining why
corporations choose the securities they issue. The section concludes by reconsidering whether
the irrelevance of nancing can be restored.
In the second part, we reveal that corporate underinvestment is not conned to the presence
of asymmetric information. To the contrary, it can also arise when all market participants are
equally well informed. The seminal paper in this regard comes from Myers (1977). He shows
that all that is necessary for underinvestment to occur is the assumption that the management
of a rm levered with risky debt acts exclusively in the interest of its shareholders. By the
use of a numerical example, we will show that the intuition of the model is straightforward.
Imagine a rm that has the chance to undertake a protable new investment opportunity
that is risk-free, i.e., a sure increment in rm value. If, however, a state materializes in which
the companys value is well below the face value of the outstanding debt, managers will
rationally decide to pass up the opportunity because it would harm shareholders, who have
to provide the funds. If the investments NPV is not enough to raise the rms value above
the face value of debt, then it entirely goes to enhance the debtholdersclaims. In such a
scenario, shareholders have no interest in investing, and a good opportunity vanishes. Thus,
preexisting debt causes a nancial distortion to corporate investment. This represents (once
again) a clear deviation from MMs irrelevance proposition: the market value of the rm
is dependent on its capital structure. Here, excessive leverage alters the rms investment
scheme to the worse. If the rm were nanced completely with equity, it would always
invest, for the NPV would entirely go to shareholders. A broad overview of the existing
literature will show that this type of underinvestment is in fact a real-world concern. For
example, economists regularly invoke its detrimental e¤ect on investment as a justication
for providing debt relief (to corporations, nancial institutions, households as well as entire
countries).
In the third and main part, we will apply Myers (1977) underinvestment problem in the
reconstitution of damaged assets, as rst considered by Mayers and Smith (1987). The
worthwhile investment opportunity the rm faces in this scenario is accounted for by the
fact that the rm is assumed to be able to rebuild its assets for an investment cost that is
lower than the actual damage. That is, rebuilding has a positive NPV. Yet management
will in some states of the world refrain from investing if the rm is levered with risky debt.
Unless it purchases casualty insurance. As we will see, an appropriately structured insurance
contract completely removes the underinvestment problem and, thus, restores the rst-best
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rm value, irrespective of the amount of risky debt the rm has in its capital structure.
However, this result prevails only as long as the insurance company does not include a safety
loading in the insurance premium. For Schnabel and Roumi (1989) show that, in this case,
the conclusions of the original model do not hold any longer in that the rm abstains from
acquiring insurance coverage for some levels of risky debt. This is where the contribution of
this dissertation comes into play. It holds true that a safety loading may alter the conclusions
of the original model. However, we provide proof that, if it does, the correct outcome from
Schnabel and Roumis (1989) model is exactly the other way round. The results we present
have economic meaning. Specically, given a su¢ ciently high safety loading, we show that
there is a critical level of debt above which the rm stops to take out casualty insurance.
Shareholders of a highly levered rm have little stake in the company. If, in addition to that,
the insurance company charges a high safety loading, which represents a deadweight loss to
shareholders, then they have no interest in saving a company from default that basically does
not belong to them. They rather take their chances, and make use of their option to default
if a bankruptcy state materializes. By contrast, shareholders generally acquire insurance
coverage for low levels of risky debt. We establish the proof for two settings. One is general,
while the other is for a special case that considers uniform state prices. We do so because
the latter both o¤ers better intuition and provides neat graphical representations.
We further contribute to the existing literature by incorporating bankruptcy costs into the
underinvestment model in the presence of a safety loading. As we will see, such costs have
an inuence on the rms decision to insure. We close another research gap by explicitly
considering the e¤ects of a safety loading in the nancing condition interpretation of the
model that was rst provided by Garven and MacMinn (1993) in a follow-up paper to Mayers
and Smith (1987). This setup allows the face value of debt to change with the insurance/no-
insurance decision. We show that our main result also holds under this alternative nancing
assumption.
Throughout this text, it will become clear that underinvestment remains an active and wide
area of research. It is applied in many di¤erent areas of economics, ranging from nancial to
development economics. By providing the new insights concerning corporate underinvestment
and casualty insurance, a small contribution to current research is made by this dissertation.
6Part II
Corporate Underinvestment and
Asymmetric Information
2 The Myers and Majluf (1984) model
Asymmetric information is merely a fancy phrase to express that one party has more
information than another. I know more than you do. In a perfect capital market, there
is, inter alia, no such thing as asymmetric information. Every single piece of information is
readily and costlessly available to everybody.2 If this were indeed the case in reality, it would
imply that, for instance, high ranking managers of a rm, who deal with internal corporate
matters on a daily basis, have exactly the same level of knowledge about the value of their
own company as random outside investors, say, investment bankers. In reality, however, the
latter, being institutional investors, spend a considerable amount of resources this cuts out
the costlessly-part and time this cuts out the readily-part on trying to lay their
hands on the very information in possession of the rms management. Still, even when
ignoring the costs and the delay in time, is it reasonable to assume that investors can really
succeed in gathering all of it? Common sense tells us that, generally, the answer must be: no.
For example, why else would there be laws against insider trading in real life? What is more,
for a great number of companies, maintaining an informational advantage and keeping this
rm-specic information from the market and, by implication, their competitors is the source
of economic success.3 Therefore, it sounds like a good idea to ease this strict assumption of
perfect information  exactly what Stewart Myers and Nicholas Majluf set out to do in their
1984 paper. They examine how the presence of asymmetric information, in that managers
have knowledge about their rms payo¤s ahead of the market, alters the rms decision to
invest, given the investment needs to be nanced by issuing new shares.4
2The characteristics of perfect capital markets are explicitly laid out in Miller and Modigliani (1961, p.
412), along with an explanation of rational behavior.
3For a deeper insight into the importance of information and its interrelation with corporate success, which
constitutes a research area in the eld of business administration, see, e.g., Porter (1985).
4As mentioned by Myers and Majluf (1984, p. 196) themselves, their paper, like so many others, traces
back to Akerlofs (1970) pioneering work on asymmetric information in the market for used cars  the famous
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Model setup and assumptions are laid out in the next section. Intuitively, however, a major
result of this equilibrium model is easy to grasp right away: once potential new investors
cannot be certain about a rms value anymore, they become suspicious whenever manage-
ment announces that it wants to raise funds by issuing new shares. Suspiciousin that they
will presume the new shares are overvalued and that management wants to take advantage
of their relative ignorance. As a consequence, the market revises downwards the price it is
willing to pay for the new stocks. If the accompanying decline in rm value is too large, the
rm will refrain from o¤ering new shares in the rst place. In consideration of these adverse
e¤ects of fresh equity, an opportunity for new debt as a substitute means of nancing could
open up in the quest for securities less prone to asymmetric information. Let us have a look.
2.1 Model setup
In our model world, there are three dates: t =  1, t = 0 and t = +1. There are three
types of risk-neutral actors: a rms managers, its shareholders and outside investors (the
market). While the information about the rms value is the same for all parties at t =
 1, the informational asymmetry is incorporated at t = 0, when management receives new
information that the market does not learn until t = +1. That is, at t = 0, and at that
date only, management is better informed. Informed about what exactly? The true value of
the rm. Consider a company that is made up of an asset in place [AIP] and an investment
opportunity. The potential values of the former at t = 0, labeled a, are represented by the
distribution of the random variable eA. The realization a is yet unknown to both management
and outside investors at t =  1. With each party being aware of the distribution of eA,
everyone rationally agrees that the value of the AIP at t =  1 is the (unconditional) expected
value A = E( eA).5 The realization a becomes known to management at t = 0, whereas it
takes the market until t = +1 to nd out about it. The same logic holds true for the NPV of
the investment opportunity, the second (potential) contributor to rm value. Possible NPVs
at t = 0 are described by the distribution of the random variable eB, which again is known
to both management and outside investors from the beginning, so that the market value at
lemons problem. For a discussion of the overall signicance of the economics of information for modern-day
economics, see Stiglitz (2000). Of course, asymmetric information is just one way of introducing a market
imperfection among many others. See, e.g., Calcagnini and Saltari (2009) for a compilation of di¤erent market
imperfections and their inuence on economic decision-making.
5As most of the times in economics, we, too, impose that individuals act rationally. They behave like the
notorious homo oeconomicus. If you are not a friend of the concept of rational behavior as it may not always
represent actual human characteristics, it might provide at least a little bit of relief to know that the concepts
presented here (and elsewhere in economics) would totally work on the planet Vulcan from the ctional Star
Trek Universe. Think of the famous Mr. Spock. The planets inhabitants, Vulcans, are guided by pure logic
and rationality. This is also the reason why they completely suppress their feelings.
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t =  1 is B = E
 eB. The actual project NPV, b, is known to managers from t = 0. The
market needs an extra period to nd out about this information.
We assume the rm does not have enough internal funds to nance the growth opportunity
entirely by itself. Rather, these internal funds, C, are used to draw down the (residual)
amount to be raised through a public stock issue (debt will be considered later on). In other
words, the rm needs to conduct a seasoned equity o¤ering, more commonly known as SEO.
As mentioned by Myers and Majluf (1984, p. 190), internal funds the authors call them
nancial slack  are composed of cash at hand, marketable securities and the amount of
risk-free debt the rm can issue (more on the latter later). The amount raised in equity is
denoted by E. Referring to the investment necessary to nance the growth opportunity as
I, it follows that E = I   C, where C < I. The project is non-divisible, investing in part of
it is not possible. Given this information, we make a distinction between old shareholders,
i.e., the ones holding stocks at t =  1, and new shareholders, those buying the new stocks
in case of an issue. Initially, there is no risky debt in the rms capital structure. Managers
decide on whether to pursue the investment opportunity at t = 0, after they have come to
know a and b. If they wish, they have the option to let the opportunity pass, without it ever
coming back (the reasons to be explained in a moment). The investment is now or never.
Thus, if decided against, there will be no issue of new shares and no NPV b accruing to the
rm.6
Additionally, the realized values of the AIP and NPV are assumed to be non-negative, i.e.,
a  0 and b  0. In other words, the distributions of eA and eB each are truncated at zero.
This is not surprising, once considering that managers decide on the investment project after
learning its true NPV. For if it were negative, they would simply choose not to take on the
project. Limited liability guarantees that the lowest value the AIP can take on is a = 0. The
non-negativity assumption is a major point of importance to the model. Later on, we will
explore the consequences of relaxing it.
In traditional nance theory, the NPV of an investment is the crucial decision criterion. One
is to invest in every project that has a positive NPV. When NPV is zero, there is indi¤erence
between investing and not investing. In that case, we assume that the rm will still go on
with the project7. Since b  0, one is tempted to think that the rm should always invest.
6Morellec and Schürho¤ (2011) present an adaption of Myers and Majlufs (1984) model where this assump-
tion is dropped. Instead, they o¤er a real options framework that allows for exible timing of the investment
project. In this scenario, the timing becomes vital as it acts as a signal of rm quality to the market. Specif-
ically, good rms may separate from bad ones by (costly) speeding up investment, thus impeding mimicking
behavior on behalf of rms of worse type.
7See Berkovitch and Israel (2004) for a model suggesting that NPV may turn out to be an ine¤ective tool in
a rms capital allocation process in the presence of agency problems between di¤erent levels of management.
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As we will see, however, this is not the case here  classical nance theory does not apply.
We will refer to rm value when always investing as status quo. If management decides
against the positive-NPV project in only one situation, this poses a deviation and, thus, a
loss in rm value relative to status quo.
One crucial assumption is that management works exclusively in the interest of old share-
holders  old shareholder value maximization, so to speak. In other words, objectives of
management and old shareholders are perfectly aligned such that conicts of interest between
them, as initially and best described by Jensen and Meckling (1976), are irrelevant.8 The
market is aware of this fact. Managers themselves do not own any stocks, neither do they
participate in a potential issue of fresh equity.9 If management were allowed to trade, this
would further complicate matters because the amount of new securities bought would act as
a signal to the market.
As indicated above, management may not always decide to invest. Therefore, we need a
di¤erentiation of share value conditional on the outcome of the rms issue-invest decision.
We refer to the market value of old shares at t = 0 as P 0 in case of an SEO. If the rm
decides not to invest, the market value at t = 0 of the old (and only) shares is denoted by the
letter P . Managements objective of exclusively maximizing old shareholder value gives rise
to a conict of interest between the two shareholder groups (if there are two). Herein also
lies the explanation for why the rm, i.e., its managers, may not always reach for status quo.
Correct, if the aim were to maximize rm value, then, since b  0, management would always
have to invest as it faces a net contribution to rm value. Maximizing company value is not
their objective, however. They would only do so if it were equivalent to maximizing the old
shareholderstrue value, i.e., the value that becomes known to the market at t = 1. This is
generally not the case in the model: when managers learn a and b at t = 0, they must make
the issue-invest decision. The problem they are facing is that (generally) the market value of
According to the authors, other common capital budgeting measures, such as the internal rate of return, do
a better job in maximizing rm value.
8This is a strong assumption indeed. Noe and Rebello (1996), for example, abandon it and allow for agency
problems caused by the incompatibility of interests. In pure agency theories, for instance Jensen (1986),
managers usually posses a unique skill set and, therefore, seek to secure rents for themselves as they want to
increase their personal wealth, giving rise to agency costs. The novelty introduced by Noe and Rebello (1996)
is that they combine these agency considerations with the adverse Myers-Majluf-style e¤ects that result from
information asymmetries between inside and outside investors regarding a protable investment opportunity.
Whether debt or equity is used to signal rm quality critically depends on who is in charge of nancial policy,
i.e., whether share- or bondholders control corporate investments. The two groups face tradeo¤s between
di¤erent costs in coming to a decision.
9 In a related model setup, Bradford (1987) examines what happens when managers are owners themselves
and also get to trade in the companys shares during a stock issue used to nance a worthwhile investment
opportunity. There, too, the investment is not always undertaken. Share price may rise, fall or stay unchanged.
See Fields and Mais (1994) and Bigelli et al. (1999) for empirical examinations of managerial ownership and
trading behavior during SEOs.
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the old shares and their true value will not be one and the same at that time. Only managers
know the intrinsic value10 of old shares at t = 0, which they aim to maximize. It holds true
that the market will come up with exactly the same price tomorrow but not today (t = 0).
Therefore, acting rationally and knowing the joint distribution of eA and eB, outside investors
have to resort to expected values at t = 0 in assessing the price (estimate). This generally
causes a discrepancy between true and market value, resulting in over- or undervaluation of
the shares. And this is where it gets interesting. Managers may be put in a situation where
the rm at t = 0 is (rationally) undervalued such that, if it went ahead and issued shares, it
would have to sell them for a bargain.11 Once the market, given a share issue, learns the true
value of the rm at t = 1, the formerly underpriced new shares rise in value.12 Since intrinsic
rm value, i.e., E +C + a+ b, is xed, this gain must come from the old shareholders. The
wrongprice for a security issue does not a¤ect rm value. It just transfers value from some
securityholders to others (Myers and Majluf, 1984, p. 213). That is, there is a transfer of
value from old to new shareholders (the opposite holds true in the case of formerly overpriced
new shares) and, thus, a dilution of the wealth of old claimholders. Clearly, this cannot be
in the interest of original shareholders, since the transfer constitutes a cost to them. At the
same time, they do want the NPV from the investment project. This is the tradeo¤ faced
by management. If the (dilution) cost of issuing undervalued shares, i.e., the transfer of
value, is greater than the gain to old shareholders, i.e., the investment opportunitys NPV,
then managers will decide not to undertake the project. They will, in equilibrium, let a
worthwhile opportunity pass by. Project NPV acts as a cushion to investing, which is why
management, ceteris paribus, prefers highly protable investment opportunities.
Furthermore, potential new shareholders, knowing that management acts in old shareholders
interest, correctly infer from an announcement of an SEO that it must be benecial to old
shareholders. This causes them to update (downwards) the price they are willing to pay for
the new shares, which in turn may e¤ect managements decision to issue and invest in the
rst place, as we will see.
10 In the words of Myers and Majluf (1984, p. 191): Here trueor intrinsicvalue means what the shares
would sell for, conditional on the rms issue-invest decision, if investors knew everything that managers
know. Put more simply, given a decision on the investment, the true value is the value that managers know
today, and the market will learn tomorrow.
11One might wonder how this is possible, since the amount E to be raised in the issue is xed: correct, E is
exogenous, but the number of shares necessary to raise that amount is not. Thus, given undervaluation, the
rm needs to issue a greater amount of shares in order to raise E. Accordingly, the proportion of the rms
shares held by old shareholders is lower in case of underpricing (cf. Myers, 1984, p. 583-84).
12This is one of the di¤erences to Akerlofs (1970) setup where a single good (car), whose quality is not
veriable by the buyer, is sold. Here, two goods are sold not in full, but partially, namely claims to the AIP
and to the investment project. Informational asymmetry regarding true value prevails for both of them (cf.
Myers, 1984, fn. 12, p. 583).
2. The Myers and Majluf (1984) model 11
Financial markets are assumed perfect, except for the informational asymmetry. Notably,
this implies that there are no taxes. Accordingly, debt cannot create valuable tax savings
(interest tax shields) due to the fact that interest deductions diminish taxable corporate
income. Nor are there costs of nancial distress or transaction costs associated with issuing
shares. We assume capital markets are perfect and e¢ cient with respect to publicly available
information(Myers and Majluf, 1984, p. 190).
The only source of risk (to undertaking a worthwhile investment opportunity) considered in
the model stems from the informational asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. Hence,
there is no need to be concerned about adjusting for risk when discounting future cash ows.
In fact, there is no discounting at all: The future values could be discounted for the time
value of money without changing anything essential(Myers and Majluf, 1984, p. 190).
One nal assumption is that old shareholders do not buy (part of) the new issue, i.e., they
are passive. Neither do they sell some (or all) of their shares. Original shareholders hold on
to their claims until the end of the last period, when the company is liquidated. Hence, it
is guaranteed that the groups of old and new shareholders are not one and the same, which
allows us to focus explicitly on the conict of interest between the two.13
Finally, note that we speak of the rm, i.e., we use singular. There is no multiplicity of di¤er-
ent rm types such that there exist good, mediocre and bad rms, depending on their cash
ow distribution. This point has been subject to criticism, see, e.g., Nachman and Noe (1994,
p. 3), who state that, typically, in the presence of asymmetric information ...the markets
beliefs regarding the productivity of the issuing rm are part of the equilibrium outcome and
cannot be xed exogenously. Therefore, Nachman and Noe (1994), among others, develop a
model which incorporates rm types of varying productivity. Most prominently, Greenwald
et al. (1984), around the same time as Myers and Majluf (1984), present a (complex) model
that considers equity markets as a source of nancing to complement Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981) well-known result of credit rationing in debt markets. Their conclusions are similar in
that nancing via equity is perceived as bad news by investors in the presence of asymmetric
information. In their model, only bad rms seek equity nancing. Good rms use the debt
market, even though they have to accept bankruptcy costs. Necessarily, such an advancement
increases model complexity. The beauty of Myers and Majlufs (1984) model is its simplicity.
In the following, we will formally derive the three fundamental results of the model: rstly,
we will show that asymmetric information may prompt the rm to pass up the opportunity.
Since rm value is reduced relative to status quo, this is what we refer to as underinvestment.
13Note that this assumption is crucial to the model outcome. For a comprehensive discussion of passive
versus active shareholders, we refer to section 4 in Myers and Majluf (1984, pp. 210-14).
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Secondly, we will explain why stock prices fall upon an issue announcement. And lastly,
the advantages of debt nancing and its implications for corporate capital structure will be
presented.
2.2 Underinvestment  the model
As already noted, an issue of new shares is necessary because we assume that C < I. Internal
funds (cash) must be non-negative, such that we have 0  C < I. The more internal funds
there are, the less new equity, E = I C, is necessary. We stated that managers maximize old
sharestrue value, which they come to know at t = 0 when learning the realizations of eA andeB, i.e., a and b. But how exactly do we determine the true value? Keeping in mind that we
may or may not have an issue of new shares, it must hold true that, since managers may let
some opportunities pass by, we need two truevalues conditional on the rms issue-invest
decision. If the rm chooses not to issue, it keeps its internal funds in the cash box, issues no
equity and obtains no NPV. Along with the asset already in place, this yields a true value of
V oldno issue = C + a. (2.1)
Due to that fact that no new shares are issued, this is also the intrinsic rm value. In case
the company decides to invest, it issues equity worth E. On top of that, it receives the NPV
b. Thus, the intrinsic value of the rm is V  = E + C + a+ b in the event of an issue. Since
E = I   C, rewriting yields V  = I + a+ b, where I + b constitutes the gross present value
from investing. Firm value is thus comprised of the AIP plus the entire cash ows from the
investment project. Obviously, this cannot belong to old shareholders alone. Now, they have
to share with the new stockholders. Therefore, we have
V  = V oldissue + V
new.
Conditional on an issue, the intrinsic value of the rm (which managers know at t = 0 and
the market learns at t = 1) is the sum of the true values of the old and the new shares, to be
specied subsequently. It is clear that the two shareholder groups each hold a proportion of
V . The weights must be the fractions of all shares held by the respective group. Thus, the
post-issue weighting for old shareholders is P
0
P 0+E . Accordingly, their intrinsic value is given
by
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V oldissue =
P 0
P 0 + E
(E + C + a+ b) . (2.2)
Following the same logic, the fraction held by new shareholders EP 0+E .
14 It follows that the
true value of the new shares is
V new =
E
P 0 + E
(E + C + a+ b) . (2.3)
Again, both theses values are already known to management at t = 0. Generally, they will
not equal their respective market counterparts at that time. For outsiders to nd out about
(and agree with) V oldissue and V
new, it takes another period.
Management, when learning a and b at t = 0, must decide on whether to issue or not. They
will do whatever yields the higher intrinsic value to old shareholders. Therefore, it follows
that the issue will only be executed in case it holds true that V oldno issue  V oldissue, i.e.,
C + a  P
0
P 0 + E
(E + C + a+ b) .
Combining the two (C + a)-terms allows us to express this inequality equivalently as
E
P 0 + E
(C + a)  P
0
P 0 + E
(E + b) (2.4)
Presented in this manner, there is a nice interpretation: C+a on the left-hand side is the true
value of the rm already in place, i.e., excluding the investment project, cf. equation (2.1).
If undertaken, investment causes rm value to increase by E + b, as seen on the right-hand
side. Combined with the respective weightings, as found in (2.2) and (2.3), the inequality
tells us that the rm will issue and invest if the share of the increase in rm value received by
old stockholders is greater than the share of oldrm value going to new stockholders via
the transfer of value (that is, old shareholders lose part 1  P 0P 0+E of the pre-issue rm to the
new co-owners). In short, old shareholders need to gain more than they lose in order for the
SEO to be conducted. Rewriting the condition yet another time yields EP 0 (C + a)  (E + b)
14At rst, it seems strange that the fractions are not expressed in terms of number of shares such that, say,
the fraction held by new shareholders is the number of new shares divided by the overall number of shares after
the issue. Myers and Majluf (1984) do not provide an explicit explanation. Let o denote the number of old
and n the number of new shares. It follows that the fraction of shares held by new shareholders is n
o+n
. The
market value of old shares at t = 0 is P 0 conditional on an issue, while the corresponding value is E for new
shares. Obviously, stocks must trade at the same price once issued (for reasons of arbitrage). Therefore, price
per share is P
0
o
= E
n
. Staying with the new stockholders, rewriting their fractional ownership yields
nE
n
(o+n)E
n
and, hence, E
oE
n
+E
. Since P
0
o
= E
n
, we ultimately have E
P 0+E , as presented in equation (2.3) Accordingly, the
fraction is P
0
P 0+E for old shareholders, cf. (2.2). There is no need to introduce the number of shares.
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Figure 2.1: The Issue-Invest Decision Faced by Managers at t = 0.
and, thus,
E
P 0
C   E + E
P 0
a  b.
As long as the projects NPV is large enough, the rm will issue shares and invest. Given
this inequality, the issue-invest decision is nicely depicted in an (a; b)-diagram. See Figure
2.1, which follows Myers and Majluf (1984). Graphically, the line
b =  E + E
P 0
(C + a) (2.5)
represents those (a; b)-combinations for which the rm is just indi¤erent between investing
and not investing (and will, per assumption, settle for an issue). It represents the investment-
indi¤erence line.
From the last inequality, the rm issues for all (a; b)-combinations falling into the region on
and above the indi¤erence line , denoted by M 0, in Figure 2.1. Recall that we restricted a
and b to non-negative values. Therefore, all realized combinations of the random variables eA
and eB must not lie outside the rst quadrant in the gure. As a result, the shaded, triangle-
shaped area below the a-axis and (on and) above line b =  E + EP 0 (C + a) is not part of
region M 0.
If, on the other hand, (a; b) falls into region M , managers will forgo the valuable investment
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opportunity as doing so would only harm old stockholders because the rm would issue shares
that are undervalued too heavily.15 This is also the reason why, as can be seen in Figure 2.1,
the rm will only issue shares when b is high enough (for a given a) in that (a; b) is located on
or above the investment-indi¤erence line: the gain from investing is large enough to outweigh
the loss caused by the transfer of value to new shareholders. Generally, combinations of high
NPVs and low values of the AIP make an issue of new shares most likely. When a is low,
there is not much value to be transferred to new shareholders in absolute terms, while a
high b leaves a lot to gain for old shareholders, cf. (2.4). Note that underinvestment occurs
whenever an (a; b)-realization is located in regionM  rm value is reduced relative to status
quo; the classical paradigm to invest in every non-negative-NPV project is violated.
Figure 2.1 is also useful in understanding the composition of both P 0, the market value of
old shares at t = 0 when issuing, and P , the market value when not investing. Even though
already used in the (in-)equations above, we have not determined these two values so far.
First of all, outside investors are not stupid. To put it simply, Figure 2.1 is not exclusively
known to management, but also to the market. Remember that outsiders are aware of the
joint distribution of eA and eB. They can thus tell which of them fall into region M and
M 0, respectively. Therefore, once management has decided on an action, there is no need
to incorporate all possible realizations of eA and eB into the markets price estimate when
establishing the expected values of AIP and NPV. A public announcement at t = 0 to issue
stocks acts as a signal to the market. Outside investors learn from this decision that the
realized combination of a and b must obviously lie (on or) above the indi¤erence line, i.e.,
in region M 0. This leads them to update their estimate of existing shares intrinsic value
(the market value). Given an issue announcement, investors rationally establish the expected
values of both the AIP and the NPV solely over those realizations that fall into region M 0.
Dene the expected values conditional on an issue announcement by A (M 0)  E( eA j E =
I   C) and B (M 0)  E( eB j E = I   C), where E = I   C > 0. It follows that the market
value of old shares when investing at t = 0 is given by the equilibrium value
P 0 = C +A
 
M 0

+B
 
M 0

. (2.6)
Generally, the true value, which the market does not learn until t = 1, will not coincide with
this market value. P 0 is correct on average, however. It is the rationally formed expectation
15An overvaluation obviously is in the interest of managers. New shares are sold for more than they are
actually worth. Once the overvaluation becomes known at t = 1, new shareholders su¤er a capital loss because
the share price shifts to its intrinsic value as all the informational insecurity is resolved. In that case, there is
a transfer of value, but the other way round, i.e., from new to old shareholders.
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over all possible intrinsic values in subregion M 0.16 Note that the same holds true for new
sharesmarket value E: although a certain SEO will be mispriced, there is no systematic
capital gain to be made. In an equilibrium with a stock issue, outside investors do not expect
a change in the value of new equity from t = 0 to t = 1. Managers know the actual change
from t = 0 on.
The reasoning just applied also holds true for the market price of the old shares in case the
rm decides not to issue. In determining the market value of the AIP, only those realizations
lying below the indi¤erence line in Figure 2.1 are taken into account (there is no need to
compute the expected value of the NPV over all realizations lying below that line, since
there will be no investment and, thus, no NPV when there is no issue). The absence of an
announcement to issue acts as a signal, too. In this case, it tells outside investors that the
realized values of a and b do not satisfy the requirement for an issue, as given by inequality
(2.4). We dene the expected value of the AIP conditional on no issue of new shares as
A (M)  E( eA j E = 0). Note that the conditional expected values, i.e., A (M 0), B (M 0) and
A (M), contain all the information at hand to outside investors at t = 0, namely the joint
distribution of AIP and NPV as well as either the announcement to issue and invest or the
decision not to issue. It follows that the old (and only) shares at t = 0 are worth
P = C +A (M) (2.7)
when the rm does not invest. That is, the conditional expected value of the AIP plus the
cash at hand. Since there is no stock issue, this value furthermore equals the overall market
value of the rm at t = 0. The rm itself may still be under- or overvalued, but it has no
consequences for the owners because there exist no new shares to/from which wealth could
be transferred.
The values of both P and P 0 are governed by the (a; b)-combinations and their respective
probabilities of falling into regionsM andM 0. In other words, they depend on the joint prob-
ability density function of
 eA; eB. Likewise, the boundary of both regions itself depends on
P 0, cf. equation (2.5). As mentioned by Myers and Majluf (1984, p. 201), this implies that
the equity values P and P 0 and the regionsM andM 0 are determined simultaneously.17 Once
16Only if the rm were to always invest, i.e., not let a single project pass, then the (status quo) value of
old shares would equal P 0 = C + A + B. The issue announcement would be fully anticipated, and no signal
sent to the market. Hence, we implicitly assume that region M carries positive probability mass, so that
underinvestment may actually occur.
17Consider this small thought experiment to clarify the point: based on Figure 2.1, assume that the line
parting the two subregions had the same intercept, but was modied to be just a little atter. Now, more
(a; b)-realizations would fall into region M 0, altering P 0 (and thus P ) because the conditional expected values
A (M 0) and B (M 0) would be calculated over more (a; b)-combinations than before. From (2.5), this would
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again, keep in mind that P and P 0 reect all information possessed by outside investors. My-
ers and Majluf (1984, p. 203) themselves say it best: They are rationally-formed, unbiased
estimates of the rms decision rule as well as its decision[emphasis in the original].
Before we go on to examine the share price reaction to an issue announcement, let us briey
refer to an interesting statement made by Myers and Majluf (1984, p. 203) about the im-
pact of informational asymmetry in the model: One insight of the model is that you need
asymmetric information about both assets in place and investment opportunities to get in-
teresting solutions [emphasis in the original]. The best way to grasp this point is by using
the following example: suppose there is no asymmetric information regarding the true value
of the AIP. Everybody learns a at t = 0. The market is merely confronted with not knowing
b before t = 1. Equation (2.6) becomes P 0 = C + a+ B (M 0), where a has replaced A (M 0).
Rewrite (2.4), the condition for an issue, as E
 
C+a
P 0
  E + b. We know that B (M 0)  0 in
the P 0-equation because b  0 per assumption. It follows that P 0  C+a and, thus, C+aP 0  1.
In that case, the issue-invest inequality is always satised as
 
C+a
P 0

E  E and b  0. In
other words, when there is no informational asymmetry concerning the value of the AIP, the
rm will always decide to issue and invest. Status quo prevails because there is no underin-
vestment and, consequently, no problem (despite the informational asymmetry regarding the
projects NPV). Worthwhile investments are always carried out. Consequently, the value of
the old shares is given by P 0 = C+a+B. Since the rm always invests, the expected value is
computed over all realizations b, and conditional and unconditional expected values coincide.
Note, however, that an issue can still be under- or overvalued in such a situation. This may
occur via b > B or b < B, respectively. The point is that now there is always some (net)
value to gain for old shareholders (and none to lose from the AIP). Therefore, asymmetric
information about a and b at t = 0 is imperative for underinvestment.
2.3 Why an issue announcement is perceived as bad news
The heading forecloses the result: share price will always drop upon managements announce-
ment to issue and invest. Mathematically, we have to show that P 0 < P to prove this asser-
tion.18 The proof is easy. Check Figure 2.1 again. The indi¤erence line crosses the abscissa
alter both the intercept and slope of the indi¤erence line, which again would modify the values P 0 and P , and
so forth. Therefore, the values are determined simultaneously.
18The number of old shares is xed. Therefore, when the value of old shares given investment, P 0, is less
than that when not investing, P , the same holds true for the price of a single share. Note that these two share
prices would coincide if region M indeed carried no probability mass because then the market would know for
sure that the rm will invest such that there is no information to be inferred from an issue announcement to
update the price estimate.
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at a = P 0   C. This follows from setting b = 0 in equation (2.5) and solving for a. Graph-
ically, if the (a; b)-combination falls into the no-issue region M , the rm does not take any
action. Most importantly, the gure tells us that region M only commencesto the right of
a = P 0 C. Consequently, every single a-value to be found in M must exceed P 0 C. A (M)
is the expected value of all these realizations in M . Hence, it must be greater than P 0   C,
too. Additionally, we know from equation (2.7) that this conditional expected value is given
by A (M) = P   C. Taken together, it follows that  A (M) =P   C > P 0   C and, hence,
P > P 0. This completes the proof.
Let us focus a little more on the intuition behind this important result. Why should the
stock price fall when management announces that it will pursue an investment project that
the market knows has positive NPV? For a start, Myers and Majluf (1984, p. 203) o¤er the
following statement: P exceeds P 0 because investors rationally interpret the decision not to
issue as good news about the true value of the rm. By implication, a decision to raise new
capital must convey (relatively) bad news. We have already mentioned why this is the case: a
decision to issue, i.e., (a; b) falling intoM 0, will be interpreted as an attempt by management,
which works for old stockholders, to rip o¤ the market by issuing overpriced shares, leading
to a loss for the new owners at t = 1, when the true value is revealed. A decision not to
issue sends a signal of good news regarding the rms true value to the market, which is
why P exceeds P 0: the (preannouncement) rm must be worth more than what the market
thinks, since only this situation will lead management, whose decision-making rule (2.4) is
well known, to decide against the worthwhile investment. The transfer of value from old to
new shareholders would be too large in that it would outweigh the gain from investing. The
consequence is that management refrains from issuing shares.
One other point helps to clarify. Recall that b  0. Now, what if b = 0 in some circum-
stances?19 The investment project is neither bad nor good. It simply is a zero-NPV project,
not adding to (nor reducing) overall rm value. From Figure 2.1, an issue given b = 0 may
well happen. This is because the segment on the a-axis from zero up to a = P 0   C is part
of region M 0. It follows that an issue does not necessarily signal that the rm is going after
a positive-NPV project (this statement holds the more true, the higher the probability that
b = 0 on the mentioned part of the segment). Instead, it may well be that a is low enough
(a  P 0   C) such that the rm even nds zero-NPV opportunities attractive. Therefore,
...the decision to issue does not signal positive-NPV investment but only region M 0
(Myers and Majluf, 1984, p. 205).
19For example, picture a situation in which the company cannot nd protable investment projects and,
therefore, decides to deposit the money in the bank.
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In case one is still wondering: note that the quote above does not imply that a rm may
never pursue a really goodinvestment opportunity, i.e., one with a high value of b. Such a
situation may well occur. It can cause confusion, however, to understand that going after a
highly protable opportunity is not considered good news. It is good news indeed  but not
at t = 0. The distribution of eB (and eA) is known from t =  1. At that time, the market (and
management) rationally determines the value of the NPV to be its unconditional expected
value B. Hence, all the good news of potentially very lucrative projects is incorporated into
the preannouncement value already. Subsequently, the market value changes relative to that,
depending on the issue-invest decision made at t = 0. Truncating the distribution of eB
at zero means that the market anticipates a protable new project. This positive informa-
tion is reected in the preannouncement price. Thus, when the rm announces an equity
issue, the negative information concerning the overvaluation of assets-in-place overwhelms
any additional positive information about the project(Cooney and Kalay, 1993, p. 156).
2.3.1 SEO announcement returns  evidence from the real world
Stock returns following the announcements of public SEOs in the U.S. have been subject
to vast empirical research. We will now give an overview of the main results. Generally,
(average) negative stock price reactions to a public seasoned equity issue have received broad
empirical support, as predicted by Myers and Majluf (1984). The rst studies on U.S. corpo-
rations from the 1980s and 1990s are nicely surveyed by Smith (1986) and Eckbo and Masulis
(1995).20 Both report average two-day abnormal common stock returns of the order of  3%
for industrial rms. When taking into account utility companies, whose price reaction aver-
ages about  1%, the overall average amounts to  2% (where average is calculated using the
individual sample sizes as weights). Consistent with these ndings, Mikkelson and Partch
(1988) observe that cancellations of previously announced SEOs are followed (on average) by
a signicantly positive valuation e¤ect.
While  3% may seem like a small reduction at rst sight, it really is not. It is important
to remember that this decline applies to the entire (pre-issue) equity market value. Asquith
and Mullins (1986) relate this reduction in dollar value on the announcement day to the
proceeds obtained in the subsequent SEO. They conclude from their sample (N = 121) that,
on average, an amount corresponding to 31% of the funds raised in the SEO is lost. Eckbo et
20Asquith and Mullins (1986), Masulis and Korwar (1986) and Mikkelson and Partch (1986) are frequently
quoted among the rst to empirically investigate the stock price reaction to an SEO. Abnormal returns are
calculated using event study methodology. Two-day abnormal returns usually relate to the day of the public
announcement and the day before.
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al. (2007) report a lower, but still impressive 15%. Since the loss occurs at the announcement,
it obviously comes out of existing shareholderspockets. That is, it represents a real-world
measure of the dilution sustained by original owners when issuing fresh equity. Interestingly
enough, in Asquith and Mullins(1986) sample 6% of the issues involve dilution of more than
100%: the rms market capitalization after the issue is actually lower than before.
More recent results  some of them surveyed by Eckbo et al. (2007)  conrm that the
negative price reaction shown by common equity upon announcement is robust over time.
For example, Heron and Lie (2004), Bethel and Krigman (2008), Lee and Masulis (2009) and
Henry and Koski (2010) all report statistically signicant negative average price reactions in
the range of  2% to  3% for U.S. rms. Heron and Lie (2004, p. 630) conclude: Overall,
the evidence is consistent with the notion that managers make decisions related to equity
o¤erings that maximize the value for existing shareholders.
Note that the smaller market reaction associated with utility o¤erings mentioned above is
not evidence against, but rather in favor of the underinvestment theory. As explained by
Eckbo and Masulis (1995, pp. 1049-50), [T]he investment and nancing decisions of utilities
are highly regulated, and public knowledge of regulatory policy lowers the probability that
a utility announcing a stock o¤er is attempting to take advantage of an informational asym-
metry in the stock market. Consistent with this, Polonchek et al. (1989) report that U.S.
commercial banksstock prices are signicantly depressed upon SEO announcements, but to
a lesser extent than shares of industrial rms. Such weaker reactions are attributed to the
fact that the commercial banking sector is subject to tight regulations (regulatory capital,
leverage ratios, etc.). More evidence along these lines comes from an interesting study by
Cornett and Tehranian (1994), who also examine public common stock issues of commercial
banks. The advantage their sample o¤ers is that roughly half of the 491 issues are executed
involuntarily because regulation authorities mandated them in order to make sure that cer-
tain capital standards would be met. Since management is hardly likely to pursue existing
shareholdersinterests with such o¤erings, they should not convey as much information ac-
cording to our theory. This is how results turn out indeed. While voluntary issues show a
signicantly negative two-day announcement return ( 1:56%) for common stock issues, man-
dated o¤erings show a signicant, but less negative average wealth e¤ect ( 0:64%), where the
di¤erence between the two is statistically signicant.21 Unfortunately, this evidence is not
indisputable. As part of their paper on commercial bank SEOs, Krishnan et al. (2010) redo
21Other types of securities are issued, too. They generally show no signicant two-day abnormal return,
neither in the voluntary nor in the involuntary sub-samples. The fact that we still observe a negative return
of  0:64% should not be too surprising, considering that a mandated issue due to failure to meet capital
standards is probably in itself not the best of signals.
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Cornett and Tehranians (1994) procedure using a sample that is smaller, but encompasses a
longer time span. Both groups are subject to statistically signicant negative announcement
returns, but the di¤erence between the two is not signicant.
Krasker (1986) generalizes Myers and Majlufs (1984) model by endogenizing managements
choice of the equity o¤er size. The author nds that larger issues are associated with greater
price declines. This is consistent with empirical ndings summarized by Eckbo and Masulis
(1995) and Ritter (2003).
Interestingly, the announcement e¤ect becomes signicantly positive when funds are raised
by public rms in a non-public o¤ering (private placements). This is rst reported by Wruck
(1989) and later on conrmed in many studies, as reported by Eckbo et al. (2007).
The picture changes considerably when looking at the rest of the world (where, unlike in
the U.S., rights issues are usually the predominant form of executing an SEO). For example,
Cooney et al. (2003) nd that announcements of public SEOs are accompanied by a signicant
positive stock price reaction in Japan, while Gajewski and Ginglinger (2002) nd a slightly
negative, but insignicant price impact following announcements by French rms. We refer
the interested reader to Eckbo et al. (2007), who survey a great amount of international
studies.
Choe et al. (1993) explicitly consider certain macroeconomic variables and document that
the business cycle has an inuence on the average SEO announcement return in that it turns
out signicantly less negative in economic boom phases. Presumably, there is less uncertainty
associated with issuing equity because investment projects are generally of higher protability
in such periods, prompting investment even by rms of otherwise worse quality. Increased
equity o¤ering behavior is indeed reported during periods of economic upturn.
Supposedly, one possibility to decrease the informational uncertainty/asymmetry associated
with an SEO is to have the issuing rm covered by nancial analysts. Since their job is
to produce information about the company for outside investors, this should hold the more
true the greater the number of analysts in place, provided their information is not contra-
dicting. Consistent with these predictions, DMello and Ferris (2000) nd that the average
(three-day) abnormal return surrounding SEO announcements is signicantly more negative
for those companies covered by a smaller number (below sample median) of analysts. It also
holds true that information of lower quality, as indicated by a higher standard deviation of
analystspredicted earnings, leads to a signicant valuation e¤ect that is more negative than
that of high-consensus o¤erings. Best et al. (2003) conrm these results. Using a sample of
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717 SEOs, they determine that a sub-sample comprised of companies followed by analysts
(N = 560) experiences a signicantly less negative announcement return than its non-covered
counterpart. Korajczyk et al. (1991) provide evidence that rms actively seek to minimize
the degree of informational uncertainty when conducting SEOs. Supposedly, information
asymmetry in the market is low (at least concerning AIPs) after the release of meaningful
corporate information, such as annual reports. The authors rely on quarterly earnings dis-
closure statements as a proxy and nd that SEOs indeed tend to cluster subsequent to these
notications. Consistent with theoretical predictions, price drops are lower the sooner after
the information release the announcement is made.22 Dierkens (1991) also nds evidence of
SEO announcement clustering following earnings releases. Interestingly, rmsinformation
policy may even assume a proactive role: Lang and Lundholm (2000) compare a small sample
of 41 SEO rms and 41 non-SEO rms. They report that, starting six months prior to the
issue announcement, o¤ering companies signicantly increase their information disclosure (to
the extent it is legal) relative to the control sample. With these deliberate actions, rms
presumably aim to bring down the level of asymmetric information by the time the o¤ering
is announced.
Henry and Koski (2010) present evidence on increased (and manipulative) short selling activ-
ity surrounding the actual issue date, while no abnormally high shorting behavior is reported
at the time of the announcement. This implies that market participants generally are not
privately pre-informed about an impending issue notication  a situation that would per-
mit to earn a prot on average by taking advantage of the imminent price decline. Also,
Loughran and Ritter (1995) conclude from an enormous sample of some 3; 700 seasoned eq-
uity issues that a commensurate control sample of non-issuing rms considerably outperforms
SEO rms in the ve-year time window subsequent to the announcement. One interpretation
is that the market lags behind in that it does not fully react to information at the time the
o¤ering is declared. This suggests that announcement returns would actually be a lot more
negative than reported if they capitalized all information at once. However, this new issues
puzzle is solvedby Eckbo et al. (2000), who show that the underperformance assertion
cannot be upheld once correctly adjusting the di¤erences in risk between SEO and non-SEO
rms in the econometric process leading to Loughran and Ritters (1995) results. We advise
the interested reader that there exist alternative theories that also provide solutions to the
puzzle. In addition to advancing their own proposal, an overview is provided by Lyandres et
22The same authors one year later formalize these results in a dynamic model of time-varying asymmetric
information. Even though deferring is costly, good rms will nd it optimal to postpone SEOs until after the
next information event, when the asymmetry about AIPs has dissolved. See Korajczyk et al. (1992).
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al. (2005).
As noted by Myers and Majluf (1984, p. 195, fn. 5), a rights issue, an alternative mode of
issuing fresh equity, has the potential to completely solve the underinvestment problem. When
every existing stockholder makes use of his (temporarily) certied right to acquire a pro rata
share of the new issue, and holds it subsequently, there e¤ectively will be no new shareholders
to whom value could be transferred. Accordingly, asymmetric information would not pose a
threat to reaching status quo in the model.23 Of course, this is likely to be impractical in
real life. Some owners may not have the nancial means or may follow a portfolio strategy
that does not support the purchase. Nevertheless, Eckbo et al. (2007) report that various
studies indicate that, in the rare event of an announcement of an uninsured rights issue in
the U.S., the price reaction is neutral, while shares on average display a slightly negative
performance (signicant abnormal return of around  1%) when the market placement is
guaranteed (insured) by an underwriter. Gebhardt et al. (2001) report an average two-day
announcement e¤ect for German rights issues that is not signicantly di¤erent from zero. On
the other hand, Eckbo and Masulis (1995) state that stock prices outside the U.S. usually
react positively to rights issues.
Finally, note that the nding of negative announcement e¤ects of SEOs in the U.S. is not a
trivial result, for there are theories that would justify positive valuation e¤ects (wait for the
next section). One example is the frequently quoted static tradeo¤theory, cf. Scott (1976)
or Myers (1984): management sets the level of corporate debt to strike the optimal balance
between its benets (tax shields) and costs (of nancial distress/bankruptcy). By implication,
there is a non-excessive target debt ratio in place. Such ratios have indeed been found for
some rms in surveys conducted by Graham and Harvey (2001), albeit with di¤ering degrees
of strictness. Thus, in a situation where a rms leverage ratio is too high, an equity issue
should be received as good news. It should be met with a positive price reaction as it
moves the rm closer to its value-maximizing target debt ratio, cf. Myers (1993). We now
return to the model.
23Wu and Wang (2007) reintroduce this threat by considering asymmetric information surrounding private
benets of control in a setting where a rights issue is the selected mode of nancing. The paper also sheds
some light on the low popularity of rights issues in the U.S., unlike in European markets. See also Eckbo
and Masulis (1992) for a model on the choice of the equity otation method in the presence of asymmetric
information, where old shareholdersparticipation rate in a rights issue has informational content.
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2.4 One small change in the assumptions, one big change in the outcome
To be fair, the negative share price reaction in the model critically depends on the assumption
that negative values of b are ruled out. Overstating it a little, b  0 is similar to assuming
that management is awless, perfectly able to lter out any bad investment opportunity and,
thus, capable of presenting only worthwhile investment projects to shareholders. It is easy to
argue that the assumption is unrealistic. Obviously, even highly qualied corporate managers
make bad decisions in real life, resulting in the execution of a project that turns out to be
bad, i.e., has negative NPV. Why else would there be bankruptcy codes all over the developed
world? Therefore, it is fair to ask how the share price behaves when there are not only good
investment projects, but bad ones, too.
This is exactly the question posed by Cooney and Kalay (1993) in a direct extension of
the underinvestment model.24 Assumptions are exactly the same as above, short of one
exclusion: in addition to zero and positive NPVs, we also allow for negative NPVs. Given this
modication, we basically redo section 1.2 in the following and ask once again how the stock
price will change in reaction to an announcement of an equity issue. Note that the equations
we have established in prior sections remain unchanged in appearance. For example, the
issue-invest decision is still represented by inequality (2.4). Market and intrinsic values, too,
present themselves in the same manner as before. The only distinction is that eB may take
on negative values in all these equations, and then ask ourselves: what are the consequences
for the outcome of the model? Graphically, the di¤erence to Myers and Majluf (1984) is that
regions M 0 and M become bigger in size. Now, they also expand into the second quadrant.
Figure 2.2 follows Cooney and Kalay (1993) and displays the new scenario accordingly.
Since negative NPVs are present, the shaded, triangle-shaped area in Figure 2.1, which is
denoted by M 0S in Figure 2.2, is not excluded from M
0 anymore such that we have M 0S M 0.
It has become part of the (new) issue-and-invest-regionM 0, represented by the lightly shaded
area in Figure 2.2. Evidently, in addition to underinvesting (region M), managers may be
put in a situation where they decide to issue new shares despite knowing that the project has
negative NPV. This happens when the value of the AIP is relatively low (0  a < P 0 C) and
NPV is slightly negative, causing the (a; b)-combination to fall into subregion M 0S . Notably,
this means that management deliberately goes after an investment project that it knows has
negative NPV, reducing overall rm value. Given we dened not taking on a worthwhile
24Myers and Majluf (1984, fn. 12, p. 203-04) briey touch on this issue themselves, but in a slightly di¤erent
manner: they raise the possibility of incurring issue costs when selling the new equity. If these costs exceed
the projects non-negative NPV, then e¤ectively it becomes negative. The authors acknowledge that P 0 < P
cannot be guaranteed in that case, but do not pursue this issue any further. Instead, they assume that the
mentioned costs are of second order.
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Figure 2.2: The Issue-Invest Decision at t = 0 When Allowing for Negative NPVs
investment opportunity as underinvestment, this means that over investment may occur in
the presence of negative NPVs.25
Before we continue to investigate the circumstances under which overinvestment will arise,
let us provide some intuition right way: at rst, it may sound uncommon to learn that man-
agement will deliberately invest in a value-destroying project  just as it sounds uncommon
not to invest in a value-creating project. The bottom line is, once again, that management
is solely concerned with the maximization of the old ownerswealth. Its actions are (still)
guided by the decision rule in (2.4), i.e., EP 0+E (C + a)  P
0
P 0+E (E + b). Thus, when manage-
ment opts for overinvestment, this is because it is benecial to old shareholders.26 From the
inequality, the condition for the rm to issue and invest can be satised for negative values
of b: a needs to be relatively small in that the (a; b)-combination falls into subregion M 0S .
There, managers will take advantage of the low true value of the AIP and sell part of the old
rm for more than it is really worth. The simultaneous loss from investing in a project with
25See De Meza and Webb (1987) for another model dealing with overinvestment in the presence of asym-
metric information, where di¤erent projects have di¤erent expected returns.
26Stulz (1990) presents a model of asymmetric information where the assumption of compliant management
is dropped, and costly overinvestment happens out of self-interest of managers who derive utility from any
kind of investment (while not owning any stocks themselves). Constantly claiming to be in need of external
funds to nance new investments, management is condemned as untrustworthy by shareholders, leading to
underinvestment because good opportunities nd no nancing when internal funds are indeed too low. Debt
nancing is benecial for battling overinvestment because it generally makes less funds available to manage-
ment as it requires payouts (coupon payments); this is the same argument as in Jensens (1986) famous free
cash ow theory. At the same time, it exacerbates underinvestment. The converse logic holds true for equity.
The authors then derive the rm-value-maximizing nancing policy. See McConnell and Servaes (1995) for
some empirical insights in this regard, such as the twofold e¤ect of leverage.
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negative NPV is justied by selling shares that certify ownership to an AIP that should be
worth less. Note that this rationale will only work as long as NPV is not getting too negative
(for a given a in M 0S). For if it were, we would move out of the issue-region M
0 in the gure
(into region MS), since the loss from investing would dominate. In that circumstance, the
interpretation is simple and straightforward: the rm does not want to undertake a project
whose NPV is strongly negative.
Likewise, region M , where the rm decides not to issue and invest, expands to the entire
area below the a-axis, with the exception of subregion M 0S (which includes the indi¤erence
line). The crucial point is that (a; b)-combinations may appear anywhere in the second
quadrant now. Note that this includes the heavily shaded area labeled MS (MS M). The
consequence is that, unlike in the previous section, A (M) is not necessarily greater than
P 0   C (the intersection of the indi¤erence line and the a-axis).27 For it to be smaller, the
heavily shaded subregion MS comes into play. If the joint probability density function of eA; eB is constructed such that there is enough probability mass on realizations in MS , an
area where the AIP takes on quite low values and NPVs are even more negative than in M 0S ,
then it will follow that A (M)  P 0   C holds true for the expected value of AIPs in the
no-issue region M . As MS  M , this statement signies that there must be a substantial
probability that the rm will decide not to issue. If, on the other hand, there is su¢ cient
probability mass on realizations in the remainder of regionM , then A (M) > P 0 C prevails.
As shown in section 1.3, it results from equation (2.7) that P 0 < P is implied by P 0   C <
A (M). Accordingly, P 0 > P , i.e., a positive stock price reaction, follows from P 0 C > A (M)
(and P 0 = P for P 0 C = A (M)).28 As we just mentioned that we cannot exclude the latter
case any more (depending on the joint distribution function), we cannot exclude P 0 > P at
t = 0 any more either. An announcement to issue new equity may increase share price. This
is the novelty introduced by Cooney and Kalay (1993).29
27 In the words used in the last section: region M does not commence to the right of a = P 0  C any
longer, but also includes lower values of a (those of the (a; b)-combinations in MS).
28 In addition to the joint probability density function of
 eA; eB, whether P 0 C < A (M) or P 0 C > A (M)
applies also depends on the cash C and the size of the equity issue E. The former is obvious from the two
inequations above. The latter is true because E (besides C) helps to establish the indi¤erence line, which is
responsible for the partition of space into the areas M 0 and M , cf. equation (2.5).
29We have made it clear that the stock price at t = 0 may be greater with an issue than without, i.e.,
P 0 > P , when the distribution of eB is not truncated at zero. Cooney and Kalay (1993) go one step further
and explicitly model the price change from period t =  1 to t = 0 conditional on the issue-invest decision.
Denote the market value of old shares at t =  1 by Pb and the (known) probabilities of (a; b) falling into
M 0 and M by is and no, respectively. As there are no other regions, we have is + no = 1. Accordingly,
market value at t =  1 is given by Pb = isP 0 + noP (remember that the interest rate is zero and agents
are assumed risk-neutral). Since Pb is merely the weighted average of the (positive) potential market values
at t = 0, it follows that P 0 > Pb if, and only if, P 0 > P , which we have just shown to be feasible in the current
setup. In other words, in case the share price at t = 0 is greater with an issue announcement (P 0 > P ), then
the share price is also greater after the announcement than before it (P 0 > Pb). For the model as considered
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Intuitively, when the probability of (a; b) in MS is high, the market will perceive the decision
not to issue as bad news, reasoning that the AIP will (likely) have little value and NPV
will (probably) be highly negative  a rather bad combination of a and b. Therefore, if the
rm should indeed decide to issue new shares in this situation, the announcement will be
received as good news because it tells investors that the NPV will be positive or at least not
as negative as originally imagined, causing stock price to rise. Thus, the announcement of an
equity issue need not necessarily be bad news any more.
Depending on the joint probability of ( eA; eB), it may be the case that the rm now chooses
not to issue precisely because it faces a bad combination of a and b. In other words, it might
simply decide not to pursue a bad investment project (which it signals to the market via the
decision to go without an issue). This most straightforward interpretation of not investing
becomes possible because region M contains negative realizations of eB in this model setup.
From Figure 4.2, with the exception of subregionM 0S , where overinvestment occurs, managers
will never pursue the investment project when its NPV is negative.
We have explored the circumstances under which an issue announcement will boost the
stocks value. Conversely, share price when issuing will still be lower than its counterpart,
i.e., P 0 < P , when P 0   C < A (M). This happens either when NPV is non-negative, as in
Myers and Majluf (1984), or, in the presence of value-destroying projects, when there is not
enough probability mass in subregion MS . Overall, the value of old equity may fall, rise or
stay unchanged (P 0 = P ) following an announcement to issue new stock if bad investment
opportunities are present.
In yet another direct extension of Myers and Majlufs (1984) framework, Wu and Wang
(2005) not only build on Cooney and Kalays (1993) model by dropping the convention
of solely having non-negative NPVs, but furthermore allow managers to be self-interested.
That is, another assumption essential to the results of the original underinvestment model
is discarded, namely the perfect alignment between original shareholdersand managements
interests. This is accomplished by adopting managerial stockholdings (insider ownership)
and introducing private benets of control, which accrue to management whenever it (issues
and) invests in a new project. As opposed to maximizing old shareholdersvalue, the objec-
tive function now envisages the maximization of managements own wealth, composed of both
the value of their stockholdings and the private benets of control.30 The equivalent of the
by Myers and Majluf (1984), this implies that share price also decreases relative to its pre-announcement value
in response to a statement to issue and invest. Note that this pre-announcement value Pb will generally not
coincide with the one calculated under Myers and Majlufs (1984) framework because here we allow for b < 0.
30Dyck and Zingales (2004) present an international comparison of private benets of control in 39 countries.
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issue-condition (2.4), which now states that (managerspersonal) wealth must not decrease
if an issue is to take place, is given by w (C + a)  w P 0P 0+E (E + C + a+ b  c) + c. Here, w
represents insider ownership, i.e., the percentage of old shares held by management, while c
stands for the dollar amount of the control benets. The benets accrue in full to manage-
ment, but at the same time lower their (and everybody elses) share value as a consequence of
the socially irresponsible handling of corporate resources. Consistent with Cooney and Kalay
(1993), both over- and underinvestment may occur in this setup. Notably, overinvestment
will not be excessive: yes, investment in a negative-NPV project is favorable for management
through private benets, but at the same time it may decrease their claimholdingsworth.
Generally, insider ownership and benets of control each have a conicting impact in the
model: when managers own a larger percentage of shares (ceteris paribus), their wealth is
more sensitive to adverse stock price movements. This reduces overinvestment while exacer-
bating underinvestment.31 When private benets are larger in turn, managements incentives
to invest are increased, prompting more overinvestment, but less underinvestment.
An interesting alternative explanation of overinvestment comes from the eld of behavioral -
nance. Malmendier and Tates (2005) model attributes such behavior to CEOs who overassess
their own capabilities. As a consequence of their overcondence, CEOs ascribe higher returns
to investment projects than the market. On the one hand, this leads them to overinvest when
su¢ cient internal funds are readily available. On the other, they refrain from raising capital
externally because they think its o¤er price is too low. The authors nd empirical support
for their model, where overcondence is measured in relation to the duration of managerial
stock (option) holdings.
This concludes the excursion to the eld of negative NPVs and overinvestment in the context
of Myers and Majlufs (1984) model. Let us now return to the original theory, i.e., back to
b  0, and explore alternative modes of nancing.
Generally, the better a countrys (legal) institutions, the lower the level of private benets. Such benets
accrue to management when it exploits its control over corporate resources such that it (exclusively) enjoys
advantages. One type, which may take on many di¤erent forms, is self-dealing, cf. Djankov et al. (2008); a
classic example is management awarding a possibly overpriced contract to a rm it (partly) owns. Tunneling
is a closely related pattern, occurring when corporate resources are expropriated from the rm and transferred
to managers/controlling shareholders. It ranges from outright theft to selling corporate assets or products to
management at below-market prices, cf. Johnson et al. (2000). Zingales (1994) presents an empirical study
on corporations in Italy. There, private benets of control are tremendous, translating into a huge trading
premium (82% on average) enjoyed by voting shares.
31See, e.g., Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell et al. (2008) for empirical examinations of the relationship
between insider ownership and corporate value. These studies nd that such stockholdings can be value-
increasing up to a point, beyond which rm value diminishes with increasing insider ownership.
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2.5 Debt nancing
So far, we have exclusively considered issuing new shares as a means of externally nancing
the investment opportunity. We have neglected the possibility of nancing through a debt
issue. This changes now. As we will see, model results will not remain una¤ected. Denote
the debt counterpart of E by D (= I   C). To illustrate the advantages of debt, let us rst
compare the two modes of nancing separately. Suppose that the rm publicly decides on
one of the two sourcing policies in the rst period, and sticks to it subsequently.
Starting with equity, let us slightly rewrite the true value of the old shares when issuing at
t = 0, cf. (2.2). Myers and Majluf (1984, p. 207) state it as: V oldissue = E + C + a + b   E1,
with E1 (known to management at t = 0) denoting the market value of the new shares at
t = 1, i.e., after the transfer of value has occurred. Remember that there is no informational
asymmetry at the nal date: outside investors have learned a and b, which is why the market
value of the new shares equals their true value at t = 1. The new equation merely presents
the true value of old shares in a slightly di¤erent manner. While the initial equation (2.2)
states that old shareholders own part ( P
0
P 0+E ) of the entire rms true value (E +C + a+ b),
the new equation states that old shareholders own the entire rms true worth minus the
value of new equity, which, by assumption, is not theirs.
There is, however, a minor redundancy in writing out the new equation in the way done by
the authors: introducing the term E1 is unnecessary, given that Myers and Majluf (1984, p.
192) dene the true value of new shares by V new, cf. equation (2.3), in their paper. The two
notations in fact are one and the same. To prove this, we simply equate the expressions for
the true value V oldissue such that E+C + a+ b E1 = P
0
P 0+E (E + C + a+ b), and solve for E1.
This yields E1 = EP 0+E (E + C + a+ b). By (2.3), the right-hand side describes V
new and,
thus, the true value of new shares. Therefore, E1 = V new.
Given an issue-announcement, dene by E  V new   E the actual change in the value of
new equity from t = 0 to t = 1 (recall that there is no discounting). E may be positive
or negative, i.e., outside investors may realize a capital gain or loss at t = 1, depending
on whether the shares are under- or overvalued, respectively, when issued at t = 0. Such
misvaluations may take place in any particular issue. However, the market expects E to be
zero in equilibrium, so that the purchase of the new stock has an expected NPV of zero to
new shareholders. Original ownersintrinsic value becomes V oldissue = C + a+ b E, and the
issue-no-issue decision, V oldno issue  V oldissue, is given by C + a  C + a+ b E. Accordingly,
the rm will opt for investment if b  E. The NPV must not be smaller than the new
shareholders capital gain (or loss). In other words, the maximum amount of new shares
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undervaluation that old stockholders are willing to tolerate in an o¤ering is b. Intuitively, old
shareholders, who are in charge, want a piece of the pie, too. Hence, project NPV must at
least su¢ ce to balance the new co-ownersrealized capital gain such that some non-negative
amount is left over for the original owners. Obviously, this is always the case when an SEO
is overvalued: the ensuing capital loss to new shareholders, i.e., E < 0, causes b  E to
be satised as b  0 per assumption. This is consistent with the statement that the rm
always wants to issue overvalued shares and, thus, take advantage of the market. Recall that
mispricing does not a¤ect the intrinsic value of the rm, which increases by E + b if the rm
decides to issue, but instead causes a transfer of wealth from one group of shareholders to
the other. In case of an overvaluation, it follows from V oldissue = C + a + b   E that old
shareholders not only receive the projects NPV in full, but on top of that benet from a
transfer of value from new shareholders, cf. fn. 15. This implies that the portion of the rise
in rm value going to old shareholders when investing amounts to an absolute value greater
than b. Note that, since NPVs are non-negative per assumption, shares that are fairly priced
ex-post (E = 0) prompt an issue, too. Buying shares in this case turns out to be a zero-
NPV investment to outsiders: the entire NPV (but no more) goes to the holders of the old
shares, whose value becomes V oldissue = C + a+ b. Given E > 0, the investment decision is,
as already mentioned, dependent on whether the size of the NPV is big enough to outweigh
the capital gain to new shareholders.32
Now, consider debt nancing. Assume all other things equal, except that bonds must be issued
instead of new shares to nance the investment project. Following the same reasoning as
above, denote by D1 the true/market value of debt at t = 1 (when the information asymmetry
has dissolved). The capital gain or loss put into e¤ect at t = 1 is labeled D  D1   D
accordingly, where D is the amount raised in the debt issue. In order to compare the two
nancing policies, we merely substitute debt for equity in the equations such that the true
value of the original equity is V oldissue = D + C + a + b   D1, i.e., the true rm value less
the intrinsic value of debt. Hence, management will issue and invest in the project if the
inequality b  D is satised.
At this point, we have the means to come back to a statement made at the beginning. Risk-
free debt should be included in the internal funds C along with cash. When debt is riskless,
its price is not subject to uctuations as it is not threatened by default. In other words,
32Cadsby et al. (1990) develop a modied, game theoretic version of Myers and Majluf (1984), where two
types of rms exist and auctions decide over which investor gets to nance a project. The authors examine
the model predictions by playing the sequential game in an experimental setting with various participants.
One group of participants (rms) rst decides on investment, the other (investors) then engages in the
bidding process for the right to nance.
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given no discounting for time value, D is always zero when debt is risk-free. Since b  0,
b  D holds true at all times, and the rm reaches status quo due to the fact that it always
issues and invests with riskless securities. The value of risk-free debt is not a¤ected by private
information. This is the same result as obtained when nancing entirely with cash. Provided
that the rm has enough internal funds at hand, it does not need to issue any kind of risky
security, but will rather take on every worthwhile project, for the entire NPV goes to the old
(and only) shareholders. In this case, we are back to the classical paradigm of investing in
every non-negative-NPV project. Cash and risk-free debt can be used interchangeably, and
the capacity to issue riskless debt should count towards nancial slack.
Therefore, we consider risky debt in what follows. In other words, the company is assumed
to face the risk of not being able to pay back its debtholders. Like E, the change in debt
value may be negative, zero or positive, but is expected to be zero as it is the equilibrium
value. Clearly, one is tempted to conclude that, since we merely alter denomination, the rm
will take on or not take on the very same projects irrespective of equity or debt nancing.
This conclusion is wrong.
There is one major di¤erence between equity and debt. It holds true that D will always
show the same mathematical sign as E, but it will at all times be less in absolute values
such that it holds true that jEj > jDj. This is a well-known result from option pricing
theory. Myers and Majluf (1984) refer to Galai and Masulis (1976) for a rigorous explanation
of the underlying options theory. For example, as pointed out by Myers (1984, p. 584), one
requirement implicitly imposed hereby on the model is that changes in corporate value follow
a lognormal distribution and that all actors agree on its variance. A quote by Frank and
Goyal (2003, p. 220) should help to clarify: [E]quity is subject to serious adverse selection
problems while debt has only a minor adverse selection problem. From the point of view of
an outside investor, equity is strictly riskier than debt. Both have an adverse selection risk
premium, but that premium is large on equity. Therefore, an outside investor will demand a
higher rate of return on equity than on debt. Corporate public debt will always be under-
or overvalued when equity is under- or overvalued, respectively, but it will be less so because
it is a safer security than equity; residual claims are exhausted rst in case of an adverse
shock to rm value because they are least senior and, thus, more prone to new information.
Eckbo et al. (2007) add that, by virtue of being a xed claim, cash ows of a straight debt
security are more easily predictable (plus they usually recover some value in case of default).
This is why debt with almost absolute certainty carries less potential for misvaluation and,
thus, underinvestment.
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It follows from the logic applied in the case of equity that the rm will always invest when
debt is either overvalued or correctly priced (D  0) because b  0 per assumption. It gets
interesting when comparing capital gains of newly issued equity and debt securities. Given
the rm issues equity in such a situation, it follows from b  E that b > D (asE > D).
Whenever equity leads to investment, debt does so, too. What if b  D ? Then, equity
need not necessarily lead to an issue because D  b < E is possible. Assuming at least
one such b exists, we will have a situation in which debt is issued, but equity not. Public
debt thus leads to a lower expected underinvestment loss in rm value relative to status quo.
That is, debt always enjoys an advantage over equity as a source of nancing. Generally,
more projects are funded when debt is the security of choice.
Remember, however, that up to now we have assumed that the rm publicly pre-commits
at t =  1 to one of the two modes of nancing. What if it does not, but instead only
decides at t = 0 which type of security to o¤er? Here is the (seemingly) perfect solution for
management: in case a new issue has to be sold for less than it is worth, the rm should
always use debt. Its lower undervaluation leads to less dilution of existing shareholdersclaims
and, accordingly, to a lower capital gain for the new claimholders. Management will never
issue equity voluntarily when its value is too low. On the other hand, since equity is always
more overpriced, managers should issue shares in case of overvaluation, for they can snatch
more wealth from the new shareholders. Unfortunately, this only sounds like a perfect plan
if one were to think that the market is stupid. Given that outsiders are rational, they will
foresee managements reasoning.33 Hence, every time an SEO is announced, the market will
instantly know that management is trying to take advantage. As a consequence, outsiders
are unwilling to invest in the company, forcing managers to issue debt instead.
Thus, regardless of whether the rm precommits or not, the (somewhat extreme) result of
the model is that if investment takes place, it is always funded by debt. Equity is never
raised again after the initial public o¤ering [IPO]. These results, coupled with the insights of
his 1984 paper, lead Stewart Myers to the formulation of a preference hierarchy of nancial
instruments to be used in funding investments, called the pecking ordertheory of corporate
nancing.
Before we set forth the pecking order in detail, however, let us rst review the empirical
evidence on the implication of Myers and Majlufs (1984) model that the announcement of
a debt issue must lead to a less harsh stock price response compared to an SEO, since debt
33The market may not be as rational in identifying overpriced shares in reality. Baker and Wurgler (2002)
derive a very simple and appealing theory of corporate capital structure based on their econometric ndings
about rmsnancing behavior. They state that capital structure is no more than ...the cumulative outcome
of past attempts to time the equity market(Baker and Wurgler, 2002, p. 29).
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carries less risk of being overvalued and, thus, leads to more e¢ cient nancing.
2.5.1 The impact of new debt on share prices
As the price decline upon the announcement of a seasoned o¤ering is predicted to increase
with the securitys sensitivity to asymmetric information by the pecking order, we expect it
to be less severe for straight debt issues than for SEOs. Consistent with the theory, such
o¤erings are indeed greeted with a less painful reaction by capital markets on average. That
is, if there is one at all. We begin with Eckbo et al. (2007), who provide an excellent
summary of some of the existing evidence. Out of the nine studies reviewed, merely two,
namely Dann and Mikkelson (1984) and Howton et al. (1998), show average abnormal returns
that are signicantly negative. This, however, is not to be interpreted as evidence against
the lower informational content of straight debt: the values are a mere  0:37% and  0:50%,
respectively. The remaining studies cannot verify that announcement returns are signicantly
di¤erent from zero. While most present low negative price reactions, Johnson (1995) even
reports a slightly positive average e¤ect (a sub-sample even shows a signicant positive price
reaction). The calculated sample-weighted average abnormal return over all nine studies is
insignicant and comes to  0:22%. Smith (1986) arrives at qualitatively similar conclusions
in his survey paper.34
A look at junk bonds should be interesting, too. Presumably, because lower rated bonds
carry more risk, they should be more prone to mispricing and, thus, accompanied by a more
negative announcement e¤ect compared to their investment grade counterparts. Yet evidence
is mixed. Shyam-Sunder (1991) nds no signicant average stock price reaction for straight
debt issues for her entire sample ( 0:11%), and these results do not change signicantly
when focusing at the low-grade bond issues only. Eckbo (1986) reports similar ndings for
his sample. Consistent with this, Castillo (2001), who looks at junk bonds exclusively, nds
no average two-day abnormal return signicantly di¤erent from zero ( 0:28%). By contrast,
Pilotte (1992) reports a signicant negative wealth e¤ect for below-investment-grade debt,
suggesting that the drop in share price indeed depends on the bonds risk. Yet the e¤ect is
still a lot smaller than for fresh equity. Thus, the result remains that debt leads to a lower
fall in stock price.
What is more, Smith (1986), among others, addresses an important concern that could other-
34Results are not always consistent in international data, which naturally receive less attention. For example,
Verona Martel and García Padrón (2006) report statistically signicant positive announcement e¤ects for the
Spanish market, and name other studies that all come to similar conclusions. Christensen et al. (1996) nd
that there is no wealth e¤ect for Japanese straight debt o¤erings.
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wise be raised as a point of criticism against the quality of the valuation results just presented:
debt issues are predictable to some degree. Just think of maturing bonds that need to be
rolled over. More precisely, certain preannouncement rm characteristics, such as earnings
and investment growth, give away an impending debt issue to some extent, cf. Chaplinsky
and Hansen (1993). Marsh (1982) is one of the rst to formally provide a theoretical basis
for issue prediction by constructing a descriptive (logit) model of a rms nancing choice
between new equity and debt from a sample of nearly 750 o¤erings of these two types of secu-
rities. Since the (two-day) abnormal announcement return captures only the unanticipated
part of the entire price change caused by the issue, it is conceivable that announcemenmt ef-
fects only appear so small and/or insignicant for debt issues because the market has already
capitalized the remainder prior to the issue notice as it has expected it. Put di¤erently,
the claim is that the announcement e¤ect is inversely related to the degree of anticipation of
the issue.35
For all we know, this does not seem to be the case. First, Bayless and Chaplinsky (1991)
try to directly test for anticipation, building on Marshs (1982) model. They assign each
of the security-o¤ering public rms in their sample (252 debt and 223 equity issues in the
U.S.) with a probability of using debt or equity in the issue. Presumably, if investors really
anticipate the security issue and the type of nancing instrument used, we should observe
announcement e¤ects of equity and debt that are more negative than usually reported once
controlling for investorsbelieves. One way of doing so is to focus on those issues which show
a high probability of one type of security being issued, but where the other one is actually
announced and chosen. For these unanticipated o¤erings, the informational content should
be fully reected in the abnormal return. Unexpected SEOs indeed show a more negative
two-day announcement return ( 3:5% versus  2:9% for all equity issues in the sample),
while expected SEOs experience a less negative e¤ect. Looking at unexpected debt o¤erings,
35Bayless (1994) uses Marshs (1982) model to control for anticipation and reassesses the announcement
impact using a sample of 826 public debt and equity o¤erings. First, the model is used to provide each
individual issue in the sample with a likelihood of using debt as the security of choice (the accuracy rate of the
logit model is 70% for debt and 83% for equity). Second, the cumulative two-day abnormal return of SEOs in
the sample is regressed on this probability along with two dummy variables, one denoting the use of debt and
the other indicating whether a rm has ever issued new securities prior to the current o¤ering. The intuition
for the latter variable is that the market infers information from experiences with prior o¤erings such that for
rst-time issuers the informational insecurity should be the largest, leading to a more extreme valuation e¤ect
(Carter, 1992, provides evidence from underwritten IPOs that low-risk rms show an increased likelihood and
predictability of future o¤erings). Controlling for the anticipation of the type of security issued, rst-time-ever
SEOs lead to an announcement e¤ect that is 4:15 percentage points more negative than that of new debt.
Importantly, the di¤erence in valuation e¤ects for equity and debt is 2:88 percentage points when looking at
non-rst-time issuers only, akin to those of Smith (1986) and Eckbo et al. (2007). The di¤erence between these
two sub-samples is statistically signicant. Note that the valuation e¤ect of debt is hardly a¤ected by prior
o¤erings, further supporting that debt issues have little information content. First-time SEOs are subject to
a harsher announcement e¤ect than subsequent ones.
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however, matters become puzzling. When rms identied as having a high probability of
o¤ering equity issue debt instead, a signicantly positive announcement return of 1% is
observed (all debt issues together yield an insignicant 0:1%). Bayless and Chaplinsky (1991,
p. 213) themselves note that this is ...di¢ cult to explain unless debt issues convey good news
relative to equity issues. While it holds true, according to Myers and Majluf (1984), that debt
is relatively better than equity, we should still observe a (signicantly) negative price reaction
upon announcement because the debt carries risk of overpricing, albeit to a lower extent.
More conclusive evidence comes from Eckbo (1986), who segments 552 straight debt issues
into sub-samples according to the use their proceeds are put to (renancing debt, investment
or unspecied). Generally, a straight debt o¤ering intended to raise funds for investment
purposes is less predictable than a simple roll-over because the maturity structure of the
bond already in place is public knowledge. Consequently, if anticipation really matters, we
should observe a more negative two-day announcement return when investment is the stated
purpose. Though, except for a small investment-sub-sample of o¤erings by public utilities,
neither one of the three stated purposes is associated with a signicant valuation e¤ect for
any of the sub-samples. The observed announcement returns of straight debt thus do not
seem to be inuenced by (the degree of) anticipation. Somewhat ambiguous evidence along
these lines comes from Chaplinsky and Hansen (1993), who, akin to Eckbo (1986), group
bonds into four sub-samples corresponding to their respective purpose of nancing stated in
the issue notice. Those bonds whose purpose is not specied(about a quarter of the entire
sample) display a signicant two-day abnormal return. The argument goes that these rms
are most concerned about information leaking prior to the issue announcement, for otherwise
they could have stated their intent right away. Consequently, a signicant price decline is
consistent as the market cannot have (easily) anticipated the o¤ering. On the other hand, the
size of the valuation e¤ect still is only  0:6%, well below returns caused by SEOs. Besides,
it seems fair to question why the return for the sub-sample investmentis insignicant and
positive (the other two categories are devoted to roll-overs): given a rm is dependent on
external funding to nance a protable investment, it is reasonable that, considering such
opportunities usually are both short-lived and valuable in the hands of competitors, the rm
is anxious for non-disclosure, too. If anticipation really mattered, we would thus expect a
(signicantly) negative valuation e¤ect. Finally, Shyam-Sunder (1991) checks for e¤ects of
anticipation by looking at trading periods starting as early as 60 days prior to the issue notice,
but does not nd evidence of signicant abnormal returns and, thus, premature disclosure of
information during this time span.
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Eckbo et al. (2007) arrive at the conclusion that the greater part of the evidence, though
not fully unambiguous, suggests that partial anticipation does not signicantly bias reported
results on the announcement e¤ect of fresh debt.
A word of caution is in order at this point: Myers and Majlufs (1984) theory extremely well
explains observed stock price behavior upon equity and debt issue announcements. However,
it is certainly not the only theory of debt versus equity in the presence of asymmetric in-
formation. In his famous paper, Ross (1977) presents a model in which good rms signal
their quality by the use of debt, for they do not face a high probability of bankruptcy. Klein
et al. (2002) provide an overview of di¤erent models and empirical results concerning the
choice between debt and equity when insiders are better informed.36 We now come to the
formulation of the pecking order of corporate nancing
2.6 Pecking order
In a strict interpretation, rms will rst exhaust internal funds (cash built up by retaining
earnings, followed by riskless debt) to nance an investment opportunity, since there is no
potential for dilution of existing claims caused by asymmetric information. When these funds
are exhausted, the company will start to make use of external nancing with risky securities.
In doing so, it will rst issue risky debt claims, securities that are less sensitive to private
information. Only when the corporate debt capacity is fully used up, the company will
issue new equity, as a last resort so to speak.37
The mentioned capacity for debt was introduced by Myers (1984) to put into perspective the
extreme result that a company will never again issue shares after going public initially. Think
of elevated costs of nancial distress that preclude yet another increase in liabilities, giving
rise to equity.38 As noted by Frank and Goyal (2008, p. 151), there is no clear-cut denition
36For example, Narayanan (1988) examines this choice in a setting with a continuum of rm types where
external funds are needed to nance a possibly protable investment. The informational asymmetry solely
pertains to the investment project. While rm types di¤er in their investments quality, outsiders cannot
discriminate between them initially: lemon rm types are present, which makes the investment risky to
outsiders. In conclusion, debt is always preferred to equity. The reason is that risky debt, being a xed claim,
is less preferable to bad rms due to the risk of bankruptcy. Hence, protable rms signal their quality by the
use of debt, which, to bad rms, acts as an entry barrier into the market. This in turn increases the average
quality and, thus, value of the remaining corporations. This holds true despite the survival of a few lemons
in equilibrium: some otherwise unprotable rms may end up making expected prots due to overvaluation.
Equity is never issued in the model.
37Donaldson (1961, 1984) early on presents evidence from extensive case studies on large corporations and
nds corporate nancing behavior akin to the pecking order. He does not provide a formalized theory.
38 If you are thinking that the issue of new stock in such a situation, where the rm has no choice other than
equity, should act as a positive (pricing) signal, think again! First and foremost, the fact that the company
all of a sudden switches to equity tells the market that it is in bad shape because management apparently is
seriously concerned about nancial distress.
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of the debt capacity in the literature, which makes it harder to validate the theory empirically.
Myers (1984) also addresses the issue of cash dividends, which the underinvestment model
does not consider at all (nor does it explain why a rm should pay them in the rst place).
Given the existence of dividends, one prediction that we can make is that their payout ratio
should be inversely related to investment and positively so to protability: dividends use
up valuable internal funds that could otherwise be used for nancing new projects without
incurring problems of asymmetric information. Regarding protability, successful companies
should be able to pay more dividends simply because they have enough cash to do so. Indeed,
Fama and French (2002) report supporting evidence for these two assertions in their regression
analysis. However, as explained by the authors, these ndings cannot unambiguously be
attributed to the pecking order, for they are also consistent with the tradeo¤ theory of
corporate nancing. Nevertheless, Myers (1984) postulates that rms adapt their payout
ratios to suit investments. Importantly, this is done at a slow pacesuch that dividends are
sticky. Myers (1984) does not explain his reasoning though it is backed by empirical evidence,
cf. Fama (1974) and Fama and French (2002). An implication is that dividends will not be
adjusted at short notice to provide more or less cash for countering short-term variability in
investment opportunities.
Another issue we have not spoken about is nancial innovation. Fine, we have considered
equity and debt, but what about a hybrid security such as convertible debt which features
characteristics of both (putting it in between the two in terms of sensitivity to private infor-
mation)? In simplied terms, a convertible bond consists of a regular bond and a warrant,
i.e., a call option written by the company on new stock exercisable at any time prior to the
maturity of the bond. Upon exercise, investors make use of their right and exchange debt
for equity according to a predened conversion ratio (which denes the conversion price, the
equivalent to the strike price of an option). Typically, after an initial protection period, such
bonds are callable by the rm, in which case investors are compelled to decide on conversion
before the bond matures. Thus, given favorableconditions, the company may force early
conversion, e¤ectively stripping investors of the time value of their warrant/option. Accord-
ingly, management may see convertible bonds as a means of getting equity into the capital
structure through the backdoor.39 Brennan and Schwartz (1988, p. 56) underline the
relative insensitivity of their value to the risk of the issuing company, which reduces the
39The (complex) classic paper on convertible debt valuation comes from Ingersoll (1977a). Du¢ e and
Singleton (2003, chapter 9) provide a textbook treatment, while Brennan and Schwartz (1988) present a nice
non-technical introduction to convertibles. See also Asquith (1995) for interesting insights into corporate call
policies, notably the rectication of a common misconception regarding late calling.
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potential for mispricing. Indeed, Stein (1992), in his adaptation of Myers and Majlufs (1984)
model, shows that there is demand for such a security when an investment project requires
external funding. Each of three considered rm types runs a chance or receiving either a high
or a low cash ow (generated by the AIP and the investment). Types merely di¤er in their
respective odds of achieving these cash ows, where probabilities are private information.
Without going into detail, the appealing fact about Steins (1992) work is that, albeit the
setting is somewhat di¤erent to our model, the interpretation of its separating equilibrium
outcome is supportive of the pecking order.40 Given costs of nancial distress, good rms,
not facing the risk of bankruptcy, have unused debt capacity and issue bonds, which allows
them to avoid the dilutional cost of equity. Bad rms, however, cannot a¤ord this luxury
and must issue equity for fear of bankruptcy, accepting the negative consequences of this
information-sensitive security. Medium rms are able to utilize convertible debt instead, a
security whose sensitivity to private information lies between debt and equity due to its hybrid
character. Thus, in nancing an investment opportunity externally, use is made of securities
in the order of their informational sensitivity, starting with the claim that is least sensitive to
information.41 This leads to a testable hypothesis, namely that (given similar issue sizes) the
announcement return of a convertible debt issue will lie somewhere between those of equity
and debt as the securitys potential for mispricing is less than equitys, but more than that
of straight debt due to its hybrid character. This prediction has received broad support. De
Roon and Veld (1998) nicely summarize a great deal of empirical studies.42 Literally every
one of them reports a statistically signicant negative (two-day) valuation e¤ect surrounding
announcements of convertible bond o¤erings in the U.S., amounting to an average abnormal
return of roughly  1:5% (weighted by the sample sizes). While the papers on announcement
e¤ects surveyed by Eckbo et al. (2007) reveal a signicant sample-weighted average abnormal
return of  2:22% for SEOs and an insignicant  0:22% for straight debt, the corresponding
valuation e¤ect is a statistically signicant  1:82% for convertible bonds.
40Schulz (2003) sets about formally combining Myers and Majlufs (1984) and Steins (1992) model into
one.
41Nyborg (1995) criticizes Steins (1992) model for considering forced conversions by management only,
disregarding the right of claimholders to convert voluntarily (insofar as the convertible has not been called
yet). Additionally, the author formally accounts for the fact that the decision on the part of the rm to force
conversion has informational content as well, which remains unconsidered in Stein (1992). The announcement
of a call to convert usually leads to another negative stock price reaction on top of the issue announcement
e¤ect, cf. Mikkelson (1981) and Brick et al. (2007). Therefore, convertible bonds actually induce more severe
share price declines when called in the model. Nyborg concludes that the qualitative result of Stein (1992),
i.e., the benecial function of convertible debt in achieving investment e¢ ciency in the presence of asymmetric
information, holds true only if the conversion is voluntary.
42Among the rst authors to empirically investigate this issue are Dann and Mikkelson (1984), Mikkelson
and Partch (1986) and Eckbo (1986). Recent evidence, such as Liu and Switzer (2010), is supportive of their
ndings.
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Note that the picture changes, once again, when looking at other countries. For instance,
Kang and Stulz (1996) report a signicantly positive announcement e¤ect (0:83% for the
two-day abnormal return) for convertible issues in Japan, while De Roon and Veld (1998)
nd a slightly positive, but insignicant return for Dutch o¤erings.43
Summing up, at least in the U.S., real-world data show that the hybrid security indeed lies
between equity and straight debt in respect of the severity of the o¤ering announcement price
decline. This explanatory power is the key benet of Myers and Majlufs (1984) theoretical
predictions.
This brings us to the formulation of a less strict form of the pecking order, as considered by
Myers (1984, 2002): nancial slack is the preferred source of nancing. Since dividend policy
is sticky, corporate cash ows, which are subject to variation, may or may not su¢ ce to
nance an investment opportunity; if so, remaining cash ows go to build up nancial slack
or pay back debt. If not, cash holdings are spent. Once external funding is unavoidable, the
rm rst issues debt. As more external funds are required for investment, the rm works
down the pecking order, issuing securities in the order of increasing informational sensitivity,
that is from (safe to risky) debt via hybrid securities down to equity in the end, when there
is no more capacity for any other security.
We nish this section with the advice to exercise some caution: researchers think that infor-
mation asymmetry is the driving force behind the pecking order. It is by far the most popular
explanation in the literature. However, we cannot exclude that other determinants may have
some (or even sole) explanatory power. Frank and Goyal (2008, p. 151) state: [T]o the best
of our knowledge, no one has tried to distinguish among the alternative possible sources of the
pecking order behavior. Myers (2003) himself points out that incentive conicts of the type
considered by Jensen and Meckling (1976) may lead to a pecking order, too. Fresh equity
carries large potential for agency costs because it passes on part of the costs of the private
benets enjoyed by corporate management to new shareholders. Consequently, debt is the
rst choice when internal funds are exhausted. Furthermore, Alt¬nk¬l¬ç and Hansen (2000)
examine underwriter fees in seasoned issues of equity and debt. While there are obviously
no issuance costs associated with cash, the authors show that, depending on the size of the
issue and the bond rating, the costs of common equity may outweigh those of straight debt,
implying a pecking order based on the cost of external nancing.
43 In case one is wondering what could cause these country di¤erences, Moerland (1995) provides an inter-
esting attempt to explain based on historical and cultural diversity leading to corporate systems that di¤er in
their economic characteristics, including their way of dealing with agency problems.
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2.6.1 ...Does it work?
A large body of empirical research on the real-world e¤ectivity of the pecking order exists
(using mostly U.S. data). To cut a long story short: for all we know up to this point, it is not
a theory that entirely explains corporate nancing behavior (in fact, there is not one doctrine
to this date that can). Results are rather mixed. Given that equity should only be used a
last resort, the sheer mass of empirical studies on SEO announcement e¤ects, many of them
mentioned above, may in itself be indication of the failure of the pecking order. Let us start
o¤ with a look at some real-world data on security issues, provided by Eckbo et al. (2007).
Out of 80; 627 public and private security issues in the U.S. in the years 1980-2003, we have
37; 398 public straight debt o¤erings, 11; 151 SEOs and 1; 545 less than 2% convertible
debt o¤erings among them (where the bulk of the remainder is split up between IPOs and
private security issues). While debt issues are in fact the most common form of nancing
(consistent with the pecking order), its ratio to equity is roughly three to one. SEOs seem to
be too high in number, considering they should be used as a last resort. Further, if the pecking
order were indeed correct, we would have to identify convertibles outnumbering SEOs, which
we clearly do not.44 To put it in the words of Frank and Goyal (2003, p. 218), [E]quity
nance is a signicant component of external nance.
Early evidence comes from Korajczyk et al. (1990), who take a closer look at the mentioned
debt capacity prior to an SEO. Their underlying logic is that if the pecking order is in fact
correct, rms would rst use up their debt capacity before issuing equity. Consequently,
we would expect a rise in corporate debt ratios (as measured in book values) in the periods
leading up to an SEO. Contrary to this reasoning, the authors nd that ratios do not increase,
but rather decline (both in market and book values) in a sample of nearly 1; 500 seasoned
o¤erings. Such behavior is interpreted as being inconsistent with the pecking order because
equity is issued without having exhausted the ability to issue debt. Next, Helwege and Liang
(1996) examine the nancing behavior of a sample of young high-growth rms whose earnings
are relatively low, reasoning that such rms will have an increased demand for external capital
to support their investment strategy. The good news is that the rms generally do not go to
the capital market when internal funds are su¢ cient in a given year. The consistency with
the theory vanishes, however, when it comes to external nancing. First, the pecking order
is discarded at one central point: a greater cash decit does not imply a greater likelihood
44For the sake of completeness: the average public debt issue raises $230 million, and is around three times
the size of an SEO and twice that of an average convertible debt issue. When looking at issuer classes,
industrial rms account for the biggest part of the capital put up in SEOs, while banks/nancial institutions
take the lions share in the market for public straight debt. Utilities rank last in both these categories. The
entire sample amounts to more than $12 trillion raised.
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of obtaining external nancing. This result is not driven by outliers having trouble raising
funds. Second, rms that do issue securities basically are equally likely to use debt or equity,
although, under the pecking order, there is no necessity to use the latter. Neither do rms
with higher (proxied) asymmetric information show a decreased probability of equity issuance,
which clearly violates the pecking order. Jung et al. (1996) show that nearly a quarter of the
equity-issuing companies in fact conform to the characteristics of the typical debt-o¤ering
rm in their sample. The authors argue that their behavior is justiable by the nancing
hierarchy only if the information asymmetry surrounding these rms happens to be small,
in which case the SEO announcement return would have to be less negative than usually
reported. This is not the case.
A much noticed study comes from Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), who set out to test
the pecking order against the static tradeo¤ theory, utilizing a small panel data set of 157
mature (i.e., non-growth) industrial rms during the years 1971-1989. The link to testing the
pecking order is its implication that there is no target debt ratio (unlike in the static tradeo¤
theory): capital structure is solely driven by the rmsoutside nancing needs such that the
observed debt ratio merely reects the cumulative corporate demand for external funds up
to the present time. Since equity is meant as a last resort, the basic nancing hierarchy is
tested by simply regressing the change in book debt value (debt issues) over a period on
the decit in internal funds (basically capital expenditures less internal cash ows) in that
period. If this procedure and the theory are correct, we will observe a slope coe¢ cient of
one and an intercept of zero for a strict interpretation of the nancing hierarchy. In short,
they nd that the pecking order surpasses the tradeo¤ model in explanatory power. More
importantly, it survives tests of statistical power which the tradeo¤ theory does not. This
leads Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999, p. 242) to conclude that [T]he pecking order is an
excellent rst-order descriptor of corporate nancing behavior....
Finally some good and persuasive results conrming the pecking order, correct? Unfortu-
nately, this need not be the case. While Shyam-Sunder and Myers(1999) methodology for
testing nancing behavior is novel, Chirinko and Singha (2000) convincingly argue that it
is seriously awed, and raise doubts about its usefulness in testing either one of the two
theories. The authors present three scenarios where the testing procedure falsely accepts
(rejects) the nancing hierarchy when in fact it is void (valid). Frank and Goyal (2003) also
reassess Shyam-Sunder and Myers(1999) approach  and also o¤er criticism. Making use
of a considerably larger data set of U.S. rms, they conclude that generally the pecking order
does not describe nancing decisions for the broad sample. Merely a sub-sample of large
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corporations displays nancing behavior reconcilable with the nancing hierarchy. Smaller
and more growth-oriented companies (which we would expect to be more plagued by asym-
metric information) fail in this regard. Most surprisingly, it is found that net equity issues,
and not net debt o¤erings, do the better job in tracking the nancing decit, which is highly
inconsistent with the pecking-order-implied dominance of debt. Yearly equity issues usually
surpass their debt counterparts in magnitude in the sample, too. Beyond that, adding addi-
tional regressors, such as asset tangibility and protability, yields better results, suggesting
that the decit is not the sole driver of debt issues. This casts further doubt on the pecking
order. Fama and French (2002) use dividend and debt regressions to also test the tradeo¤
theory against the (dynamic version of the) pecking order, but cannot o¤er a clear winner.
This is partly due to the fact that some of the ndings can be attributed to both theories.
On the other hand, the clear-cut predictions of either theory do not always receive support.
Conclusive inferences cannot be made from their results.
Perhaps the lack of an unambiguous testing methodology represents a constraint to deriving
clear results about the pecking order. For this would explain contradicting ndings from
testing it. For instance, Fama and French (2005) report that the pecking order works best for
a sub-sample of smaller rms; which is inconsistent with Frank and Goyal (2003). The authors
apply a di¤erent methodology by examining in detail the corporate equity issue behavior of a
sample of all industrial rms listed on the major American stock exchanges during the years
1973 to 2002. As an example, in the last of the three decades considered, the average number
of companies climbs to 4; 417. Importantly, Fama and French (2005) include not only SEOs
in the net equity issues, but rather argue that all other ways and means of equity nancing,
such as private placements, rights issues, mergers nanced with new stocks or o¤erings to
employees, should be included as well. They claim that not all of these instruments, as we
have seen above in the case of rights issues, are necessarily exposed to problems of asymmetric
information to the same extent as SEOs. The authors emphasize that their conclusion that
...the pecking order does a poor job describing the equity decisions of individual rms
(Fama and French, 2005, p. 571) could well be due to the fact that rms circumvent these
problems by increasingly relying on such information-insensitive stock issuing techniques,
which casts doubt on equitys role as a last resort. The percentage of rms that issue stock
every year rises steadily, reaching a stunning 86% average in the nal decade. The respective
number for equity issues net of repurchases is 72%. During the same period, only 49% of
the overall sample nance in a manner consistent with the pecking order. That is to say,
every second rm violates it. Equity o¤erings are generally substantial in size and frequently
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exceed debt issues.
Recently, Leary and Roberts (2010) also have a try at testing the pecking order. Applying a
di¤erent testing methodology, the authors identify nancing decisions (by dening debt and
equity issues as the net between-period-changes in book values of debt and equity relative
to book assets above a certain threshold) and check if they are consistent with predicted
nancing behavior generated from a pecking order model dening nancing thresholds above
which the rm switches from internal resources to debt and, respectively, from debt to equity.
Here, too, results are sobering. While it may be taken as a success that three quarters of
the rms behave as specied by a strict interpretation of the pecking order model regarding
the use of internal versus external funds, corporate nancing decisions fail with respect to
selecting the right type of security when it comes to outside nance. A mere 17% of
sample rms act correctlywhen choosing between debt and equity. Only when considering
a highly relaxed variant of the nancing hierarchy, which also incorporates features of the
static tradeo¤ theory, the security decision is correctly classied for a large proportion of
the sample. This plays into the hands of Myers (2003) and Fama and French (2005), who
suggest that it may be better to look at both theories not as mutually exclusive, but rather as
existing side by side, each contributing to the understanding of observed corporate nancing
behavior. Another troublesome discovery made by Leary and Roberts (2010) is that (proxies
for) incentive conicts à la Jensen and Meckling (1976) rather than (proxies for) informational
asymmetry have the highest predictive precision for pecking order behavior. This suggests
that asymmetric information is not the actual driving force behind the nancing hierarchy.
On the other hand, Lemmon and Zender (2010) use a variation of Shyam-Sunder and Myers
(1999) approach that controls for the fact that rms operate at di¤erent levels of their debt
capacity and argue that a modied pecking order does a good job in describing rmsnancing
behavior. Finally, Bharath et al. (2009) also rely on the Shyam-Sunder-Myers-type regression.
Their innovation is that they construct an index of asymmetric information, compiled from
measures used in the eld of market microstructure, and annually partition the companies
in their sample (1973-2002) into deciles according to the severity of the rms information
asymmetry. Regressions reveal that the nancing decit coe¢ cient is indeed increasing as
we move up in deciles, meaning that companies plagued by more asymmetric information
adhere to the pecking order more closely, for they obtain a higher proportion of their external
nancing in the form of debt. While this speaks for a role of information in determining
nancing decisions, other factors exert inuence as well: further regressions and robustness
checks, inter alia to account for the aforementioned methodological criticism by Chirinko
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and Singha (2000), show that the asymmetry index is just one (signicant) determinant of
leverage and, thus, capital structure among others. Therefore, the nancing hierarchy is not
the sole driver of nancing decisions.
This look at the (older and more recent evidence) tells us either that there is not yet a
convincing way to test the pecking order or that it not suited as a general theory to explain
nancing decisions made by rms. Until we are convinced of the contrary, we adhere to the
latter.
2.7 Securities in the capital structure  security design
Like Stein (1992), Chakraborty and Yilmaz (2011) consider the role of convertible debt in
resolving the underinvestment problem. The major novelty they introduce is that asymmetric
information is only dissolved partially in their adaption of Myers and Majlufs (1984) frame-
work. A convertible bond can be designed whose value is completely disentangled from any
private information about the rms type. No potential for mispricing remains and the rm
always issues and invests. The underinvestment problem is completely solved, even though
the rm faces a positive probability of bankruptcy.45
The usefulness of convertible debt has led to its inclusion in the pecking order, as we have
seen. But this naturally brings forth the following question: why should it stop there? The
rst problem is that only a limited menu of security designs have been considered, essentially
debt and equity. With such narrow choice sets, claims of optimality are weak(Nachman and
Noe, 1994, p. 2). Especially in times of investment banking and nancial engineering, there
seems to be an almost indenite number of issuable securities at the rms disposal. Hence,
the real question is this: when a rm is in need of external funds to nance a worthwhile
investment project, [W]hat securities should the rm sell to raise the required capital? This
is the fundamental capital structure question reformulated (albeit loosely) as a security design
problem(Nachman and Noe, 1994, p. 2). The authors of the quote have rst looked into
this problem, and thereby initiated a new line of research in the context of the pecking order
 security design. They use a two-date model in which a game of externally raising a xed
investment amount is played in the presence of asymmetric information. In contrast to Myers
and Majluf (1984), both a broad set of securities and rm types are considered. Outside
investors cannot observe the type, which is governed by the productivity of the investment
project. Firms of high productivity face the risk of having to issue an undervalued security
45For further insights into the usefulness of convertible bonds in nancing protable new projects when
the rm is better informed than the market, see Brennan and Kraus (1987) and Constantinides and Grundy
(1989).
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due to imitation of its design by bad companies  a classical lemons problem. Given this
setup, the authors determine the characteristics a security needs to have in order to be
optimal in raising external funds (in that it supports a pooling equilibrium outcome of the
game; separating equilibria do not exist). The natural question to ask, given the multitude of
securities, is whether straight debt, as suggested by the pecking order, actually turns out to be
optimal in minimizing underinvestment (the folklore proposition). The authors determine
that this is generally not the case. It holds true only if rm cash ows adhere to a strict
ordering of stochastic dominance (conditional stochastic dominance). Therefore, support for
the pecking order is limited. Note that Nachman and Noe (1994) consider security design
in an ex-post setting. As in Myers and Majluf (1984), the issuing rm knows its own type
and then decides on matters of design. Consequently, the choice conveys information to the
market.
In contrast, DeMarzo and Du¢ e (1999) engage in optimal security design in an ex-ante setting
in a model based on liquidity and asymmetric information. Issuers receive information on the
payo¤ of the security not until they have nished designing it, but before o¤ering it to the
market. Hence, the issuing company cannot signal information by the choice of the design
per se, but merely through the fraction of the issue sold to the uninformed market (and not
retained). This, however, is where the problems of asymmetric information start to kick in.
The rm credibly signals high quality (high cash ow) of its security only by keeping back
a rather large fraction of the issue. But doing so is costly and decreases the amount raised
through the otation. In other words, when o¤ering a large fraction to the public, outsiders
will rationally interpret this as a sign of inferior quality. This leads to a depression of the
securitys market price through reduced demand, implying lower liquidity. This illiquidity
problem, inter alia, depends on the sensitivity of the value of the selected design to the
companys private information. Issuing rms establish the security that optimally solves the
tradeo¤ between costs of illiquidity in the market and the retention costs due to asymmetric
information. The model is related rather closely to Myers and Majluf (1984), but features
some obvious distinctions. For example, the amount to be raised externally is not xed.
Furthermore, the o¤ered security is completely backed by the rms existing assets, and
not the investment opportunity. Like Nachman and Noe (1994), the authors determine the
conditions for a design to be optimal in general and address the situation in which risky debt
fullls these requirements in particular. Again, straight debt may be optimal, but only under
certain restrictions imposed upon cash ow distribution  the same holds true for equity.
Overall, the model provides mixed support for the pecking order, subject to the assumptions
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made.
Further studies exist that deal with the properties of security design under asymmetric in-
formation, though not as closely related to Myers and Majluf (1984) as the models just
introduced. For example, Goswami et al. (1995) specically focus on the design of an op-
timal debt contract. In their three-date model, a rm possesses superior information and
seeks to raise funds through a debt issue to invest in a worthwhile project. The authors focus
both on short-term and long-term debt securities. This distinction is relevant because the
degree of asymmetric information surrounding short-term and long-term cash ows (of the
project) may vary. Critically depending on the exact structure of asymmetric information in
the di¤erent periods, the authors specify the optimal debt contract according to commonly
used covenants, i.e., requirements imposed upon the borrower that are specied in the bond
agreements (indenture), such as time to maturity, coupon payments and restrictions on div-
idends.46 Next, Rahi (1996) considers the security choice of an owner-manager who possesses
superior information regarding the investments payo¤. In equilibrium, the entrepreneur de-
cides against issuing a security that would otherwise allow him to exploit his informational
advantage. The cost associated with asymmetric information render this venture unprof-
itable. Therefore, all information is transferred to the market via price setting, leaving all
actors equally well-informed. Since dilution is no longer a concern, the owner-manager opts
for equity as the security of choice: a company nanced by a single type of security distributes
business risk e¢ ciently across its holders. Heinkel and Zechner (1990) consider the optimal
mixture of common stock, debt and preferred stock when externally nancing a protable
project whose quality is private information to the rm. The latter two security types are
benecial because they curb underinvestment and because the model considers tax benets.
Finally, in the context of a signalling model, DeMarzo (2005) examines whether it is better
to sell o¤ assets separately or pooled, considering that nancial intermediaries who buy and
resell nancial claims are better informed than the market. Both ex-ante and ex-post optimal
designs are considered.
46Paglia (2007) provides a compact overview of covenants frequently used in large commercial bank loans.
As an example, Smith and Warner (1979) look at a sample of 87 public debt issues and nd that roughly
91% include covenants that restrict future issues of debt, while 23% have limitations on the distribution of
dividends.
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2.8 Cash holdings
We have seen that risky debt helps to alleviate the underinvestment problem. It does not
solve it, however. Myers and Majluf (1984, pp. 216-17) provide an (seemingly) easy way to
eliminate it entirely. The intuition is this: always make sure to have enough cash at hand
when the project is due. If so, the problems caused by asymmetric information do not emerge
as there are only insiders at work. This could be achieved by issuing fresh equity or debt
in the rst period of the model, when information is still symmetric, and storing the raised
funds until they are needed in t = 0. This line of thought, in contrast to Jensens (1986)
agency theory, provides a strong rationale against paying out large amounts in dividends
(even though not considered in the model) in order to conserve valuable nancial slack. The
bad news, however, is that this solution is not as easy as it seems: rst of all, how much money
is enough? If there is no upper bound on how much a new investment may cost, then one
can never be sure to have raised enough cash to not be reliant on capital markets again during
times of asymmetric information in the future. Moreover, even if the amount of investment
I were known ahead of time, Myers and Majluf (1984) point out that the ine¢ ciency result
could be restored quite easily by assuming that the information disadvantage (in that the
market learns news one period late) is permanent. If so, the problem of deciding on an issue
is merely brought forward one period (assume managers know A and B at t =  1, whereas
to the market these are just two random variables because the distributions of the AIP and
the investment opportunity are yet unknown). Therefore, management may still decide not
to issue (at t =  1) in some cases due to information problems. In this case, there is no easy
way out of the underinvestment problem.
Nevertheless, it holds true that rms with considerable amounts of cash fare better in battling
underinvestment than the ones without. Bates et al. (2009) report that the average cash
ratio of U.S. rms has risen dramatically in the period 1980-2006. While the authors neither
test for underinvestment nor exclude it specically, they state that the likely cause for this
build-up is that rm characteristics have changed in recent years. To give an example, cash
ows have become increasingly volatile due to elevated rm-specic risk. Consequently, the
rise in cash holdings is a precautionary measure against negative shocks to cash ows and,
thus, default. Related to this development, Fama and French (2001) report that dividends
increasingly disappear.
Among others, Opler et al. (1999) and Dittmar et al. (2003) provide empirical studies
attempting to explain the determinants of actual corporate cash holdings. Support for in-
formational asymmetries and, thus, the pecking order as the main driver of corporate cash
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policy is limited  other theories of cash holdings trade o¤ miscellaneous costs of holding
cash against its benets when determining the optimal cash balance. However, it is dangerous
to call a single theory the winner, since, as noted by Opler et al. (1999, p. 14), there is a
substantial overlap between them such that several of the empirical ndings can be ascribed
to more than one theory. Examining cash holdings across di¤erent countries, as done by
Dittmar et al. (2003), more practical issues, such as corporate governance and legal aspects,
tend to play a role, too.
2.9 Some nal comments  restoring the irrelevance of nancing
We are approaching the ending of the rst main part. We have, quite extensively, considered
ine¢ ciencies in corporate investment decisions arising from the presence of asymmetric infor-
mation, posing a departure from the stylized perfectmarket as considered by Modigliani
and Miller (1958). One of the consequences, as seen in Myers and Majluf (1984), is that
nancing matters. In the models that we have considered in detail, asymmetric informa-
tion favors debt nancing over issuing equity, which has implications for corporate capital
structure and, thus, contrasts with the famous MM irrelevance proposition.
As much support as there is for underinvestment and especially the ensuing announcement
price declines, we would not be providing sincere scientic work if not pointing out that
opposing views regarding information asymmetry and corporate nancing exist, too. Dybvig
and Zender (1991) provide a critique of Myers and Majlufs (1984) underinvestment result,
and claim that optimal investment along with the irrelevance of capital structure (and divi-
dend policy) may well prevail under asymmetric information. They present a model that very
closely resembles that of Myers and Majluf (1984), with few exceptions: given an investment
decision, the market does not learn a and b individually, but only a + b in conjunction. In
other words, it is assumed that the investment project is inseparably attached to the AIP
and cannot be looked at as a stand-alone opportunity. Think of the costly upgrading of an
existing production line, for example. The authors reason that, otherwise, the AIP could
simply be spun o¤ from the investment project (or sold) and be treated as a separate entity;
this would solve the underinvestment problem because there is no more conict between old
and new claimholders. Be aware that this point does not go unnoticed by Myers and Majluf
(1984, p. 202), who, however, treat it as a special case. Moreover, Dybvig and Zender (1991)
allow for bad projects. Their main point of criticism aims at the assumption that managers
act solely in the interest of old shareholders (cf. fn. 8) and do not follow their own objectives
instead, so that agency conicts between these two groups are prevented. Since such behavior
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leads management to execute the ine¢ cient investment strategy in the rst place, the authors
endogenize the choice of managements incentive contract. To reach an optimal investment
plan, i.e., investment in every worthwhile project, the authors argue that one has to set the
incentive scheme for managers optimally. Once compensation is chosen accordingly, it is
shown that the rm reaches status quo irrespective of the mode of nancing. Thus, an MM-
type result holds despite the presence of asymmetric information. Furthermore, the authors
claim that their paper may just as well explain observed issue announcement e¤ects, suggest-
ing that the great explanatory power of Myers and Majlufs (1984) theory is not exclusive in
this regard.
Note that Myers and Majluf (1984, p. 210-12) themselves briey point to another direction in
reestablishing the irrelevance of nancing: the assumption that old shareholders act passively
has to be dropped, i.e., one has to allow them to trade in old and new claims such that they
could, for instance, buy the entire new equity issue with their private cash. If so, basically
the same argument as in Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1969) applies. That is, active origi-
nal owners could always respond to changes in capital structure (induced by managements
decision to invest) by rebalancing their own portfolios.47
Daniel and Titman (1995, p. 753-54) come back to a point made earlier in the context
of rights issues. Underinvestment disappears if every original shareholder buys and holds
a pro rata share of the new issue  regardless of whether debt or equity is chosen. The
rm remains in the hands of old shareholders, for they are the sole investors. Hence, there
is no conict between original and new shareholders and, thus, no underinvestment. It
follows that a management whose objective function is to maximize existing shareholders
wealth would invest in every non-negative-NPV project and, accordingly, reach status quo.
Then again, this is easier said than done. For one, since shareholders are active, this may
well conict with their individual portfolio motives. Secondly, personal resources to provide
funding for a new project may be constrained. That is to say, passive shareholding may not
be such a bad assumption after all. Myers and Majluf (1984, p. 211, fn. 21) also recognize
the ex-ante optimal character of having old shareholders completely fund a project (though
not necessarily on a pro rata basis), but conclude that ...the problem is enforcing it. If
shareholders are active, who is going to force them to buy new shares or stop them from selling
old ones ex-post? Corporate claimholders are free to trade at will in real life. Fields and Mais
47Fulghieri and Lukin (2001) present a model that does not restore irrelevance, but where the pecking
order may be reversed. The novelty is that some investors may become informed by buying access to
an information production technology. Depending on the degree of information asymmetry about the rms
quality and the cost and quality of the information, issuing equity (rather than straight debt) may prove
benecial to high-quality rms: as it is more information sensitive, it prompts more information production,
which in turn increases overall demand and, ultimately, the o¤er price the market is willing to pay.
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(1994) empirically investigate changes in ownership structure and nd that managerial and
institutional (banks, insurance and investment companies) ownership declines signicantly
in the wake of SEOs, suggesting passive behavior. By contrast, holders of large blocks of
no less than ve percent of the rms equity trade actively: their fractional holdings do not
change signicantly. By implication, not all of the old claimholders share the desire to hold
the corporations new securities, promoting underinvestment.
In the end, asymmetric information most likely is one determinant of capital structure.
Building an entire theory of a rms mix of securities around it, however, does not get the
job done properly. This holds true especially in case of the pecking order, for it does not
imply a target debt ratio: the use of leverage merely reects the cumulative demand for
outside capital to nance investments when nancial slack is insu¢ cient. Capital structure
remains an active and vast eld of current research. Although there is not yet a unique
and general theory, what we can say is that there are many more (potentially) determining
factors of capital structure: taxes, bankruptcy, various agency costs, corporate control or
market timing, to name just a few. We point to Harris and Raviv (1991) for an extensive
introductory summary of di¤erent theories of corporate capital structure.
In the end, we take Myers and Majluf (1984) as a theory based on asymmetric information
that exceptionally well explains the observed (negative) announcement e¤ects of various types
of securities  but not as a theory explaining why they are selected. As we will come to
know in what follows, informational asymmetry is one cause of underinvestment, but not the
only.
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Part III
Corporate Underinvestment and
Symmetric Information
3 Corporate underinvestment in the presence of symmetric
information
Up to this point, we have come to know how informational asymmetry may lead to socially
suboptimal investment behavior in that protable investment opportunities are not pursued.
Unfortunately, this need not only be the case in the presence of asymmetric information. That
is, even if all parties share the same information (at the same point in time), underinvestment
may still occur. Obviously, this must happen for reasons other than the ones just discussed.
Therefore, the bigger part of the remainder of this work is dedicated to this topic. On our way
to the model of underinvestment in the reconstitution of damaged assets, let us rst have a
glance at the model that laid the groundwork for all other work on corporate underinvestment
in the presence of symmetric information to come.
3.1 The original underinvestment problem
The underinvestment problem in the presence of symmetric information often also labeled
the debt overhangproblem originates from a seminal paper by Stewart Myers published
in 1977.48 At the core of the problem lies the existence of risky debt in a rms capital
structure. Risky in the sense that a rm faces a positive probability of defaulting on its
debt, i.e., with positive probability the value of the rm will not su¢ ce to repay the face
value to bondholders. Capital markets are assumed perfect and complete. Informational
asymmetries and their associated consequences mentioned in the last part cannot cause any
problems, either in Myers(1977) model or the ones to be explained subsequently. Rather,
the issue here is that the mere presence of risky debt will force a rm whose management
48According to the database IDEAS (http://ideas.repec.org/), Myers(1977) paper has been cited 499 times
and, thus, ranks among the top one percent of economic publications by number of citations (May 31, 2012).
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acts in its shareholdersinterest to pass up some positive-NPV investment opportunities, i.e.,
it underinvests. This suboptimal investment policy reduces the rms market value relative
to the case where it is nanced with either risk-free debt or equity only. To grasp the idea,
let us have a look at a simple example that neatly illustrates the entire concept of the model.
Assume there are two dates. The rms value as of the rst date equals V  = 90 (the AIP),
and it has debt F = 100 outstanding, to be repaid at the second date. Suppose a risk-
free investment opportunity arises that requires an initial outlay of 10 at the rst date and
promises a sure 15 at the second  clearly a positive-NPV project.49 Investment requires
fresh capital, however: the rm has no cash or other marketable securities at its disposal. If it
decides to go ahead with the growth opportunity, it will have to issue new equity in order to
raise the required capital.50 For simplicity, we assume an interest rate of zero subsequently.
What should the rm do? The rst intuition is to give the go-ahead as any Finance 101
class tells you to take every positive-NPV investment opportunity. Doing so, however, would
make us really bad managers, provided our aim is to act in shareholdersbest interest. The
following table gives an overview of the rms options.
value at second date without project with project
total rm 90 90 + 15 = 105
value of debt 90 100
value of equity 0 5
Obviously, debt is risky as not undertaking the project will not allow bondholders to receive
their full promised repayment, i.e., the rm will default on its debt. The dilemma is this:
yes, taking the positive-NPV investment will make the rm worth more. But only as a
whole. Between the two groups of claimholders, there is a transfer of value from equity- to
bondholders. Due to their higher seniority, debtholders are entitled to receive the incremental
cash ows rst, up to the point where they are fully paid o¤. Only then will shareholders,
being residual claimants, also start to gain. They provide the whole 10 in funds, yet only
receive 5. Thus, this project has a negative NPV to shareholders. This is a classical situation
49Thus, we implicitly assume that the riskfree interest rate is less than 50%. This is a reasonable assump-
tion.
50Note that this assumption is not unrealistic. Campello et al. (2010) report from surveys conducted with
CFOs that, in normal times, 46% of nancially constrained rms (in that they have trouble getting funds from
the credit market) are dependent on external nancing (though not necessarily equity) as a means of raising
funds for attractive investment projects.
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of interest incompatibility between bondholders, who want to undertake the safe investment,
and shareholders, who oppose. Put another way, the return threshold for which the project
breaks even is higher for shareholders than for the rm as a whole due to the preexisting
liabilities. Consequently, managers, acting on behalf of shareholders, will decide not to invest,
leaving the rm worse o¤ as a whole. This is the underinvestment problem.
Risky debt in the rms capital structure discourages investment that would otherwise in-
crease rm value. The reason for this is nicely expressed by Stein (2003, p. 116): This is
because if the existing debt is trading at less than face value, it acts as a tax on the proceeds
of the new investment: part of any increase in value generated by the investment goes to
make the existing lenders whole, and is therefore unavailable to repay those claimants who
put up the new money. Another implication of the example above is that, everything else
equal, the tax on the proceeds will be perceived as higher by shareholders if the face value of
debt is even greater. In that case, NPV to shareholders will be even more negative. Hence,
the higher the probability of default, the lower the marginal return that the rm expects
to receive from its investment, the smaller its incentive to invest (Occhino and Pescatori,
2010, p. 1). Accordingly, theory predicts that the underinvestment problem is most severe
when companies are highly levered and confronted with a high probability of default. Note
that the transfer of value only harms old shareholders, i.e., the ones implicitly in control of
the rm. Since markets are assumed perfect, the new shareholders will pay a fair price for
the issue, making it a zero-NPV investment to them. This excludes transfers of wealth away
from them.
Timing is crucial to the emergence of this underinvestment problem. The portrayed outcome
is dependent on the assumption that ...the debt matures after the rms investment option
expires(Myers, 1977, p. 153). For if it were the other way round, i.e., debt maturing prior
to the investment decision, debtholders could simply take over the rm in the course of the
rms bankruptcy procedure, and then go ahead with the investment opportunity as the new
owners. Timing issues aside, having creditors take over the rm after a default may prove
rather problematic in reality: just think of the loss in reputation accompanied by a default.
Additionally, corporate bankruptcy is not a process that is handled over night. By the time
debtholders are in control, the business opportunity simply may have disappeared.
A short comment on the conict of interest between bondholders and shareholders: this is
not an unknown phenomenon. The reason for it to exist really is limited liability: you cannot
lose more than the amount you have invested.51 By creating an asymmetry between the
51See Easterbrook and Fischel (1985) for an insightful discussion of limited liability.
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costs and benets of risky activities, limited liability causes bondholders and shareholders
to have incompatible incentives whenever the corporations debt is subject to the risk of
bankruptcy(Garven and MacMinn, 1993, p. 636). Generally, shareholders bear more risk
than debtholders. This is because they are residual claimants after all. Their claims are
wiped out rst in case the rm value crashes. The upside is that they cannot be forced to
contribute additional funds. Because of this limited liability, shareholders will not invest in a
project which is known to have a negative NPV to them, even if it would benet debtholders
and, thus, the rm as a whole. Therefore, the rm underinvests.
Unfortunately, this need not necessarily be the end of the adverse e¤ects of the debt over-
hang problem. Leaving the connes of Myers(1977) model, there may follow up a second
e¤ect, making a bad thing worse. Hennessy (2004, p. 1737) nds that ...within a given rm,
debt overhang distorts investment composition and not simply its level. In other words, in
addition to investing less when highly levered, rms may change the scope of their invest-
ments, too. Note that this is not yet a negative statement per se, for the rm could take
better investements. Sadly, this is generally not the case. Campbell (2010) also speaks on
this issue and convincingly argues that shareholders, being in control of the rm, will further
impair their companys prospects (but not their own) by taking on projects that are to a
great extent riskier than would be optimal in case the rms debt burden were signicantly
less. The reason is, once again, limited liability. Due to underinvestment, a safe project
that yields a relatively low positive NPV is not desirable for shareholders as it has negative
NPV to them. Consider another opportunity; this time with negative expected NPV, but
extremely high cash ows in a few good states. The project as a whole is riskier to the
entire rm, since it will destroy value on average. But to shareholders it is not. If the rm
is in deep nancial trouble already such that debt trades far below face value and equity is
nearly worthless, shareholders have nothing to lose  but a lot to gain if they strike lucky. In
the unlikely event that one of the high-cash-ow states materializes, shareholders will receive
some of the NPV as well. They benet from high payo¤s, but do not bear the downside risk
in such a situation.52 Therefore, the rm is going to switch to a riskier investment plan that
is harmful to the company on average. Parrino and Weisbach (1999), for example, provide
results consistent with this view in their numerical simulations of the impact of leverage on a
rms investment decisions. Furthermore, they show that this risk-taking behavior intensies
when debt is increased.
52This is basically the risk-shifting argument, rst made by Jensen and Meckling (1976). It is yet another
agency cost of corporate debt and generally referred to as the "asset substitution" problem, since the rm
substitutes investment in low-risk assets with investment in high-risk assets when being in nancial trouble.
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Debt overhang need not be a problem of (manufacturing) rms alone. It a¤ects the entire
nancial sector as well. Allen et al. (2008) advance the view that the Myers-style under-
investment problem played a vital role in the 20072010 global nancial crisis. They argue
that the U.S. Treasury may have ordered the (quasi-) compulsory infusion of fresh (preferred)
equity into the nine largest U.S. nancial institutions (along with a government guarantee on
freshly issued unsecured bank debt for the three years to come) for fear of underinvestment
 apart from preventing the adverse e¤ects of possible bank runs (Diamond and Dybvig,
1983) on the part of short-term creditors unwilling to execute debt roll-overs (cf. Veronesi
and Zingales, 2010, p. 341).53 ;54 Campbell (2010) reports that some U.S. investment banks
had ratios as high as 30 dollars in debt for every dollar held in equity. In the light of Myers
(1977) model, by forcing a recapitalization, the government in e¤ect hoped to stop existing
debt from preventing nancial institutions to carry out worthwhile investments, i.e., lending
out money, by bringing down the leverage ratio. After all, one of the major concerns during
the recent nancial crisis was that corporations would not be supplied with enough loans by
banks to keep their production processes and, thus, the economy running. The government
hoped to counter this by its actions : Purchasing equity would inject capital the lifeblood
of nance directly into the undercapitalized banking system. That would reduce the risk
of sudden failure and free up more money for banks to lend(Bush, 2010, p. 464). Occhino
(2010) adds that the granting of credit was especially lax in the pre-crisis years. Risks were
perceived wrongly, excessive leverage was not taken as a potential threat and lending stan-
dards were loose. This led to risk premiums being lower than fundamentally justied (in
hindsight, of course). As a consequence, assets were increasingly nanced with debt. When
asset values eventually plunged in the wake of the crisis, many rms were suddenly faced with
53O¢ cially titled the Troubled Asset Relief Program [TARP], this was a $700 billion program under the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, enacted by the Bush administration and intended to imme-
diately counter the e¤ects of the subprime mortgage crisis. This makes it the largest ever nancial rescue
package in the history of the U.S.. Here is what President Bush himself has to say about TARP in retrospect:
"The strategy was a breathtaking intervention in the free market. It ew against all my instincts. But it was
necessary to pull the country out of the panic. I decided that the only way to preserve the free market in the
long run was to intervene in the short run" (Bush, 2010, p. 458-59). In any case, TARP did have major inu-
ence on the market: before nally passing in a second vote, the bailout-bill had initially failed on September
29, 2008. This caused the Dow Jones Industrial Average to plunge 777.68 points subsequently, the largest
single-day loss in history to this day, cf. The Wall Street Journal (2008). See the U.S. Department of the
Treasury (2011) for more information on TARP. Recently, Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012) provide insightful
background information, for example on the pivotal role of the restrictions on executive compensations, along
with a critical assessment of TARP.
54According to Landler and Dash (2008), the banksCEOs did not have the slightest clue of what was
expecting them when being informed about the governments planned intervention by Treasury Secretary
Hank Paulson in a private meeting. Apparently, Mr. Paulsons planwas presented more in the way of an
ultimatum, leaving no room for debate. In the end, the executives came to realize that the bailout was a sweet
deal: following its announcement by Secretary Paulson on October 13, 2008, the Dow Jones recorded one of
its largest single day surges in history, gaining 936.42 points, cf. Stanton (2008).
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an augmented debt burden, giving rise to underinvestment. The initial misjudgment certainly
favored the emergence of debt overhang. Campello et al. (2010) survey a large number of
CFOs of non-nancial rms from 39 countries and state that nancially constrained rms cut
back on their investments more than less constrained corporations during the nancial crisis.
Veronesi and Zingales (2010, p. 364) attest to the capital infusion into the nine banks that
it generally accomplished its purpose: [F]rom a purely economic point of view, the plan
could be considered a success because it created value. The authors calculate that the
plan to purchase the $125 billion in freshly issued equity on behalf of the U.S. Treasury
immediately increased the value of the nine banks by a total of roughly $130 billion following
its announcement on October 13, 2008. The great deal of this identied rise is accounted
for by debt, which gained $119 billion in value. Existing preferred equity, which is junior to
debt, but senior to other forms of equity, rose by $6.7 billion. In contrast, common equity
lost $2.8 billion (in line with the underinvestment theory). Since the $125 billion in preferred
equity are estimated to be worth only between $89 and $112 billion, the bailout comes at a
cost of between $13 and $36 billion to taxpayers, directly transferred to the banks (or, more
specically, mostly its creditors). Relating this to the gain of $130 billion, it still represents
an overall creation of value. Consistent with Myers (1977), the authors estimate the total
transfer of value to debtholders upon the announcement of the capital injection to be $38
billion, supporting the view that the great deal of the rebound in rm value is absorbed by
debtholders. The data also suggest that the probability of a bank run decreased following
the announcement of the equity infusion. Accordingly, the expected costs of bankruptcy were
reduced and, thus, corporate values elevated. The nancial institutions most threatened by
a bank run recorded the highest gains in value. However, when considering (with the benet
of hindsight) alternative government interventions, the authors arrive at the conclusion that
the outcome of the government intervention could have been reached on better terms, i.e.,
with less costs to taxpayers, for example trough a swap of debt for equity.
In his paper, Myers (1977) examines other possible solutions to the problem, such as rewriting
and renegotiating the debt contract55, shortening debt maturity56 or restricting dividends in
55See Bhattacharya and Faure-Grimaud (2001) for more details on debt restructuring. Tirole (2006, p.
126) even suggests that it is not risky debt, but the lack of (partial) debt forgiveness that is at the core
of the underinvestment problem: Renegotiation breakdown creates debt overhang. Specically, free-riding
behavior among small public creditors poses a major threat. Individual investors have an incentive not
to participate in the restructuring because their claims will rise in value if everyone else takes part (in an
exchange o¤er, for example), cf. Gertner and Scharfstein (1991). Gilson et al. (1990) report from a sample
of 169 public, nancially distressed U.S. rms that in 53% of all cases private restructuring indeed failed,
prompting bankruptcy and, thus, reorganization under Chapter 11. Furthermore, failure of private workout
is more likely when ownership is less concentrated. Franks and Torous (1994) provide similar results.
56This point is frequently made in the literature. Assume debt is short-term in that it matures prior to the
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order to maintain a certain level of cash to nance new investments.57 However, he concludes
that all these attempts are either impossible to enforce or costly to monitor. Moreover, in
perfect capital markets potential lenders will foresee these costs. Upon issue, they will be
reected in the liabilitiesmarket value, providing the rm with fewer funds. Thus, ultimately
shareholders as the owners of the rm fully bear theses costs. At the same time, this provides
them with a strong incentive to solve the problem. But this creates another dilemma: if the
rm decides to take actions against the underinvestment problem by including appropriate
covenants in the bond contract, the associated costs will also lower the rms value relative
to pure equity or risk-free debt nancing. This comes down to trading o¤ the two types of
costs, as shown by Myers (1977). Occhino (2010) promotes the use of sinking funds. These
are corporate accounts into which the rm makes predetermined payments which are then
used to pay back parts of the loan early. The benet hereof is that the level of corporate debt
decreases with the (book) value of assets in place, which is depreciated over time. Provided
that no new debt is taken on, this ensures that the likelihood of underinvestment is reduced.
It is not abolished, however, since some liabilities remain (at least for some time to come) in
the capital structure. The main point we want to emphasize is this: the only way to solve
the problem without incurring any loss in value is the extreme result that risky debt should
never be issued by rms. A rm nanced with risk-free debt or no borrowed capital at all will
feature a di¤erent investment behavior than one with risky debt in its capital structure, for
the latter will let pass by worthwhile investment opportunities. The suboptimal investment
policy is an agency cost induced by risky debt(Myers, 1977, p. 149).58
investment decision. If a state materializes in which shareholders would rather not invest, bondholders could
simply take over the rm and invest in the protable opportunity, cf. Myers (1977, p. 152). Therefore, debt
overhang is usually considered to be more severe for long-term debt. Recently, Diamond and He (2011) rene
this view. They point out that the maturity structure of short-term debt just considered is a special case.
Rather, one should concentrate on debt of di¤erent terms to maturity at the time the investment decision is
made. The authors consider a four-date model of a rm that has both long-term and short-term debt due in
future periods, where the latter needs to be rolled over. They conclude that both types of debt may cause
underinvestment. As a matter of fact, short-term liabilities may actually induce more severe debt overhang.
The inuence of maturity has also been subject to empirical testing, and results are mixed. Guedes and Opler
(1996), who consider roughly 7,300 bond issues in the U.S., use the market-to-book ratio (book value of debt
together with market value of equity over total assets) as a proxy for a rms growth opportunities and nd
that rms with good prospects prefer debt with shorter maturities. Barclay and Smith (1995) also nd that
growth opportunities are negatively related to maturity. On the contrary, Johnson (2003) nds a positive
relation between the two. Finally, Graham and Harvey (2001) survey nearly 400 CFOs and nd that overhang
generally plays no major role in determining corporate debt policy. Specically, there is practically no support
for the use of short-term debt as a means of mitigating underinvestment.
57See, e.g., Kalay (1982) for more information.
58Aivazian and Callen (1980) provide a theoretical counter-argument and claim that e¢ ciency, i.e., the rm
value maximizing investment strategy, is restored easily. Building on Myers(1977) model, they argue that the
adverse incentive e¤ect of risky debt embodied in the transfer of wealth to bondholders is a negative externality
(see Coase, 1960) to shareholding, which results in the value forgone by not investing. Given a perfect
market where there are no transactions costs of bargaining, the authors state that, by the Coase Theorem,
both shareholders and bondholders will want to internalize the externality and, thus, return to the optimal
investment strategy (thereby sharing the resulting gains among them). Specically, this is accomplished by
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Obviously, conning oneself to issuing only safe debt may be impractical in real life. After all,
highly levered rms do exist in the real world. Plus, there are other theories that may answer
the question of why rms issue risky debt.59 However, the model gives a strong rationale to
limit debt in the capital structure.
3.2 Applications and quantications
Before we focus our attention on debt overhang in the context of corporate casualty losses
in the central part of this dissertation, take note that there exists a great number of other
applications and extensions of the underinvestment problem. For example, Perotti and Spier
(1993) present a model in which shareholders use potential underinvestment as a threat in
a wage-bargaining game in order to achieve concessions from their employees. The rm
faces a situation of low prots, which makes further worthwhile investments necessary to
be able to fully pay out wages to the workforce, whose claim is considered senior to any
other. Shareholders, knowing that workers are dependent on the investment decision, may
issue junior debt and use the proceeds to buy back equity in the market in order to increase
leverage in the rms capital structure and, thus, convincingly threaten not to invest in
protable new projects. The concessions extracted in the renegotiation of the wage contract
allow shareholders to reap a greater share of the investments NPV.
Other extensions and applications of the underinvestment problem include Hart and Moore
(1995) and Bhattacharya and Faure-Grimaud (2001). The former modify Myers (1977)
model structure to admit of debt of di¤erent maturities and seniorities available for nancing
investments as well as a self-serving manager, implying that both overinvestment (empire
building, perquisites, etc.) and underinvestment may impede socially optimal investment.
Given these assumptions, the ideal mix of debt and equity with respect to maximizing the
entire rm value is established in the absence of the possibility of renegotiation, with a
either debtholders or shareholders buying up all the claims from the respective counterparty (or an outside
investor buying the entire rm). The price of the claims is a matter of negotiation  a cooperative game
between shareholders and bondholders and will lie somewhere between zero and the value forgone by not
investing. Hence, there is no underinvestment problem. Optimal investment strategy (and thus rm value) is
no matter of corporate capital structure. Note that the fact that the price ultimately paid for the claims is
uncertain (as it depends on ones ability to negotiate) leads to a new problem: how to determine the ex-ante
value of both debt and equity? The authors dedicate the remainder of their article to the solution of this
problem.
59Jensen and Meckling (1976), for example, point out that both equity and debt come with agency costs.
Therefore, debt may simply be the better of two bad options. Once tax considerations come into play, the story
changes signicantly in favor of the issuance of debt because valuable tax shields are created. Evolving out of a
debate (see, e.g., Durand, 1959) over their famous Propositions I-III, this tax benet was rst acknowledged by
Modigliani and Miller (1963) in a correction of their seminal 1958 paper on the irrelevance of capital structure
in perfect capital markets. Miller (1977) later on rationalizes why this does not mean every company should
be maximally levered. He provides an equilibrium theory of the aggregate amount of rm debt in an economy
where personal taxes paid o¤set the gains enjoyed by corporations.
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particular interest in long-term debts role in controlling managements investment behavior.
The latter deal with ine¢ ciencies encountered in the attempt to solve the underinvestment
problem by renegotiating the debt contract in a setting where investment choices are not
veriable. Possibilities to overcome these impediments are discussed as well.
Philippon and Schnabl (2012) do not consider debt overhang in the corporate sector, but
rather in the banking sector. Drawing parallels to the recent global nancial crisis, the
authors consider an entire nancial sector that is crippled by too much leverage (due to a
negative shock). One can imagine the devastating potential of debt overhang on investment
(say, protable bank lending to rms) in the nancial sector, since its adverse e¤ects would
multiply by spilling over to other parts of the economy. The model focuses on the interactions
between banks carrying risky debt and households, who are assumed to own both the equity
and the bonds issued by banks as part of their income portfolio. At the same time, they have
loans outstanding to these institutions. A household will default if its income is lower than
the face value of its loans owed to banks. The latter are assumed to own industrial projects
(their AIPs) and, on top of that, must decide on undertaking new investment opportunities
for which they need to borrow money from the households. A double e¤ect occurs because too
much debt in their capital structure is not only value-destroying for the banks themselves,
but impacts once again by hindering repayments to households (debtholders receive some
repayment, whereas shareholders get none). As part of their income has just been lost,
households cannot repay their loans to other banks and default, which in turn intensies the
debt overhang problem among these institutions. Philippon and Schnabl (2012) underline
the important role of debt overhang in the recent nancial crisis and devote a great part of
their paper to investigating the e¢ ciency of various government intervention schemes (such
as asset purchases or the injection of fresh equity) to stabilize the economy by reestablishing
welfare-improving bank lending.
Leaving behind this model, one can easily think of another potentially disastrous scenario
caused by debt overhang, but this time relating to the corporate sector. If banks face problems
of underinvestment, they may be kept from lending to rms which are in urgent need of
the funds to nance their operations and growth opportunities. Accordingly, the whole
economy may face a downturn because rms are kept from executing the production process.
Either way, debt overhang in the nancial sector potentially has enormous consequences
and may make government interventions necessary. Diamond and Rajan (2011) focus on
underinvestment in the banking sector and its connection with potential re sales of assets
in case of a future nancial crisis due to urgent need of liquidity.
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Debt overhang even causes trouble at the individual/household level. In his empirical study,
Melzer (2010) focuses on levered U.S. homeowners in a state of negative equity, which occurs
when ones mortgage liabilities outweigh the value of ones home. The author uses data
from 2006 to 2009 and argues that negative equity is a proxy for debt overhang and nds
that such households indeed tend to invest less in their homes relative to households with
positive equity, who are further away from strategic mortgage default because their asset
is less levered. Investing in the homes maintenance and improvement to enhance its value
constitutes an avoidable loss in such a situation, since the bank collects the home including the
benets from these investments in case of default.60 Potential objections to this reasoning are
addressed, and discarded: for example, liquidity constraints cannot be used as an explanation
for reduced investment because high-income earners with negative equity cut back, too. Next,
one might object that such investments may simply be poor in that they have negative
NPV, regardless of whether the residence is highly levered. However, this is implausible
because principal payments of underwater homeowners fall behind as well. Unlike measures
of home improvement, such payments, which represent an investment from the mortgagors
perspective, do not boost the value of the house. Therefore, we expect a reduction in these
payments only in the case of debt overhang. Finally, it is found that households do not cut
back on investments that will not accrue to lenders upon default, such as cars or furniture.
Accordingly, Melzer (2010) concludes that debt overhang is the likely cause of the problem.
Olney (1999) hints at mortgage default behavior consistent with underinvestment during the
Great Depression. Unlike with their home loans, households did honor their commitments
in the matter of other consumer credits, e.g., car loans, despite being highly indebted. To
accomplish this, they signicantly cut back on consumption levels. Finally, Mulligan (2008)
presents a model where depressed collateral values (say, due to a recession) create debt
overhang in the mortgage market, which prompts a decline in the supply of labor on behalf
of households. The reason is that homeowners incentives to work fall because they know
that part of their income goes to lenders to pay o¤ the debt. The more negative the equity
is, the lower becomes the incentive to supply labor. Worse still, as creditors maximize their
60Excluding the top ten percent income earners, an American familys residence generally made up for about
45% of all assets owned (the value drops to around 32% for the entire population) in 2007. It follows that
investments in property are among the most important nancial decisions made by families, cf. Bucks et al.
(2009). Christie (2012) reports that the fraction of underwaterhomeowners in the U.S. has risen to 22:8%
by the beginning of 2012. According to Gittelsohn (2011), the city of Las Vegas holds the saddest record with
a stunning 85% of mortgaged homes in negative equity. Foote et al. (2008) examine the empirical relation
between mortgage default and negative equity. In conclusion, underwater homeowners not only invest less,
but default more often, too. In absolute terms, however, the majority will not experience foreclosure. In other
words, ...negative equity is a necessary condition for default, but not a su¢ cient one(Foote et al., 2008, p.
234). Guiso et al. (2011) provide survey evidence that the willingness to default is higher the more negative
the equity position is.
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income through optimal debt forgiveness depending on the households income, stimuli for
other households to renounce labor income in favor of higher debt relief are created, since
higher-income households are taxedmore heavily. Through this channel, excessive leverage
creates unemployment  yet another negative characteristic of debt overhang. Mulligans
(2008) model is reported to be consistent with behavior during the Great Depression.
Kroszner (1998), in an interesting paper, provides empirical support for the positive e¤ects af-
liated with the removal of excessive debt burdens (as underinvestment is alleviated). During
the times of the Great Depression, the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed a case led by creditors
in response to the U.S. governments decision to no longer enforce the so-called gold indexa-
tion clause, which, for reasons of claims protection, granted creditors the right to be repaid
in gold in case the dollar devalued too much with respect to gold. When the depreciation
took place indeed in the wake of U.S. President Roosevelts New Dealprogram to revive the
economy, actually enforcing this right would have radically increased the burden for debtors
(by nearly 70%), putting them into massive nancial trouble. Interestingly, not only share
prices rose upon the courts announcement of the e¤ective haircut, but corporate bond values,
too. Hence, the benet to corporate creditors from eliminating the underinvestment problem
must have outweighed the loss from potentially getting a higher repayment. Additionally, the
price increase is positively related to the amount of debt a rm carries, indicating that the
underinvestment problem becomes more severe with growing leverage, consistent with My-
ers(1977) theory. Obviously, debt relief is everything but a perfect solution to the problem.
Instead, it may simply be the better of two costly options. Once the debt overhang problem
is pronounced in that a rm is highly levered, creditors are (likely) not going to get paid
back in full. This circumstance will be reected in the bond trading well below face value.
Occhino (2010) states that a partial debt relief may be useful if it is su¢ ciently large, since
it brings back the incentives for shareholders to undertake protable investment projects.
Thus, it supports the interest realignment of shareholders and debtholders (though not fully
because usually not all risky debt is forgiven), which will ultimately lead to an increase in the
market price of the remaining debt through value-generating investment. As in Kroszners
(1998) gold indexation example, the impact of this realignment may be so strong that debt,
even though it has been cut, is worth more than in the case without a relief. This is not
to be misunderstood as a general pleading for debt forgiveness. In real life, the outcome of
this tradeo¤ needs to be determined on a case-by-case basis. The general rule for creditors
must be to decide in favor of the haircut if it increases their expected repayment. Since
such a procedure, if undertaken, will be benecial to shareholders as well, debt forgiveness
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constitutes a Pareto improvement. Either way, it is clear that a loss remains for debtholders
relative to being paid back in full.
In a related paper, Giroud et al. (2012) second the potentially benecial character of debt
forgiveness, using an innovative approach. They examine the fates of 115 highly indebted
Austrian ski hotels that undergo debt restructuring. Their approach is unique in that it allows
the authors to di¤erentiate between rms that indeed face nancial distress because of debt
overhang (strategic defaulters) and those whose nancial situation is simply accounted
for by a streak of bad luck (liquidity defaulters). That is to say, several highly levered
ski resorts may have simply su¤ered a series of adverse demand shocks. Unlike in the case
of debt overhang, writing o¤ some of the debt in favor of these creditors is uncalled for
because the distressed situation is merely a problem of temporary illiquidity (rather than
insolvency), which could be resolved, for example, by extending the debts time to maturity.
The big question is, of course, how to assign a rm to its respective group.61 The answer is:
snowfall. Obviously, the amount of snow signicantly determines a ski hotels performance.
The authors measure unexpected snow for each hotel, that is, the average snowfall in
the two years prior to the restructuring relative to the average snowfall in the previous ten
years. The reasoning is that a liquidity defaulter has experienced two bad years, whereas a
strategic defaulter goes into restructuring despite having had lots of snow and, thus, good
prospects for business (under normal circumstances). Hence, such kind of bad performance
is not accidental, making underinvestment (undermaintanance) the likely cause. Two results
are especially noteworthy. First, Austrian banks apparently are capable of distinguishing
between strategic and liquidity defaulters. Despite having had similar leverage ratios prior
to the restructuring, no substantial debt relief is granted to hotels that experienced negative
unexpected snow (roughly half of the sample), while for those with a lot of unexpected
snowfall, i.e., strategic defaulters, creditors agree to signicant reductions (23% of the debt
owed is forgiven on average). It seems that leverage cuts are only awarded to rms who truly
need them. Second, for the hotels su¤ering from debt overhang, the result is qualitatively
similar to Kroszner (1998) and, thus, consistent with Myers (1977). Larger write-o¤s are
signicantly associated with larger increases in operating performance (as measured by return
on assets), supporting a benecial role of debt relief in the presence of debt overhang.
What is more, one can also adopt a macroeconomic perspective on the debt overhang issue.
61 In an analysis of homeownersattitudes towards defaulting on their mortgage in the wake of the recent
global nancial crisis, Guiso et al. (2011, p. 2) annotate: [T]he main problem in studying strategic defaults
is that this is de facto an unobservable event. While we do observe defaults, we cannot observe whether a
default is strategic.
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Occhino and Pescatori (2010) apply the underinvestment problem in a standard business
cycle model that includes households, rms, banks and the government. The novelty is that
debt overhang intensies and prolongs the already adverse e¤ects of negative macroeconomic
shocks (to technology and/or productivity) on the economy by transporting them onto the
rmsbalance sheets. In a (shock-induced) recession, rmsasset values are depressed, in-
creasing the leverage ratio and, thus, the probability of default. This brings (amplied) debt
overhang to the scene, which in turn further decreases rm value by distorting investment
as rms do not favor investment that would merely boost their creditorsclaims, leading to
an even greater probability of default. Firms nd themselves trapped in a vicious circle.
Accordingly, an already bad economic situation is made worse. This calls for government
interventions, for example expansive scal policy, in order to trigger o¤ investment and,
thus, partly o¤set the underinvestment problem. Two other models provide similar conclu-
sions. First, Lamont (1995) considers a general equilibrium model where investment activity
depends on agentsexpectations on the economys well-being: in good times, investment op-
portunities have high returns, whereas the opposite holds true during recessions. One and
the same (su¢ ciently high) level of preexisting leverage in rmsbalance sheets may trigger
underinvestment. Sunspots determine the outcome, giving rise to multiple equilibria. If a
recession is expected, rms will refrain from investing because returns would not su¢ ce to
support their own claims (but accrue to debtholders instead), and the economic activity in-
deed turns out low. Thus, owing to corporate debt, pessimistic expectations cause a shock
to the economy in the model. Second, Philippon (2010) presents a theoretical model that
considers a double debt overhang, both in the market for mortgages on the borrower level and
in the market for bank bonds on the lender level. Due to interdependencies between these
two, exogenous shocks loom larger because underinvestment in one of the markets intensies
its counterpart in the other.
Leaving the corporate environment for a moment, Krugman (1988), surprisingly without
mentioning Myers (1977), engages himself in development economics and applies the under-
investment problem in a macroeconomic setting where the best way for creditors to deal with
heavily indebted (development) countries is explored. In Krugmans (1988, p. 255) deni-
tion, [A] country has a debt overhang problem when the expected present value of potential
future resource transfers is less than its debt. The resource transfer that creditors expect to
receive can roughly be compared to a companys cash ow stream out of which it nances its
current debt payments. In conclusion, it may in some circumstances be better for creditors
to reduce the adverse incentives of debt nancing instead of insisting on the settlement of
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the claims in full. By forgiving part of the debt, they may actually end up receiving a higher
expected repayment in comparison to maintaining the original face value. The reason is that
not backing down from their full entitlement is equivalent to gambling for the country to
strike lucky economically.62 Note, however, that in the presence of a multiplicity of investors
coordination among them is vital for e¢ cient debt relief because otherwise there exist high
incentives to free ride individually by holding out and having others write o¤ their claims.63
This is stated by Fischer (1989), for example. Sachs (1989) also considers the problems of
debt overhang faced by developing countries, for which, in contrast to the corporate sector,
there is no bankruptcy code equivalent that would provide legal security and protection for
creditors. Instead, such insolvencies have to be addressed through (politically motivated)
negotiations between creditors and debtors, giving rise to ine¢ cient outcomes. The author,
too, concludes that there are good reasons to partly cancel a countrys debt when it is deep
under water. Sachs (2002) further provides suggestions for reformation and formalization of
the process of working out nancially distressed poor countries with the help of international
institutions, such as major U.N. agencies.
Overall, debt relief for poor and highly indebted countries is a major eld of research in
development economics. This is partly due to the fact that its e¤ectiveness is controversial
empirically. Easterly (2002) reviews the track record of two decades of relief e¤orts, and
his results are mixed. He nds that debt forgiveness is only an e¤ective instrument for
development assistance if it is granted to countries that at the same time fundamentally
change their economic policies for the better (which should be subject to monitoring). In
that case, it may spark good long-term investment that is actually welfare-increasing to the
public. If, however, it is provided to heavily indebted poor countries [HIPCs]64 that adhere
to their bad economic behavior subsequently, its consequences can easily leave the country
62Apart from the debt overhang rationale, there is another channel through which debt relief fosters invest-
ment and, thus, growth. As pointed out by Cohen (1993), it frees up valuable resources. Given a development
country is in nancial trouble, but actually pays back some of its debt, the author nds that debt service itself
suppresses (urgently needed) investment. The funds used for paying o¤ the liabilities are obviously not avail-
able for nancing investment. Cohen (1993) argues that generally ascribing the crowding out of investment
solely to debt overhang is a naive point of view. If a highly indebted country is not expected to pay back (part
of) its debt due to its bad reputation anyway, then there should be no (large) adverse e¤ect on investment.
63The debt restructuring of Greece, which likely su¤ers from large debt overhang, provides a recent example.
After tough negotiations, 85:8% of private investors initially agreed to the restructuring in March of 2012 to
provide Greece with much needed debt relief. The Greek government did not stop there, however. By enacting
so-called collective action clauses, it forced all holders of bonds falling under Greek jurisdiction to participate,
raising the percentage to 95:7 (nearly e200 billion). This action e¤ectively ruled out free riding behavior for
all investors under Greek law. The missing 4:3% covered by non-Greek law have been given an extension to
voluntarily join the restructuring. Free riding could pay o¤ for this minority. See Petrakis and Christie (2012).
64The International Monetary Fund [IMF] and the World Bank jointly established the so-called HIPC
Initiative in 1996 with the objective of providing reasonable debt relief to poor countries. As of December
2011, 36 countries have been granted a total of $ 76 billion in debt forgiveness. For more information on the
program and a denition of an HIPC, see the associated IMF Factsheet (2011)
3. Corporate underinvestment in the presence of symmetric information 65
in a situation worse than before the cut. By re-accumulating more new debt, it ends up with
a higher public debt quota. There are several reasons. For example, it gives rise to moral
hazard, in that developing countries may borrow generously, being condent that their debt
will be relieved in the future yet again. Furthermore, it postpones urgently needed economic
reforms. Thus, debt relief may end up reducing its aim to absurdity. To overcome these
ine¢ ciencies of debt forgiveness, the author suggests a policy of a one-time-only o¤er to cut
debt in conjunction with a credible commitment not to grant future write-o¤s. Of course,
this is not easy to put into practice.
Cordella and Missale (2011) also point to the shortcomings of a policy of providing debt
relief to every HIPC. They establish a (costly) mechanism that separates good from bad
governments. In their model, creditworthy countries distinguish themselves from their bad
counterparts via the choice between debt relief and foreign aid. The idea is that good gov-
ernments will opt for debt forgiveness because it provides them with a fresh start.
Cordella et al. (2005) go about empirically examining the inuence of debt on growth for
HIPCs versus non-HIPCs, using a panel data set of 79 developing countries over a period of
32 years. At rst, it might come as a surprise that debt does not have a signicant e¤ect
on growth in the HIPC group, whereas there is a signicant and robust negative impact of
debt on non-HIPCs.65 This, however, is merely indicative of the fact that debt ceases to
exert inuence on public sector investment above some threshold level. It does not imply
that a major debt relief is not benecial to heavily indebted developing countries. The cut
needs to be large enough to push the amount of debt below the irrelevance threshold. To
come to this conclusion, the authors concentrate on debt levels over the entire sample, i.e.,
irrespective of whether a country is an HIPC or non-HIPC. They nd a signicant and robust
negative debt-growth relationship at intermediate liability levels, implying that debt overhang
only occurs within a certain debt interval, namely above the debt overhang" threshold and
below the irrelevance threshold. In addition, the size of this interval is found to be bigger for
countries with better institutions and policies. In a similar way, Imbs and Ranciere (2005)
conduct an empirical study of 87 developing countries for the years 1969 through to 2002.
They also nd a negative relation between initial external debt and growth. However, this
impact of debt overhang only starts to take e¤ect once the face value of debt passes the
average threshold of 55% of GDP. Consistent with this result, Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2010)
determine an external debt threshold of 60% of GDP above which growth starts to slow
down notably, using a sample of 20 emerging markets for the years 1970-2009. Outcomes
65Chowdhury (2001), in a smaller sample which spans a shorter time period, nds a signicant (and robust)
relationship in both the HIPC and the non-HIPC group.
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such as these have led to the establishment of the concept of a debt-growth La¤er curve in the
literature (or at least the downward sloping part that corresponds to higher liability levels),
with debt overhang setting in once the peak of the curve has been passed. Pattillo et al.
(2002) also support this view. From a panel data set of 93 developing countries, they nd
that high levels of external indebtedness are counterproductive for growth.66
Arslanalp and Henry (2005) make use of the stock market to assess the e¤ectiveness of hair-
cuts. For a group of 16 developing economies that receive a reduction of their liabilities under
a program initiated by the U.S. government, they nd that debt relief is indeed benecial to
both parties involved. In the 12 months prior to the cuts announcement, the stock market
index of a participating debtor country on average rises by 60%, while the share prices of the
western debtor banks appreciate by 35% on average in the corresponding period.
Finally, moving on from HIPCs, Brown and Lane (2011) examine whether debt overhang
endangers the economies of emerging Europe, i.e., Eastern European countries, as a con-
sequence of the recent global nancial crisis. They nd that the great majority of these
countries does not face serious distortions due to underinvestment. On the macroeconomic
level, this holds true because public debt levels are mostly low in emerging Europe. The same
basically applies to the sector level, both for households and enterprises. Merely the nancial
sector constitutes a partial exception. Due to the crisis, a good deal of loans is in default in
some of the countries, representing a potential danger in the future. Overall, however, debt
overhang does not pose a major threat to Eastern Europe. This concludes the side trip to
the eld of risky debt and its e¤ect on public sector investment in development economics.
Let us return to the underinvestment problem in the context of corporate nancing one more
time. So far, we have explored how (debt) nancing negatively inuences corporate invest-
ment decisions in that it harms overall rm value. A natural question to ask is whether it
is possible to quantify this underinvestment e¤ect. In other words, how much rm value is
actually lost? This is not a straightforward task and requires quite a bit of abstracting from
the original model framework to also include other e¤ects a¤ecting rm value. Further, it
requires quite a bit of explaining. Arguably, the most sophisticated approach to quantify-
ing debt overhang is provided by Moyen (2007). The author examines a rms investment
decision in a dynamic stochastic framework with innite horizon. This means that, unlike
66The World Bank (2012) provides an extensive overview of external debt for 129 developing countries. In
recent years, total outstanding debt has steadily risen, exceeding $4 trillion at the end of 2010. However, at
the country level, outstanding liabilities remain low as a percentage of gross national income. As a matter
of fact, debt levels have been on the decline, making up 21% on average in 2010. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2006) report that developing economies increasingly substitute external debt for equity-type liabilities, such
as foreign direct investment.
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in Myers (1977), there is more than one point in time where investment is decided upon.
The model is embedded in an environment where both taxes and bankruptcy are present.
In making a decision on investment, the rm has to balance the positive e¤ect of interest
tax shields generated by corporate debt against a deadweight cost associated with the rms
bankruptcy, incurred by the rm when shareholders default and debtholders take over as
the new and sole owners. To understand the idea of how investment is actually put to use
in the model, here is a basic sketch of what is happening: in order to describe a rms
income-generating process, two functions are modeled explicitly. The capital accumulation
process is one of them. Investment in the rms capital stock (which depreciates over time)
is endogenous and is decided upon every period . Then, capital enters into the corporate
income production function. Additionally, there is an exogenous, time-varying income shock,
which also enters into the production function. Shocks stand for the investment opportunities
that the rm encounters as time passes: the better opportunities there are, the higher the
income. From this, the value of debt (incorporating the deadweight cost in case of default)
and equity can be calculated. Firm value accounts for taxes, depreciation tax shields, interest
tax shields (given the presence of corporate debt)67 and all other variables relevant to value.
Most notably, a major innovation of Moyens (2007) work is that it allows investment to be
completely exible. That is, investment in the capital stock can be fully reversed, so that it
generally may be positive or negative. In other words, the rm may sell some of its assets.
Since underinvestment is due to shareholdersself-interest when deciding on investments, the
objective function of the levered rm is to maximize its equity value (and not rm value). It
does so by choosing an optimal investment amount every period after the income shock has
been observed. Debt overhang is then quantied as the value lost relative to rst-best value.
Of course, this raises the question which benchmark to use as rst-best. The author considers
both an all-equity rm and a levered total-value-maximizing rm for this purpose. Counter-
intuitively, the latter is the correct choice. Even though Myers (1977) employs the former,
using an all-equity rm would be an understatement in this model. The reason is that it does
not consider nancing frictions caused by debt. Only the levered total-value-maximizing rm
incorporates the (tax) benets and (default) detriments of debt. Such a company counters
the threat of default by investing more than the all-equity rm today in order to achieve
higher cash ows and, thus, a lower probability of default tomorrow. This benchmark leads
67Using an enormous sample of U.S. rms, Graham (2000) empirically calculates the tax benet of corporate
debt and concludes that it is worth 9:7% of the market value of an average rm. A second nding is that,
ironically, especially large and healthy corporations could utilize a good deal more debt in their capital struc-
ture. A typical rm in the sample could double its tax benets by levering up. In doing so, it would increase
its value by 15:7%. For a literature review on the signicance of taxes on corporate nancing decisions, see
Graham (2003).
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to a greater debt overhang. Note that other agency costs of debt, for example Jensen and
Mecklings (1978) asset substitution (cf. fn. 52), are ruled out in the model. The value
lost is thus accredited solely to debt overhang.68 Additionally, Moyen (2007) considers both
short-term and long-term debt. This is done for purposes of verifying that underinvestment
is mainly a problem of long-term debt, as mentioned in fn. 56. Given that two di¤erent
benchmarks and two di¤erent kinds of debt are considered, a specication of ve di¤ering
models is required  one for the unlevered rm, two for the equity-value-maximizing rm
(one each for short- and long-term debt) and two for the total-value-maximizing corpora-
tion. As the models cannot be solved analytically, they are rst calibrated and then solved
numerically. From this procedure, the author concludes that debt indeed causes large over-
hang losses. Notably, the result remains by and large independent of whether short-term or
long-term liabilities are used.69 This argues against conventional wisdom that debt overhang
is mainly a problem of long-term debt. Specically, given the total-value-maximizing rm
as the benchmark, results show that the costs of underinvestment amount to 4:7% of rm
value for long-term debt, while the respective costs are even slightly higher for short-term
liabilities, totaling 5:12% (when dening the unlevered rm as the benchmark, the values are
a mere 0:49% and 0:46% of the all-equity rm value, respectively). Moyen (2007) attributes
the circumstance that costs are so high to the investment exibility enjoyed by rms in her
model.
A paper that is closely related comes from Titman and Tsyplakov (2007). They consider a
similar model, where (continuous and less exible) investment and nancing decisions deter-
mine the value of a levered rm in the presence of taxes and costs associated with nancial
distress. The main goal of their paper is to explore how quickly a rm moves towards its
target debt ratio, which is exible over time. The authors specically address the e¤ects of
debt overhang on the rms adjustment behavior. In the course of this undertaking, they
also quantify the underinvestment problem, once again determined by comparing the values
of the equity-value-maximizing rm and the total-value-maximizing rm. In line with Moyen
(2007), their numerical results state that long-term debt causes an agency cost of 5:27% of
the total-value-maximizing rm value (short-term debt is not considered).
The losses calculated by Moyen (2007) and Titman and Tsyplakov (2007) are larger than
those reported in the earlier literature on the extent of underinvestment. For example, Mello
and Parsons (1992) report a very low agency cost of debt, even though costs other than debt
68We refer the interested reader to Leland (1998), Ericsson (2000) and Décamps and Djembissi (2007) for
studies that model and quantify the adverse e¤ects of asset substitution.
69 In case one is wondering what short-term and long-term actually means in reality, Johnson (2003),
among others, uses a threshold level of three years of maturity to di¤erentiate between the two.
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overhang are not explicitly excluded. They build on a contingent claims model originally
used by Brennan and Schwartz (1985) and consider the decision to operate a mine (and
extract a natural resource) or not and how this decision is inuenced by the presence of
leverage. A modication to the original model permits the incorporation of agency problems
of debt. Tax benets and costs of nancial distress are present. Following the approach
described above, the authors conclude that the agency cost amounts to a mere 0:8% of rst-
best rm value (for a rm whose debt-to-value ratio is 18%). In a related model, Mauer and
Ott (2000) do not consider the option to operate, but the (irreversible) option to expand
operations. Their ndings indicate only a slightly higher agency cost of debt of about 1:3%
of total-value-maximizing rm value.
Parrino and Weisbach (1999) use a di¤erent approach by applying Monte Carlo simulations
to numerically quantify the adverse e¤ect of corporate liabilities. Their approach is more
general in that they do not focus on a particular cost, but measure every kind of conict
between shareholders and bondholders arising from equity-value-maximizing investment be-
havior. For instance, a transfer of wealth from debtholders to shareholders may take place
by both refusing to invest in a safe positive-NPV project (underinvestment) and taking on
risky negative-NPV investments (asset substitution/overinvestment). Accordingly, one can-
not disentangle the impact of debt overhang from that of other possible agency distortions.
Notwithstanding this multitude of e¤ects, the authors reason that [R]esults imply that dis-
tortions for the projects in these simulations are not large enough to explain capital structure
decisions in most cases(Parrino and Weisbach, 1999, p. 39). This holds true even though
they are found to increase with leverage. These results are inconsistent with the large and
unfavorable e¤ects reported by Moyen (2007) and Titman and Tsyplakov (2007). The latter
two allow for more exible investment, however.
Finally, the importance of investment exibility for agency cost calculations is also seized on
by Manso (2008), who demonstrates, applying a short mathematical proof, that the magni-
tude of the agency cost of debt (both underinvestment and asset substitution) varies neg-
atively with the degree of investment reversibility in a model of dynamic investment. The
author considers a rm that has a (risky) consol bond outstanding, where no bankruptcy
costs or tax advantages to debt are present.70 A rm possesses a certain technology that has
a specic cash ow process associated with it (think of a production line for a consumption
70A consol bond is a bond that makes coupon payments in perpetuity and, hence, never repays its face
value. This type of nancial instrument is chosen in order to focus on long-term debt in the model, thus
accommodating the notion that debt overhang is primarily associated with liabilities of longer maturities, cf.
fn. 56. Though extremely rare, perpetual bonds are in fact issued, cf. The Wall Street Journal (2012).
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good). As time passes, the rm is free to invest in another technology, but incurs a cost
every time it switches from one to the other. In the presence of debt, a rm may, for exam-
ple, experience underinvestment by sticking too long to a poor technology because it wants
to evade the switching cost. If the rm defaults, bondholders continue operations and may
opt for another technology. Investment reversibility is dened over the size of the switching
cost. Given perfect reversibility, i.e., no switching cost, the author proves that there are no
ine¢ ciencies induced by debt nancing. The rst-best investment scheme (as benchmarked
by all-equity nancing) is implemented accordingly. In that case, debt overhang does not
matter. Mathematically, it is shown that the present value of agency costs is always less
than the present value of the highest possible switching cost incurred at default. Therefore,
when there is no switching cost, there cannot be any agency cost and, thus, no ine¢ cient
investment in such a circumstance.
3.3 Empirical evidence on underinvestment
Establishing quantications of the underinvestment problem from numerical model solutions
has one major advantage: it allows for the determination of both the rst-best value (ac-
cording to whatever standard) and the ms value when shareholders are in charge. All that
is left to do is determine debt overhang from a comparison of the two. Unfortunately, we
are not blessed with this luxury in reality. How is one to establish the rst-best value of
a rm when all we have at hand is real-world observations? We cannot use two di¤erent
values, but can merely work with the one (and only one) observable. Therefore, quantifying
the debt overhang e¤ect empirically su¤ers from the circumstance that we generally do not
have the proper benchmark, i.e., rst-best rm value. It is possible, however, to determine
whether debt and, thus, underinvestment exert a signicant (negative) inuence on corporate
investment by running a regression with the help of panel data. Given the complex quanti-
cation of debt overhang above, one can imagine that deriving empirical results is not simple
and far from straightforward. Once again, the most recent research is (arguably) the most
sophisticated. A pioneering study is conducted by Hennessy (2004), who provides a direct
empirical test of Myers(1977) underinvestment problem.
Before we present results, however, we need to make sure that we have a proper understanding
of the theory involved in the authors model, which is then validated by the use of data. In
order to assess the impact of debt overhang empirically, we are interested in the question
of how nancing decisions inuence investment (and, thus, growth). That is, investment
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represents the dependent variable in a regression.
But how is a rms investment actually determined? This is not a trivial task. Let us go
back in time and provide a sketch of the theory of investment essential to comprehending
Hennessy (2004). It all starts with James Tobin and his famous q theory, developed in an
inuential paper in 1969. Usually, people will refer to Tobins qas a rms market value
over its book value.71 This is because, unfortunately, people are usually inexact. We need
to be more precise. Specically, we must distinguish between average q and marginal q. As
described by Hayashi (1982, p. 214), [R]emember that q, which we call marginal q, is the
ratio of the market value of an additional unit of capital to its replacement cost. What we can
observe is average q, namely the ratio of the market value of existing capital to its replacement
cost. Hence, people usually have average q in mind when talking about Tobins q.72 Tobin
(1969) shows that the optimal corporate investment policy is an increasing function of q
(be just a little patient as to the adjective before q). If a rms q is above one, then it
should adjust its capital stock accordingly, i.e., increase the stock through investment until
q equals unity (given there are no adjustment costs to the capital stock), when all protable
growth projects have been exhausted. The decisive point is that, in economic theory, a
rms investment decision is decided upon at the margin. That is, investment should be
carried out when a marginal dollar of investment in the capital stock is worth more than it
costs to replace. Therefore, Tobin (1969) is really referring to marginal q as a measure of
optimal investment, cf. Mussa (1977). This provides the basis for empirical studies. Now, the
problem is that, in contrast to average q which can be computed rather easily with the help
of publicly available data, we cannot observe marginal q in reality.73 Fortunately, they can
be identical under certain conditions. This result is rst established by Hayashi (1982), who
formulates both a direct relationship between marginal and average q and furthermore sets
out the conditions under which they are equivalent, given the presence of adjustment costs.
Abel and Eberly (1994) also provide conditions for the equality of average and marginal
71Growth rms will usually have a high q. This is because valuable future growth opportunities are capi-
talized into the a rms share price, but not its book value. Firms in saturated industries, where prots come
increasingly from cost savings, will have lower values of q on average.
72Erickson and Whited (2000) are even more precise in their q-denitions. They state that average q is the
value the manager assigns to its rms existing capital stock divided by its replacement cost. Tobins q, on the
other hand, is the ratio of the market value of the existing capital stock over replacement cost. Given e¢ cient
markets, these valuations will coincide. In that case, average q and Tobins q will be one and the same.
73Ang and Beck (2000) state that many researchers disregard this fact and use average q as a proxy for
investment nevertheless. Caballero (1999) reports that regression results are frequently dissatisfactory in that
the coe¢ cient on average q is insignicant, while other measures, such as cash ows, turn out to be signicant
in determining investment. Erickson and Whited (2000) indicate that there have been a lot of incorrect
conclusions in measuring investment via marginal q because there is huge potential for measurement errors.
It seems a lot of studies haven not been conducted thoroughly enough (the authorsentire paper is devoted
to this issue and provides a good overview). The authors note that, if applied correctly, q theoryworks
ne. Hayashi (1982) also advises extreme caution in thoughtlessly using average q as a proxy for marginal q.
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q, but do so in an extended framework where xed costs of investment are incorporated
into the adjustment costs.74 If these conditions are honored when working with data, then
empirical validation should lead to reliable results. In that case, the beauty of the theory
is that marginal q is a ...su¢ cient statistic for investment (Hennessy, 2004, p. 1717) and
comprises the entire set of relevant factors to investment (cf. Erickson and Whited, 2000, p.
1027). Hence, in principle, a single independent variable determines optimal investment in a
correctly conducted regression.
Which nally brings us back to Hennessy (2004), who makes use of Abel and Eberlys (1994)
model (before testing it empirically)  though not without applying some necessary and
important changes. The problemwith both Hayashis (1982) and Abel and Eberlys (1994)
work is that they do not consider leverage in their setup, but act on the assumption of an
unlevered rm. We, however, are interested in testing for investment distortions caused
by leverage. Therefore, Hennessy (2004) considers a rm that initially has a consol bond
outstanding. Investment decisions are made with the aim of maximizing shareholder value,
prompting the issue of additional stocks in case internal funds are insu¢ cient. In comparison
to an all-equity rm, the di¢ culty with debt is that it raises the possibility of default, in
which case creditors would take over as the new sole (equity) owners and follow the rst-
best investment scheme, bringing us back to Hayashis (1982) and Abel and Eberlys (1994)
equity-only theory. Prior to a potential default, however, this inconsistency in considering
an unlevered and a levered rm has serious consequences for marginal q. This is worth
emphasizing again: as in Hayashi (1982), the original theory on the conditions for average q
to be equal to marginal q (which in turn is a measure of optimal investment) is based on an all-
equity rm. Once initial debt nancing is considered in the capital structure, circumstances
change in that marginal q does not equal average q anymore. Before producing regression
results, marginal q of the levered rm must therefore be adopted to incorporate the e¤ects
of debt nancing, such as the possibility of default and its associated bankruptcy costs.
Exactly this discrepancy between average and marginal q is utilized by Hennessy (2004) to
build a testable theory of the adverse e¤ects of debt nancing on corporate investment (i.e.,
debt overhang). Importantly, since the rms management, as in Myers (1977), is assumed
to work exclusively in the interest of shareholders and, thus, maximizes equity value, it is not
anymore marginal q that is relevant to optimal investment, but levered equitys marginal q.
And Hennessy (2004) argues that average q overestimates levered equitys marginal q: when
74Most importantly, in both Hayashi (1982) and Abel and Eberly (1994), the rm must act as a price taker
(perfect competition), plus the production function and the adjustment cost function of the capital stock need
to be linearly homogeneous (constant returns to scale).
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shareholders make use of their default option in the model, lenders take over and recover
the rm net of some value lost (the bankruptcy cost) during the process of reorganizing
the company. The post-default recovery value is irrelevant to shareholders because they
only care about cash ows benecial to themselves, i.e., before default. To debtholders,
however, this value is relevant as they seize it upon default. In e¢ cient capital markets, it
will be reected in the market value of debt. The market value of debt in turn enters into
the computation of average q (in the numerator). Therefore, average q is large relative to
levered equitys marginal q because part of the market value of debt captures post-default
cash ows from pre-default investments, to be recovered by lenders when shareholders bail
out. Since these investments are decided upon by shareholders, who simply do not care
about recovery values, average q does not represent a satisfying statistic anymore. That
is, ...nancial frictions drive a wedge between marginal and average Q (Hennessy et al.,
2007, p. 700). To account for this e¤ect, and in order to reestablish a proper measure
for optimal investment, Hennessy (2004) shows that the market value of recoveries in the
event of default (normalized by capital) must be subtracted from average q. The result
is levered equitys marginal q75  the relevant measure for determining investment in the
presence of initial debt. Most importantly, the (normalized) recovery values constitute the
proxy for the debt overhang correction term in the regression. The greater the magnitude of
the correction term, the more severe the underinvestment. Here is the intuition behind this
procedure: in subtracting recovery values from average q, we correct corporate investment for
returns accruing to debtholders. In other words, the rms investment, which is decided on
by shareholders, is lowered due to the presence of leverage. This should sound familiar: we
have got ourselves a test for Myers(1977) underinvestment problem  and the good news is
75 In other words, we adjust the statistic known to be a measure of rst-best investment in the benchmark
case of an all-equity rm, as provided by Hayashi (1982) and Abel and Eberly (1994), for the (debt overhang)
e¤ect of leverage. Taking a rm that is completely nanced with equity as the benchmark may potentially
not be without limitation, however. Remember that Moyen (2007), in her numerical quantication of the debt
overhang described in the last section, noted that the preferable benchmark in measuring underinvestment
is not the all-equity rm, but the levered total-value-maximizing rm, since the latter incorporates interest
tax shields and other e¤ects. This may, of course, be due to her model specications. Nevertheless, it could
turn out to be an interesting area of future research for measuring debt overhang empirically. Note that
Hayashi (1982) does consider the e¤ects of tax and depreciation in establishing the equality of average q and
marginal q in his all-equity theory. Poterba and Summers (1983) set on extending Hayashis (1982) results
to incorporate tax e¤ects of dividends paid out by the rm. Edwards and Keen (1985) consider the e¤ects of
debt nancing on the value of marginal q, but do not specify the relationship between average and marginal
q. Recently, Bustamante (2011) considers a rm, having initial long-term debt outstanding, which faces costs
of adjustment, investment and nancing. The author nds that marginal q is merely a necessary (but not
su¢ cient) statistic because both the correction for debt overhang and the available corporate cash ows have
explanatory power. The exact discrepancy between average and marginal q is not established by the author.
Rather, it is acknowledged that average q is a noisy proxy of marginal q. Bolton et al. (2011) present a model
of investment and q in the presence of nancing frictions which stresses the critical role of cash for corporate
investment and nancing decisions.
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that recovery values are observable (as well as capital, by which they are normalized). Thus,
when added in a regression as an independent variable, its coe¢ cient should enter with a
negative sign  if the theory is correct. This constitutes a testable hypothesis (and brings
to an end our short chronological sketch of the theory involved). Note that the wedge
between average and levered equitys marginal q should be smaller for high bankruptcy costs
because they imply lower recovery values for debtholders, resulting in a smaller correctional
term subtracted from average q. Also take note that the inclusion of another regressor, i.e.,
the correction term, makes marginal q a necessary statistic, but no longer a su¢ cient one.
The theoretical model of the rm used by Hennessy (2004) for empirical testing furthermore
includes (endogenous) adjustment costs as well as nancial distress. Other distortions, such
as asset substitution, are excluded. Roughly speaking, the rm optimally invests in the cap-
ital stock in the presence of adjustment costs, and capital then enters into the production
function, which is used to determine operating prots. Investment is then shown to depend
on marginal q and recovery values.76 Finally, a specic estimator is used in order to ac-
count for measurement error in average q. The author considers a set of panel data of U.S.
manufacturing rms that spans four years and yields a total of 1,112 rm-year observations.
Results indeed endorse the existence of corporate underinvestment. The coe¢ cient on the
correction term for debt overhang is negative and signicant. Robustness is ensured, too.
What is more, regarding economic signicance, it is found that the correction term takes on
considerably larger values for rms with a low bond rating. This yields further support in
that rms that already are in deep debt-trouble (and have a low rating accordingly) invest
a lot less. In other words, consistent with Myers(1977) theoretical predictions, rms that
have lots of debt outstanding face a greater underinvestment problem. Summing up, [T]his
lends support to the Myers (1977) contention that rms tend to underinvest because of the
failure of managers to account for investment returns accruing to lenders(Hennessy et al.,
2007, pp. 706-07). Finally, it is shown that debt not only distorts the level of investment,
but alters its composition, too. Specically, debt overhang causes a preference on behalf of
shareholders to invest in short-lived assets. This is reasonable, once considering that the
correction term consists of the normalized market value of recoveries received by bondholders
76Few other regressors are included. On the one hand, this is done to warrant correct econometric imple-
mentation of the regression procedure. On the other, additional regressors are also implemented to allow for
more specic conclusions. For instance, a dummy variable is introduced that divides the rm-year observations
in the sample into two groups according to their bond rating. If it is above investment grade (S&P rating of
BB+), the rm is considered to have a high rating, which in turn is used as a proxy for the ability to issue
additional secured debt in the future. This is done because Myers (1977, p. 165-66) shows that nancing
the investment project with new secured debt (instead of equity) may mitigate the underinvestment problem
because it dilutes the investment benets to old bondholders in favor of new bondholders. Counter to this
reasoning, the coe¢ cient on the dummy variable does not turn out statistically signicant in the regression.
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upon (the expected time of) default: roughly speaking, an asset whose value depreciates
slowly will usually have a higher value at a given time of default relative to an asset installed
at the same time for the same price, but with a higher rate of depreciation. Shareholders,
who are only interested in pre-default values, therefore tend to invest in shorter-lived assets,
changing the composition of the rms capital stock.
In a related model, Hennessy et al. (2007) generalize Hennessys (2004) work in that they
consider two further investment distortions caused by external nancing in addition to the
inuence of debt overhang. For one, they cover the e¤ects of collateral constraints, which
place a limit on the amount of future corporate borrowing and, thus, on the amount of
future debt-based investment. The idea is that rms which face such constraints will invest
more today, reasoning that the increased capital stock acts as collateral for tomorrows debt.
Second, focusing on an equity-related friction, convex costs of issuing fresh equity are regarded
as well. This is meant to account for the adverse e¤ects of asymmetric information, like in
Myers and Majluf (1984). The idea behind convex costs is that a rm has a harder time raising
funds with each additional dollar of new equity, with the result that it will ultimately invest
less than a rm with enough cash at hand to nance an investment project by itself. Albeit we
do not concentrate on asymmetric information in this section, it may be noted that the data
lend support to Myers and Majlufs (1984) theory, since the coe¢ cient turns out negative
(and signicant) in the investment regression. Along the lines of Hennessy (2004), where the
extra regressor (alongside q) captures the e¤ects of debt overhang, the authors add two more
terms to the regression of investment on q, each representing one of the two new distortions
introduced. The regressor that corrects for debt overhang, caused by initial debt nancing
with a consol bond, is adopted from Hennessy (2004) without modication. The result is a
regression of investment on q and three additional explanatory variables. The data set used is
considerably larger than in Hennessy (2004). Roughly 46,000 rm-year observations from the
years 1968 to 2003 are applied. Here, too, the authors nd a signicantly negative inuence
of debt overhang (asset substitution is excluded yet again). The coe¢ cient on the correction
term endures tests of robustness. Taken together, the two studies presented above strongly
support that rms indeed invest less when facing debt overhang.
An earlier, less sophisticated empirical study on debt overhang comes from Lang et al. (1996),
who provide consistent evidence. Without going too much into detail, the authors examine
the data of 142 rms over a period of twenty years. Growth, measured by di¤erent key gures
in multiple regressions, is regressed on average q and, among other explanatory variables, the
book value of leverage. The result is that there is a strong negative relation between debt and
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growth, but only signicantly so for rms having a low q (< 1). For such rms, book leverage
acts as a (noisy) correction term, so to speak. Accordingly, the authors conclude that debt
overhang is solely a problem for low-q rms, i.e., enterprises that either have bad investment
opportunities or whose good investment projects are not properly appreciated by the market
(an instance which may well be realistic, but is not intended in Myers(1977) work because
symmetric information is assumed). Be aware that the approach chosen by the authors is not
unproblematic, for the reasons mentioned. Using Hennessys (2004, p. 1719) words, ...the
mapping between their tests and the underlying theory is unclear since the leverage ratio is
an imperfect proxy for the overhang correction. Notwithstanding this critique, the ndings
may be viewed as being consistent with the studies above. Bad rms are bad because they
have poor investment opportunities (proxied by low q): the results of the regression thus state
that leverage will further reduce corporate investment for rms that are in trouble already.77
This explicitly includes nancial trouble, for rms with low values of q on average have higher
levels of debt in the sample. The authorsresults receive support from a study from Aivazian
et al. (2005), who use a sample of corporate panel data from Canada. Consistent with the
ndings for U.S. rms just presented, there is a signicant negative relationship between
corporate debt and investment, and the adverse impact of leverage is signicantly larger for
low-q rms, i.e., for rms with poor investment opportunities. One distinction to Lang et al.
(1996) is that the negative e¤ect of leverage is always signicant, irrespective of whether a
rm has high or low q. This suggests that leverage generally distorts investment for Canadian
rms.
Even earlier studies include Whited (1992). The author uses a di¤erent approach to examine
the impact of nancing on investment in that optimal investment and capital stock are mod-
eled by means of an Euler equation. In the empirical part of the paper, the author nds that
nancially distressed rms experience a signicant negative impact on investment. However,
it is not specically tested for debt overhang, but for distortions caused by leverage in gen-
77Note that we cannot attribute this result to debt overhang with complete certainty. The nding of a
negative relation only for low-q rms could also be interpreted as support for Jensens (1986) agency theory,
which promotes the benecial role of leverage in curbing unnecessary investment when no good opportunities
are left to invest in. Agency problems between shareholders and managers are the driving force behind this
over investment problem. The latter, being in charge of corporate decision making, have an incentive to use
available corporate funds to invest in a poor project in order to reinforce their own position in the company
(empire building), hereby inicting a loss on shareholders. Debt provides the advantage that it forces
management to periodically pay out funds that would otherwise be used for poor investments. Hence, which
theory prevails ultimately depends on how bad the projects considered by the rms in the sample really are
 something we cannot possibly determine. If it is mostly negative-NPV projects, the decline in investment
may be benecial as it prevents overinvestment. If, on the other hand, the majority of projects has low, but
positive NPV, then underinvestment is likely to be the source of the distortion of investment. Presumably,
both the positive and negative e¤ects of debt are present for all rms (McConnell and Servaes, 1995, p.
134). Recently, Harris and Raviv (2010) argue that shareholders would fare better anyway if they, instead of
management, controlled some of the corporate decisions.
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eral. Hence, it cannot be ruled out that other agency costs of debt are responsible for this
e¤ect. In general, the early studies, which may not yet have had the necessary econometric
means, do not test specically for underinvestment. Therefore, they are merely indicative
of support for Myers(1977) theory. For example, Opler and Titman (1994) concentrate on
distressed industries, i.e., industries experiencing a downturn in the form of reduced overall
output. In such industries, the most highly levered rms incur the largest declines in sales.
Furthermore, the operating prots of such highly indebted rms are lower compared to their
less levered counterparts on average.
This concludes this section, in which we focused on the real-world impact of underinvestment.
Taken together, especially the more recent empirical ndings strongly suggest that ...the
Myers underinvestment problem is more than a theoretical curiosity. Instead, debt overhang
creates a large drag on the investment of distressed rms (Hennessy et al., 2007, p. 707).
We have learned that high levels of corporate debt are worrisome in reality. Carlson (1993),
for example, refers to a survey carried out in 1992 among 50 blue-chip companies according
to which the amount of debt carried by the government, corporations and also households is
cited as the most inuential factor on economic outlook.
Now that we know that underinvestment is indeed a real problem, and not merely a theoretical
curiosity that is of no practical use, we move on with a good feeling to the centerpiece of this
dissertation, that provides new theoretical insight into underinvestment.
78
4 Underinvestment in the reconstitution of damaged assets
Mayers and Smith (1987) slightly alter the underinvestment problem by embedding it into
a somewhat di¤erent environment. They consider a rm that does not face a valuable new
investment opportunity, but rather su¤ers a reduction in its value by su¤ering a casualty loss
to its assets (say, a re destroys a production hall). At the same time, this loss creates a
positive-NPV investment opportunity: rm value can be reconstituted at a cost that is lower
than the loss. The only decision the rm has to make is: to rebuild or not to rebuild. As in
Myers (1977), the existence of risky debt is responsible for less-than-ideal investment as it will
in some states hinder managers, who once again act in shareholdersbest interest, to replace
the assets. The rm underinvests. However, the authors propose an easy and costless solution
to the problem. An appropriately structured insurance policy leaves rm value unchanged
relative to pure equity or risk-free debt nancing. The similarities to the original problem
are obvious: risky debt creates incentive incompatibility between share- and bondholders,
resulting in a lower rm value. After the presentation of the original model, we will consider
insurance that includes safety loadings. In this context, considerable new theoretical insights
into the interrelation between underinvestment and insurance will be provided.
4.1 The model and its assumptions and model setup
Markets are assumed perfect and complete. Shareholders control the rm in that managers
act in their best interest. Thus, if not stated otherwise, the terms shareholdersactions
and managersactionsare used synonymously. There are two dates. States of nature at
the latter date are indexed by S 2 0; S, where S > 0. The only source of uncertainty in the
model is the possibility of a casualty loss at the second date. Should this event not occur,
rm value at the latter date is a constant V  (> 0). If it does, a state-dependent casualty
loss L(S) destroys/damages corporate assets, reducing rm value to V  L(S) ( 0). Along
with the loss comes the opportunity to reconstitute the rms assets. Doing so requires a
discretionary state-dependent investment I(S) at the second date. Investing, i.e., rebuilding
the rm, always has positive NPV: L(S) > I(S) for all loss states.
Importantly, the decision to invest is made ex post  that is, after state S has materialized.
Managers thus are in a comfortable situation. They can wait and see if a loss state occurs,
and then decide whether to invest on behalf of their shareholders. This also implies that debt
matures after this decision has been made. For if it did not, debtholders, in an underinvest-
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ment situation in which shareholders would rather not invest, but let the rm go bankrupt
instead, would simply take over the rm and undertake the positive-NPV investment. This
would rule out underinvestment in the rst place.78
Market completeness implies the existence of a full set of Arrow-Debreu securities. To value
second-date payo¤s at the rst date, we thus use state prices g(S). g(S) is the price for
the delivery of one dollar at the second date in state S, and is positive and atomless for
all S 2 0; S. Consequently, the price of a safe asset, i.e., one that pays one dollar in
every state at the second date, is
R S
0 g(S)dS. One can think of state prices as accounting
for both time value and risk in discounting one second-date dollar. For states of the world
S > Sc (0 < Sc < S), the rm is in luck. No loss occurs at the latter date, and rm
value is V . For the remaining states S  Sc, the rm su¤ers a casualty loss L(S) at the
second date. The rm can be rebuilt in these states, requiring an investment I(S), where
0 < I(S) < L(S)  V  for all 0  S < Sc, and L(Sc) = I(Sc) = 0. L(S) and I(S) are twice
continuously di¤erentiable. All loss states are in order of increasing rm value (decreasing
loss and, respectively, investment). In other words, L(S) and I(S) are strictly decreasing
over the loss interval [0; Sc] with I 0(0) >  1. In short, states indexed with a higher S are
better.
Let us begin with the case of all-equity and/or risk-free debt nancing, which we will be
referring to as status quoonce again. As we will see, no risky debt means no conict of
interest, means no underinvestment problem. Figure 4.1 provides a graphical representation
of the scenario faced by managers, as rst seen in Mayers and Smith (1987).
As already mentioned, for the no-loss states S > Sc, rm value is V , represented by the
horizontal line. For S  Sc, the lower line, V  L(S), displays the second-date rm value if the
damage is not repaired. The upper line, V    I(S), indicates the rm value with investment
to reconstitute the assets. Obviously, since NPV (the vertical distance between the upper and
the lower line) is non-negative in all loss states, the rms value is higher with investment.
As shareholders are the only claimholders in this scenario, NPV will fully accrue to them.
Thus, the rm will always decide to repair the damage. Doing so increases shareholder value,
which, in this case, equals rm value. There is no underinvestment. Consequently, the value
of the unlevered rm as of the rst date is
Vu =
Z S
0
V g(S)dS  
Z Sc
0
L(S)g(S)dS +
Z Sc
0
[L(S)  I(S)] g(S)dS
=
Z Sc
0
[V    I(S)] g(S)dS +
Z S
Sc
V g(S)dS. (4.1)
78See Myers (1977), p. 15253, for more information.
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Figure 4.1: Status Quo All-Equity Financing
This is the rst-best rm value. It does not get better than this.
An important note: one is tempted to interpret (4.1) as the area below line V    I(S) for
S  Sc and below line V  for Sc < S  S. This is indeed the most intuitive way to grasp
the problem  but only for uniform state prices. If g(S) is not uniform, this reasoning is
not correct. If we want to compare di¤erent areas by the use of integrals, we can only do
so for uniform state prices. Interestingly, this is never mentioned in the original model of
Mayers and Smith (1987). To the contrary, the authors promote the geometry of the gure to
explain the problem. Garven and MacMinn (1993, fn. 4, p. 638), who present an extension
of the model (see below), invoke the Mean Value Theorem of Integral Calculus to justify
using areas. Note that this is correct for a given interval of states, i.e., areas that span that
particular interval may be compared. However, it does not hold true when comparing areas
for di¤erent sets of states. If we want to relate such areas, we have to assume uniform state
prices g(S) (= g) on

0; S

. Otherwise, we cannot interpret payo¤s at the latter date as of
the former date by making use of areas. Thus, when using the graphical approach to the
problem by referring to gures in the following, we implicitly assume uniform state prices
(if not stated explicitly). We will deal with this issue extensively later in the text when
we present new results using a linear-uniform special case of the model. But we will also
derive general results algebraically. Linearity of both L(S) and I(S), as assumed implicitly
in Figure 1, is of no importance. We merely use it to facilitate interpretation. With this in
mind, the rst-best value in equation (4.1) is represented by the area under the line V  I(S)
for S  Sc and under the horizontal line V  for S > Sc in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.2: Status Quo Risk-Free Debt Financing
Next comes nancing with equity and risk-free debt. Suppose the rm has debt with a face
value of F (where V    L(0)  F < V    I(0)) outstanding, due at the second date. Given
investment, debt is risk-free if F < V    I(0). In this case, rm payo¤ when investing
su¢ ces to pay o¤ debtholders in every state at the second date. Managers will decide to
invest if, and only if, shareholder value is not reduced by doing so. Figure 4.2 provides a
graphical representation. As can be seen, in states of the world with very high losses, say L(0),
rm value without investment would not su¢ ce to repay debtholders. The company would
go bankrupt, debtholders would be entitled to the insolvency mass V    L(0) (< F ) and
shareholders, as residual claimants, would receive nothing. Their residual claim V  L(0) F
would actually be negative, but limited liability protects them from the obligation to inject
fresh capital, so that their claims become worthless. If the rm decides to invest, however,
it does not go bankrupt, since its value rises to V    I(0) > F , as pictured in Figure 4.2.
But remember that rm value is not what managers care about. They are concerned about
shareholder value. Notwithstanding this argument, shareholders are better o¤ by investing
even in the worst state when debt is risk-free. Unlike in the case with pure equity nancing,
they do not receive the entire NPV, L(0)  I(0), but only a portion V    I(0)  F > 0. The
remainder F   [V    L(0)] goes to bondholders in order to fulll the rms debt obligation.79
But at least they get some residual claim, as opposed to the case without investment. Hence,
shareholders have an incentive to reconstitute in every loss state when F < V    I(0).
79 If the promised repayment were even lower, such that F < V  L(0), shareholders would receive the NPV
in full. Our analysis of safe debt remains una¤ected as long as F < V    I(0).
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Managers will always decide to invest in case of riskless debt. Underinvestment does not
occur. Regarding values as of the rst date, investing makes the debt safe. Consequently,
debtholder value is given by
Du =
Z S
0
Fg(S)dS. (4.2)
Shareholders are entitled to the rms value net of the promised payment to bondholders.
Equity value is
Eu =
Z Sc
0
[V    I(S)  F ] g(S)dS +
Z S
Sc
(V    F ) g(S)dS.
Firm value as of the rst date is simply dened as the sum of shareholder and bondholder
value, for there are no third parties, such as insurance companies, involved.
Du + Eu  Vu =
Z Sc
0
[V    I(S)] g(S)dS +
Z S
Sc
V g(S)dS.
Note that this is the status quo value dened in equation (4.1). It must be. In both scenarios,
managers invest in every loss state. The only di¤erence is that second-date rm payo¤s now
have to be divided between two parties. Status quo therefore encompasses two settings: all
equity nancing and nancing partially with risk-free debt. Either way, the investment to
reconstitute damaged assets is always undertaken, and rm value is rst-best.
This concludes the easy part. Let us now turn our attention to risky debt, the ensuing
underinvestment problem, and ways to solve it. To begin with, ignore corporate insurance.
Consider once again a levered rm. Obviously, debt becomes risky for high levels of face
value, in that F  V    I(0). Now, rm payo¤ will not su¢ ce to repay debtholders in some
states at the second date even if the rm decides to rebuild: bankruptcy occurs because the
rms (second date) value drops below the face value of the outstanding debt, making it a
risky means of nancing.
While Figure 4.3 illustrates the scenario for an arbitrary level or risky debt, we deduce from
it that, for every F in [V    I(0); V ],80 there is a state Sa implicitly determined by the
equation
V    I(Sa) = F . (4.3)
Graphically, this is the state for which the horizontal line indicating the face value of debt
80Obviously, a face value F > V  would not make sense as the rm would be bankrupt to begin with.
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Figure 4.3: Underinvestment
F intersects the line V    I(S). Sa obviously varies with the level of debt. For higher levels
of F , it is situated further to the right, and vice versa. Sa is the threshold state of the
underinvestment problem: for all lower states, underinvestment occurs. Why? Recall that in
the case of riskless debt nancing, shareholders at least get part of the positive NPV, even
in state S = 0. Here, rm value at the second date falls short of the promised repayment in
states S < Sa. That is, the rm is bankrupt, even if it decides to repair the damage (the
investments NPV is smaller than the debt overhang). For S < Sa, we have V  I(S) F < 0.
Shareholders have no incentive to invest in these states. They would have to provide the
outlays I(S) for the investment, yet would receive nothing in return because all the benets
would accrue to bondholders (and still not su¢ ce to pay them o¤), cf. Figure 4.3. Shares
in any state S < Sa become worthless whether or not the rm decides to invest. Providing
the funds for the investment represents a loss for shareholders  and limited liability allows
them to avoid it. Even though it is not to the rm, to shareholders repairing the damage is
a negative-NPV project in states S < Sa. Managers will decide to let a valuable opportunity
pass by, lowering rm value relative to status quo.
Here we have the incentive incompatibility. Here we have the underinvestment problem, as
identied by Myers (1977, p. 153) and Mayers and Smith (1987, p. 48). It is caused by
the presence of risky debt, coupled with limited liability. The underinvestment problem
will not arise in the absence of limited liability because a rise in company value due to asset
reconstitution will relieve some shareholdersdebt responsibilities(Hau, 2007, p. 5).
The minimum shareholders require for themselves to invest is an NPV of zero. This is exactly
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the case in state Sa. In this state, shares are only just worthless as we have V  I(Sa) F = 0
per equation (4.3), and shareholders are indi¤erent between rebuilding or not. We assume
that they will decide to go ahead with the investment in this case. For it is just like any other
investment in an e¢ cient capital market in that is has zero NPV.81
What about the proceeds of the debt issue that makes the rm levered in the rst place?
Mayers and Smith (1987) do not go into detail regarding the use they are put to. Merely
stating that the rm is levered may be misleading. For underinvestment to occur, it is
essential that the proceeds of the issue are not held as cash or any other marketable asset
that debtholders could get their hands on in case of bankruptcy, as noted by Myers (1977, p.
152). That is, the proceeds have gone to support the rms operations, so that they cannot
be used to increase the insolvency mass and alleviate the underinvestment problem if a state
S < Sa materializes. Debt repayment is supported by the investment opportunity only, there
are no other means for debtholders to acquire their promised payment.
This leads to another relevant point: the debt proceeds thus cannot be used to nance the
investment outlays I(S). Besides, the model structure would not allow for this anyway. The
decision to invest is made after the loss occurs at the second date. Debt is issued at the
rst date, however. Managers cannot know ex-ante which state of the world will materialize.
If they really wanted to make sure to always have enough funds at hand, they would have
to issue I(0) in debt at the rst date, i.e., prepare for the worst. If they did so, promised
repayment F at the second date would be at a maximum level: the more you want to borrow,
the more you have to promise to pay back. This in turn would intensify the underinvestment
problem as Sa would be situated further to the right graphically, implying the existence of
even more underinvestment states. If managers, on the other hand, were to issue less debt
(and consequently promise a lower repayment at the second date), there would be some
states in which funds would not su¢ ce to meet the required investment (a di¤erent form of
underinvestment). What is important for us is to realize that shareholders provide the funds
necessary for the investment ex-post.
81This fact is considered basic nance knowledge. In fact, it is considered so basic that  it seems  it is
mentioned in the nance and capital markets literature without ever explaining it. Should you ask yourself
why an investment in an e¢ cient market has zero NPV, here is the answer: in equilibrium, expected return
equals required return (the opportunity cost of capital). For if it were not, buying or selling pressure would
force expected and required return back into their equilibrium value (via the equilibrium price). Say, for
example, we nd the expected return from an investment in some sort of asset to be greater than the required
return: the investment overcompensates investors for the perceived risk they take by investing in it (according
to which the required return is set in the market). Therefore, smart investors will instantly buy the asset.
This demand causes the price of the asset to rise and its expected return to fall, respectively. It falls until
expected return at last equals required return; only then does the investment not seem too good. At the end
of the day, expected payo¤s from the investment are discounted with the required rate of return, yielding an
NPV of zero (see, e.g., Brealey et al., 2003, p. 18).
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Since the rm does not invest in all states, values as of the rst date di¤er compared to their
status quo counterparts. Debt is risky and will not be paid back in full for S < Sa. In any
such state, its holders take over the rm due to bankruptcy and are entitled to the entire
insolvency mass V   L(S). Debt value of the uninsured rm levered with risky debt thus is
given by
D0 =
Z Sa
0
[V    L(S)] g(S)dS +
Z S
Sa
Fg(s)dS. (4.4)
The risk of bankruptcy is reected in the fact that debt trades at less than (the present value
of) its face value, unlike in equation (4.2). Not investing in states S < Sa leaves shareholders
with
E0 =
Z Sc
Sa
[V    I(S)  F ] g(S)dS +
Z S
Sc
(V    F ) g(S)dS. (4.5)
The rst-date value of the uninsured rm which has risky debt in its capital structure,
V0 = D0 + E0, is
V0 =
Z Sa
0
[V    L(S)] g(S)dS +
Z Sc
Sa
[V    I(S)] g(S)dS +
Z S
Sc
V g(S)dS. (4.6)
In the special case with uniform state prices, which allows for the neat graphical interpreta-
tion, D0 is proportional to the area of 0SGCBA, while shareholder value E0 is proportional
to CGHJ in Figure 4.3. Taken together, the value of the rm as of the rst date, V0, is
represented by 0SHJCBA in the presence of underinvestment. The factor of proportionality
in either case is the uniform state price g(S) = g. We have already mentioned that the un-
derinvestment problem lowers rm value relative to status quo. Now, given (4.1) and (4.6),
we can calculate this reduction that is caused by risky debt in the rms capital structure.
Dene it as R0 such that:
Vu   V0  R0 =
Z Sa
0
[L(S)  I(S)] g(S)dS. (4.7)
This deadweight loss in rm value is caused by incentive incompatibility between shareholders
and bondholders. It is positive whenever F > V    I(0) (and zero for F = V    I(0)). R0
constitutes the agency cost of the underinvestment problem and it is represented by the
tetragon ABCD in Figure 4.3. Obviously, the deadweight loss R0 increases with F .
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4.2 Introducing insurance
A natural question to ask is this: are we stuck with the underinvestment problem? Do we
have to accept that, from some point onwards, debt in the capital structure inevitably leads
to a loss in rm value and nothing can be done about it? Luckily, the answer is no. There
are actually two ways of solving the problem. The rst one is obvious. We know the problem
exists exclusively for risky debt. Thus, make use of risk-free debt only by limiting face value
to levels F < V    I(0), as in Figure 4.2. Admittedly, though this will solve the problem,
it may neither be a practical nor a satisfying approach. Firms may simply need more initial
debt nancing  for whatever reason. In reality, quite a few rms certainly default on their
debt obligations. Highly levered rms do exist. They obviously have not taken the advice of
limiting debt. Hence, if it is just for a look at real-life rms, we should not be satised with
this approach and nd another one that accommodates high levels of debt.
Mayers and Smith (1987) provide just that. An appropriately structured corporate casualty
insurance (think of, e.g., property insurance) completely solves the underinvestment problem.
There are two ways to look at this. One, to return to status quo, essentially, shareholders
need to be persuadedto rebuild in all underinvestment states, since not doing so causes the
problem in the rst place. And we know what they require to do so, too. They demand an
NPV of no less than zero. The problem is that they do not invest for S < Sa because NPV
is not zero to them, but negative  unless somebody else steps in in these states and lls
up the gap to make the NPV zero, (as it is in state Sa). Put simply: from shareholders
point of view, all states have to be converted into an equivalent of state Sa from a cash ow
perspective. As Mayers and Smith (1987, p. 49) put it: [E]ssentially, V    I(S) has to be
raised above F ... by purchasing some critical amount of coverage. The way to accomplish
this is to buy (actuarially fair) insurance for all underinvestment states.
Let us work out the minimum required insurance coverage consistent with solving the prob-
lem. We know that we have V    I(S)  F < 0 in states S < Sa. As noted above, for share-
holders to be willing to still invest, we need a residual claim of 0, cf. equation (4.3). Thus,
minimum insurance coverage needs to amount to I(S)  I(Sa) in any given state S  Sa, for
this guarantees a second-date rm payo¤ to shareholders of V  I(S)+[I(S)  I(Sa)] F = 0.
This is illustrated in Figure 4.4, that depicts the deadweight loss R0 as the shaded area.
As is customary for insurance policies, total replacement cost, I(S), equals coverage, I(S) 
I(Sa), plus deductible. Thus, we have implicitly worked out the maximum deductible, namely
I(Sa), consistent with removing debt overhang. From Figure 4.4, this deductible is the same
for every underinvestment state (given a certain amount of risky debt in the rms capital
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Figure 4.4: Actuarially Fair Insurance
structure). Just as I(S)   I(Sa) represents the minimum coverage, I(Sa) conversely equals
the maximum deductible to still provide managers with an incentive to invest to reconstitute
damaged assets in an underinvestment state.
We still owe the second interpretation. Underinvestment requires risky debt in the capital
structure. Consequently, if insurance can be bought such that debt becomes safe, the problem
is solved. Note that this is exactly what the insurance policy just introduced does. For a
given underinvestment state, the shortfall in promised repayment, i.e., the vertical distance
between V   I(S) and F in the gures, is contributed by the insurance company in the form
of the coverage I(S)   I(Sa). Thus, no matter what happens, debtholders can always be
sure to receive their promised repayment in full, provided that insurance is bought for every
underinvestment state. Insurance makes the debt safe. Bankruptcy is avoided. Therefore,
the risky debt/insurance decision is essentially a reformulation of the safe debtdecision
(Garven and MacMinn, 1993, p. 640). Of course, these interpretations are just two sides of
the same coin. Insurance coverage provides shareholders with an incentive to invest, and, by
doing so, rm payo¤ at the latter date su¢ ces to repay debtholders, even in underinvestment
states. The risk of bankruptcy has been removed, and debt becomes safe.
Since we want to eliminate the problem entirely, insurance needs to be bought for every
underinvestment state. Sticking with Mayers and Smith (1987) for the moment, we assume
actuarially fair insurance policies. That is, competition is perfect in the insurance market, so
that no insurance company earns an economic rent in the form of charging a safety loading.
Hence, the fair insurance premium equals the risk adjusted present value of the insurance
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payo¤ over all states S  Sa, i.e.,
Pi =
Z Sa
0
[I(S)  I(Sa)] g(S)dS. (4.8)
The premium is proportional to the triangle DCF in Figure 4.4 in the special case with
uniform state prices. Note that we could alternatively assume full coverage. This would
solve the underinvestment problem, too. Since we would not have a deductible in that case,
the premium for such a policy would of course be higher, namely
R Sa
0 I(S)g(S)dS. However,
it is not necessary to have full coverage for our purpose of getting rid of underinvestment.
Generally, reducing the deductible below I(Sa) or, equivalently, increasing the coverage and,
thus, the premium does not alter the rms decision to insure when the insurance premium
is fair (Mayers and Smith, 1987, p. 51). I(Sa) is the maximum deductible consistent with
this aim, and we will adhere to it throughout the entire analysis.
Deductibles certainly are nothing out of the ordinary in insurance policies. Automobile
insurance comes to mind, arguably the most prominent type of insurance to fall into this
category. In case of damage, the insurance plan normally only starts to pay out after some
prespecied amount (the deductible) has been paid by the insured party.
Insurance coverage a¤ects the rst-date value of debt because it makes it safe. Debtholders
now receive their promised payment regardless of which state materializes. The rst-date
value of the insured debt is consequently given by
Di =
Z S
0
Fg(S)dS, (4.9)
proportional to the rectangle to 0SGF in Figure 4.4. Using (4.4), (4.3) and (4.9), we can
quantify, for a given risky F , the change in debt value induced by the insurance coverage:
Di  D0 =
Z S
0
Fg(S)dS  
Z Sa
0
[V    L(S)] g(S)dS  
Z S
Sa
Fg(S)dS
=
Z Sa
0
fF   [V    L(S)]g g(S)dS
=
Z Sa
0
[V    I(Sa)  V  + L(S)] g(S)dS
=
Z Sa
0
[L(S)  I(S)] g(S)dS +
Z Sa
0
[I(S)  I(Sa)] g(S)dS
= R0 + Pi. (4.10)
The di¤erence in debt values is clearly non-negative. Because insurance makes the debt safe,
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potential holders are willing to pay more for an issue with a given face value F when it comes
with insurance. In short, upon issue at the rst date, the insured debt raises more funds
than the uninsured issue. Graphically, debt value has risen by the areas ABCD and DCF in
Figure 4.4.
It is important to realize that rm value as of the rst date is no longer merely the value of
equity plus debt. Now, there is a third party involved. The rm has to pay the insurance
premium to the insurance company at date one. In terms of Figure 4.4, insurance adds R0
and Pi, but costs Pi. Netting out, we are left with a gain proportional to area ABCD relative
to the uninsured case. Firm value is given by
Vi =
Z S
0
Fg(S)ds+
Z Sc
Sa
[V    I(S)  F ] g(S)dS +
Z S
Sc
[V    F ] g(S)dS
 
Z Sa
0
[I(S)  I(Sa)] g(S)dS (4.11)
The rst term on the right-hand side is the value of insured debt dened in (4.9). The
last term is the insurance premium paid to the insurance company, cf. (4.8). What about
the two summands in the middle? One is tempted to think of them as shareholder value,
as in (4.5). Let us not go there yet, we will turn to that in a short moment. Graphically
speaking, simply take them as the area CGHJ in Figure 4.4 for the time being. Using (4.3),
rewrite the rst summand in (4.11) as
R S
0 [V
   I(Sa)] g(S)dS and further split up this integral
into
R Sa
0 [V
   I(S)] g(S)dS+R Sa0 [I(S)  I(Sa)] g(S)dS+R ScSa Fg(S)dS+R SSc Fg(S)dS. After
inserting this into the equation (4.11), we simplify to
Vi =
Z Sa
0
[V    I(S)] g(S)dS +
Z Sc
Sa
[V    I(S)] g(S)dS +
Z S
Sc
V g(S)dS
=
Z Sc
0
[V    I(S)] g(S)dS +
Z S
Sc
V g(S)dS. (4.12)
This proves that a fair casualty insurance policy completely removes the deadweight loss in
rm value associated with the underinvestment problem, since Vi = Vu, cf. (4.1). It also
implies that Vi   V0 = R0. Insurance causes rm value to rise by ABCD in terms of Figure
4.4. Vi is proportional to 0SHJD.
This result further tells us that the Pis in fact cancel out, as concluded above from the
graphical analysis. Insurance costs Pi, but also adds Pi (plus R0) in value. In other words, a
fair insurance policy is self-nancing. Note that this also explains why reducing the deductible
below I (Sa) would not change the rms decision to invest: if the price of the insurance were
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higher because of greater coverage, it would still be self-nancing as long as the contract is
actuarially fair. Furthermore, the fact that it is self-nancing leads to an MM-style rm value
result (in a world where only equity and debt and insurance are considered, admittedly). Fair
insurance completely removes the underinvestment cost irrespective of the amount of leverage
in the rms capital structure. If the level of initial debt F were higher, the premium would
be higher, too  but it would still be self-nancing. Status quo value is thus always restored.
The value of the rm is independent of the mode of nancing in the presence of fair insurance.
Most importantly, we have to consider shareholder value. This is the decisive determinant.
The above equations will only be valid if shareholder value is not lowered by buying insurance
and investing. Only then will managers decide to reconstitute. In determining equity value,
we follow for now Mayers and Smith (1987), who assume that the promised repayment F is
xed from the beginning and does not change whether or not the rm insures. This approach
to the model is called the cum dividend interpretationby Garven and MacMinn (1993, p.
636). It requires some careful interpretation: thus far, we have (at least implicitly) assumed
that shareholder value is the present value of the residual claim on the rms cash ows at
the second date. There were no cash ows to shareholders in the rst period. With insurance
coverage, this changes. Why? When the rm issued bonds with a promised repayment F in
the uninsured case, it must have done so for a reason. Regardless of what the proceeds were
intended for exactly, they must have been enough to do so. And since F does not change,
the insured debt consequently raises more than these required funds, cf. (4.10). Garven and
MacMinn (1993) point out that there is a lack of clarication in Mayers and Smith (1987)
regarding the use these excess funds are put to: [A]lthough Mayers and Smith assert that
the gains associated with resolving the underinvestment problem are enjoyed by shareholders,
their analysis does not explicitly provide the mechanism to show how this is accomplished
(Garven and MacMinn, 1993, p. 636). The authors go on to assume that, given that F is
unchanged, the excess amount net of the insurance premium is paid out as a dividend to
shareholders. Shareholders as residual claimants are indeed the only party to be eligible to
receive such a dividend. The insurance company receives the premium Pi, and debtholders,
who pay a fair price for the issue, can be sure to be paid back F in any state at the second
date. These two parties are thus not entitled to any further cash ows.
Hence, a second component to shareholder value is introduced, namely the rst-date cash ow
in the form of a dividend. We have worked out the amount already. Out of the additional
funds raised by the insured debt, R0+Pi, the premium Pi is required to pay o¤ the insurance
company. By (4.10), this leaves R0 = Di   D0   Pi as additional funds to be paid out to
4. Underinvestment in the reconstitution of damaged assets 91
shareholders. Thus, the new equity value Ei must amount to E0+R0 when the rm insures.
To prove this, rewrite equation (4.11) as Vi = Di+E0 Pi using (4.5), (4.8) and (4.9). From
(4.10), we know that the value of insured debt is Di = D0 + R0 + Pi. Substituting and
canceling out the insurance premium, we are left with
Vi = D0 +R0 + E0.
The last two summands on the right-hand side must constitute the new equity value  the
insurance premium has been accounted for already and there are no other parties left that
are entitled to any cash ows, so
Ei = E0 +R0. (4.13)
Exactly as we predicted.82 Since R0  0, shareholder value is never diminished by buying
insurance. Managers will always buy actuarially fair casualty insurance when debt is risky.
The underinvestment problem is averted.
We are led to another point that requires consideration. Would managers not do an even
betterjob if they were to fool debtholders? After all, all they care about is the well-being of
shareholders. Therefore, could they not lie to the market by promising potential debtholders
to buy insurance without actually doing so? Presumably, they could still attract the same
amount that the (de facto) insured debt raises, but pass on more to shareholders. The answer
is: no  no, they could not raise the same amount. We are assuming rational and perfect
markets. In these markets, debtholders would anticipate managers(in-) actions and adjust
downwards the price they are willing to pay for the bonds accordingly, until it represents a
zero-NPV investment for them. In a more realistic scenario (with more than two periods),
committing this fraud would not be a worthwhile action on behalf of managers either. It may
work in the short-run. But just think of the negative long-term consequences that these gains
would have to be traded o¤ against. Think of the immense loss in reputation that would
accompany this event. Think of how hard it would be for the rm to raise funds in the public
debt market in any future debt issue. Think of how the elevated required return would force
the company to o¤er future debt cheaply (given a certain face value F ), if it could at all, in
order to compensate potential buyers for the perceived risk of another fraud.
In our model, an uninsured debt issue raises less funds than an insured o¤ering. The cost of
82Note that Vi is not Di+Ei Pi, i.e., debtholder plus shareholder value given insurance, net of the premium
payment, as one might be tempted to think at rst. For this would overstate rm value by accounting for R0
twice: Di = D0 + R0 + Pi and Ei = E0 + R0, cf. (4.10) and (4.13), respectively. R0, however, may only be
accounted for once in determining rm value: Di raises R0 + Pi more than D0 at the rst date. Pi is used to
pay the insurance premium, and R0 is passed on to shareholders as a dividend.
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this underinvestment problem will always be reected in the debt proceeds upon issue, for
debtholders pay a fairprice only. By implication, shareholders bear this cost at the end
of the day. But they have a choice. If they buy insurance, they receive a dividend on top of
the value generated by second-date payo¤s. If they do not, they su¤er a loss in share value
because they receive no cash ow at date one. Therefore, given the objective of shareholder
value maximization, it is in shareholders own interest to contractually commit to solving
the problem. Since a bond is merely a contract between the rm and its lenders, they do so
by including a covenant in the bond indenture that guarantees the purchase of the required
level of insurance along with the bond issue. By writing bond covenants, shareholders, in
essence, o¤er guarantees to bondholders against certain value-reducing future actions. These
guarantees induce bondholders to pay a higher price for the debt they purchase and thus they
increase ex ante rm value(Malitz, 1986, p. 18). This also explains why, as stated before,
the insurance is self-nancing: if insurance is guaranteed, enough money is raised to pay for
the premium (and R0 to shareholders).83 Smith and Warner (1979) and Mayers and Smith
(1982) point out that covenants forcing rms to acquire prespecied levels of insurance do in
fact exist, and they are a common feature of debt indentures.
Before we continue with the underinvestment problem, a quick note on overinvestment. Just
as we described underinvestment as the decision to let a valuable investment opportunity
pass by, overinvestment, in this sense, must be dened as taking on an investment project
that is not valuable (NPV< 0). In the model, we would have to allow for the possibility
that rebuilding after a damage decreases rm value. Hau (2007) nds that, in addition to
underinvestment, this may well happen once asset reconstitution is risky. That is, unlike
in Mayers and Smiths (1989) deterministic scenario, one cannot be certain that repairing
increases rm value in Haus (2007) model. It might. But it also might not. For example,
reconstitution may turn out to be a source of (liquidity) risk to rm value if it requires
cash to be diverted from other productive activities.84 In order to make repairing the rm
a risky investment, the author introduces a further set of states, namely reconstitution
states. Now, rebuilding in any given loss state may have either positive or negative expected
NPV. Imagine a state in which the rm defaults on its debt obligation if it does not invest
(V    L (S) < F ). Further, assume that the expected NPV is negative for the rm in this
state, but that V    I (S) > F in at least one favorable reconstitution state. That is, if
83The numerical example provided by Mayers and Smith (1987, p. 5253) is somewhat misleading in this
regard. There, shareholders rst pay the fair premium (for full insurance coverage) out of their own pockets,
and later recover this advance payment from the debt issue. This is unnecessary. By committing through a
covenant, the premium could be paid out of the proceeds of the issue right away.
84Note that this relaxes the assumption that debt is not supported by cash.
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shareholders are lucky, they might not have to default, but are left with a valuable residual
claim instead (their shares would not be worthless). Given limited liability, what do they
have to lose? Exactly, nothing. And remember that managers act in favor of shareholders.
Therefore, they will decide to go ahead with an investment that is expected to decrease rm
value. While expected NPV is negative to the rm (and thus to bondholders), it is positive
for shareholders in this case  exactly the other way round than in our model. Hau (2007)
goes on to show that both the under- and the overinvestment problem can be solved by an
appropriately structured insurance contract.
4.3 Empirical ndings on the underinvestment problem
Unfortunately, empirical evidence is scarce. A major reason for this is the fact that in the U.S.
(and many other developed countries) corporations are not obligated to disclose insurance
premium expenditures in their nancial statements (cf. Regan and Hur, 2007). This makes
the data collection process cumbersome and costly. Among the few studies conducted, there
is no single one that concentrates on the underinvestment problem exclusively. For obvious
reasons: even though we focus on it here, rmsdemand for corporate insurance is motivated
by other considerations than avoiding underinvestment as well in real life. Among these are
tax e¤ects, a rms ownership structure, expected bankruptcy costs, rm size, managerial
incentives, state ownership, incentives to other stakeholders of the corporation and a rms
risk class.85 Notably, risk aversion as a motive for rms to buy insurance is not one of them.
This is because, for widely held public corporations, share- and bondholders in an e¢ cient
market can hold highly diversied portfolios of nancial instruments and can, thus, eliminate
idiosyncratic insurable risks on their own account (Mayers and Smith, 1982; Main, 1983).
Even though they may be risk-averse on an individual basis, they do not want the rm to
eliminate unsystematic risk for them, especially when insurance coverage comes with a safety
loading attached. While risk aversion can explain an individuals desire to obtain insurance,
it should not be listed as a reason for insurance demand on the corporate level.
Mayers and Smith (1990), Core (1997) and Yamori (1999) are the rst to conduct empirical
analyses of corporate demand for insurance coverage.86 Interestingly, the former two mention
85Explaining every single motive for insurance demand is beyond our scope. Literally every one of the
studies to be mentioned in the following have a section explaining various insurance demand theories. See,
e.g., Mayers and Smith (1990) and Regan and Hur (2007).
86There is another study by Davidson III et al. (1992). This study is di¤erent in that it focuses exclusively
on the hypothesis that the purchase of insurance does not have any e¤ect on a rms equity cost of capital.
For if it would lower it, this would lead rms to demand insurance as they could increase equity and, thus,
rm value. It is indeed found that no such relationship exists, i.e., insurance purchase is not motivated by
cost of equity considerations. This leads to the conclusion that an explanation in the fashion of Mayers and
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the signicance of underinvestment for corporate insurance demand (it would be strange if
Mayers and Smith would not), but do not investigate its impact by controlling for leverage
directly. Additionally, their results cannot be characterized as general. They concentrate
on specic industries/products, namely reinsurance purchases on behalf of U.S. insurance
companies (who have to report these expenditures) and Canadian rmsdemand for a highly
specialized type of insurance (required to be reported, too), respectively. Yamori (1999) is the
rst to include a leverage measure for a cross sectional data set of 504 Japanese non-nancial
rms. Prior to changes in national accounting regulation in 1987, (some) Japanese companies
published information on general insurance purchases. The author, however, does not nd
signicant evidence to support the existing underinvestment theory. He acknowledges that
there are unique features to the Japanese economy, most notably the special relationship
among Japanese nancial and non-nancial rms named keiretsu. This may lead Japanese
rms to demand more insurance per se compared to other industrialized nations (Yamori,
1999, p. 242). The study is notable in that it is the rst attempt to investigate rmsdemand
for insurance in a more general way, as it focuses on non-nancial rms and general, i.e., not
highly specialized, insurance products.
In terms of signicant explanatory power, Hoyt and Khang (2000) provide the rst meaningful
study with regard to the underinvestment problem. They focus solely on property insurance.
Due to data unavailability for U.S. rms, they design a questionnaire answered by 187 U.S.
companies in di¤erent industries for the scal year 1989 to examine possible determinants
of corporate demand for property insurance. Among others, empirical support for the under-
investment hypothesis is found. To test this hypothesis, they deploy two proxy variables, one
for leverage (debt to equity ratio) and one for growth opportunities87 (ratio of rm market
to book value), in a cross-sectional ordinary least squares regression model. For the former,
the idea is that rms with a lot of debt in their capital structure will, on average, purchase
more insurance coverage (measured by the amount paid in insurance premiums divided by
the value of insurable corporate property). As we have seen in the model above, high levels
of debt cause the problem in the rst place  and even higher levels of debt intensify the
problem and should, hence, go along with more insurance bought. The coe¢ cients on both
proxy variables turn out positive and signicant and are thus ...consistent with insurance
playing an important role in controlling the underinvestment problem (Hoyt and Khang,
2000, p. 101).
Smith (1987) must be the reason for corporate insurance demand. The problem is that the authors do not
provide empirical proof for this claim.
87For more information on AIPs versus growth opportunities in the original underinvestment problem, see
Myers (1977). We are more interested in the rst proxy.
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Unfortunately, not only are there few studies available, even worse, they contradict each
other, too. Zou and Adams (2008), in a similar way as Hoyt and Khang (2000), examine
rmsdemand for property insurance and control for the underinvestment problem, too. The
proxy used for leverage is the ratio of book value of debt to total assets. The authors focus on
publicly listed non-nancial Chinese rms across di¤erent industries that voluntarily disclose
information on their insurance purchases. The study is somewhat more sophisticated in that
it uses panel data for the years 1997 to 2003. It is thus able to incorporate potential time ef-
fects, such as overall economic development. Results contradict theory. Unlike hypothesized,
high leverage does not lead to an increase in insurance coverage among Chinese rms. Quite
the opposite: the coe¢ cient turns out both negative and signicant. Zou et al. (2003) and
Zou and Adams (2006) had already investigated Chinese corporationsproperty insurance
demand in two prior studies that are very similar in design. And results are similar, too.
Neither one provides evidence supportive of the underinvestment theory in China. Using the
same 1997-1999 panel data set, both studies examine a sample of 235 publicly listed non-
nancial companies, comprising a total of 668 observations. In the former study, once again,
the coe¢ cient of the leverage measure (debt to equity ratio) turns out signicantly negative,
i.e., there is evidence for a negative correlation between the amount of insurance coverage ob-
tained and the indebtedness of Chinese rms. In the latter, the coe¢ cient is actually slightly
positive, but insignicant. Again, no persuasive evidence conrming the underinvestment
hypothesis can be presented. Zou and Adams (2008) argue that these unexpected results
may be explained by the unique features of the Chinese market, especially the high propor-
tion of state ownership in Chinese enterprises. The central government is said to have an
incentive to save Chinese rms from bankruptcy and liquidation in order to uphold national
social stability and, thus, its own power. Therefore, the ... underinvestment problem is
likely to be of the second order(Zou, 2010, fn. 10, p. 968). For the case of China, this does
not sound implausible. Unfortunately, Regan and Hur (2007) conduct a cross-industry study
with South Korean non-nancial rms and come to similar conclusions  and in the case of
South Korea you cannot easily argue with special institutional settings like in China. Using
a large sample of panel data over an even more extensive period of time (1990-2001), and
making use of the (lucky) fact that rms in Korea do report their insurance expenditures,
the authors nd that insurance demand (insurance bought scaled by total tangible assets) is
signicantly inversely related to the measure of indebtedness of South Korean rms (debt to
equity ratio). Again, this is contrary to what the theory predicts.
A rst step towards empirically testing the underinvestment problem has been made. How-
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ever, given both the very limited number of studies available and their conicting outcomes,
one must clearly hope for further research in this area before any conclusions on the validity
of theoretical predictions can be drawn. At the same time, it may well be that this question
will not be settled empirically for a long time to come. Data unavailability for developed
countries is a major problem.
4.4 Insurance premium with a safety loading
We are far from done with the underinvestment problem. What we have seen so far is the
use of insurance to overcome the underinvestment problem  the usage of actuarially fair
insurance premiums in an economically perfect world where insurance companies do not
make any prots because they can only charge a fair price. What if we were to relax these
assumptions to allow for a bit more reality in the model? What if insurance companies
were trying to make some prots along with the services they provide? Schnabel and Roumi
(1989) intend to examine just that in a follow-up paper to Mayers and Smith (1987). They
incorporate a safety loading into the insurance premium in (4.8). We are now faced with an
actuarially unfairinsurance premium:
P = (1 + )
Z Sa
0
[I(S)  I(Sa)] g(S)dS. (4.14)
 ( 0) is the safety loading and Pi is called the loading premium. In other words: P =
(1 + )Pi. Hence, Mayers and Smith (1987) examine a special case of the underinvestment
problem, where  = 0. With a safety loading, the insurance o¤ers the same protection as
before, but it costs more. This should justify the use of the term unfair. Let us examine
the consequences of having a safety loading. Remember that we are in the cum dividend case,
i.e., F is una¤ected by the decision to purchase insurance. Adjusting rm value as of the rst
date is quite simple. Compare the rm value in (4.11), and recall that the nal summand is
the insurance premium paid. All we have to do now is to insert the new premium P instead
of Pi, so that
V =
Z S
0
Fg(S)ds+
Z Sc
Sa
[V    I(S)  F ] g(S)dS +
Z S
Sc
[V    F ] g(S)dS
  (1 + )
Z Sa
0
[I(S)  I(Sa)] g(S)dS
Making use of the same modications to the rst summand as in the derivation of (4.12), we
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can simplify to obtain
V =
Z Sc
0
[V    I(S)] g(S)dS +
Z S
Sc
V g(S)dS   
Z Sa
0
[I(S)  I(Sa)] g(S)dS. (4.15)
Put simply, we have V = Vu   Pi. What does this mean for us? The equation tells us
that, given a positive safety loading, we have departed from the status quo value yet again.
You could say that we have a new problem: second-date cash ows are unchanged, but the
insurance company now asks for more from the rm without providing more itself. This
must drag down rm value. Specically, rm value is less by the very amount that the
insurance company additionally requires, i.e., Pi. This is a new deadweight loss from the
rms perspective. This time, however, it comes with insurance. We now face two deadweight
losses: one that arises if we do not insure, and the other that arises if we do insure. This
obviously comes down to a tradeo¤. But before we go ahead, let us rst dene this new loss.
Similar to R0 in (4.7), dene the deadweight loss to be the safety-loading induced reduction
in rm value of the insured rm relative to status quo. With the help of (4.1) and (4.15), it
follows that
R = Vu   V
= 
Z Sa
0
[I(S)  I(Sa)] g(S)dS. (4.16)
From (4.8), the loading premium is the deadweight loss, i.e., R = Pi. Guess who pays
for it? Correct, shareholders do. If the rm buys unfair insurance, the insurance company
is paid o¤ and debtholders are still safe, so their claims are taken care of. The value of
debt with unfair insurance is unchanged compared to the case with actuarially fair insurance
(D = Di):
D =
Z S
0
Fg(S)dS.
Just as shareholders enjoy the benets of insurance through the dividend paid at the rst
date, they have to endure the costs that come with it at the rst date. That said, the
deadweight loss reduces the dividend shareholders are entitled to: the increase in proceeds
from the debt issue, D D0, is now used to pay for the fair insurance premium and the safety
premium. This leaves a dividend of D D0  (1 + )Pi or, equivalently, R0 R, cf. (4.10).
Since shareholderssecond-date residual claim is unchanged compared to the uninsured case,
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cf. (4.5), the equity value with unfair insurance becomes
E = E0 +R0  R. (4.17)
As shareholder value maximization is managersonly interest, the rm will now insure if, and
only if, E  E0 or, equivalently, R0  R. This is the aforementioned tradeo¤. As long as
the deadweight loss induced by insuring, R, is no greater than the loss induced by not doing
so, R0, managers will still decide to insure as shareholder (and rm) value will be higher than
in the uninsured case.
Note that this also provides a rationale for actually choosing the deductible I(Sa) (as opposed
to, say, full coverage) once insurance becomes unfair: given  > 0, the use of I(Sa) is e¢ cient
because it minimizes the fair premium Pi and, accordingly, the loading cost R, cf. (4.14)
and (4.16). Thus, while there is no need for assuming I(Sa) as the deductible if one wants
to eliminate the underinvestment problem with fair insurance, cost minimization requires so
in the presence of an unfair premium.88
Note that insurance is no longer self-nancing, for shareholders have to chip in the unfair part
of it out of their own pockets (the more so, the higher the safety loading). A look at equation
(4.15) tells us that rm value is not anymore consistent with the MM irrelevance proposition
(as a safety loading is inconsistent with perfect markets). That is, nancing matters. As long
as debt is safe, status quo is reached. But once it becomes risky, the optimal value is not
reached despite having insurance coverage. The safety loading draws down rm value relative
to status quo. It does the more so, the higher the level of debt and/or the safety loading.
The graphical representation for the uniform special case is not that simple anymore. For ease
of explanation, let  < 1, i.e., the actual premium paid is less than double the fair premium.
This should not be an unrealistic assumption. In this case, R (= Pi) is represented by a
part of the triangle DCF, i.e., the deadweight loss is displayed as  times the area DCF
(Schnabel and Roumi, 1989, p. 157). Unfortunately, the authors do not have to say more
about this issue. A more rigorous depiction of the loading premium would be desirable.
Arnold and Hartl (2011) provide a handy graphical approach, see Figure 4.5.
Let us dene point E such that line segment FE divided by segment FC is , i.e.,  = FEFC .
We know that the fair insurance premium Pi is represented by DCF. Using the formula for
the area of a triangle, we may write this area as DF FC2 . Furthermore, we know that R is
represented by  times this area, i.e., DF FC2 . This is where our denition of  becomes
88A counter-argument, leaving the connes of the model, is that the rm would be most dependent on a low
deductible in states with the highest losses (i.e., when S is close to zero) as the company is most cash-strained
in these states.
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Figure 4.5: Loading Premium
useful. Substituting for  yields FEFC
DF FC
2 , which simplies to
DF FE
2 . This fraction expresses
exactly the area of triangle DEF. In other words, if we choose  the way we do, then our
deadweight loss R is represented by the triangle DEF in Figure 4.5, as illustrated by the
upper shaded area. We will come to another benet of this way of illustrating later on. The
entire insurance premium P is thus represented by DCF (the fair part) plus DEF (the loading
premium) sitting on top of that. As we said, cash ows at the latter date remain unchanged
such that the second-date component of shareholder value is still proportional to CGHJ in
Figure 4.5. Since debt has become safe due to insuring, it is, once again, represented by the
tetragon 0SGF. Compared to the uninsured-risky case (0SGCBA), debt value has risen by
ABCF, i.e., ABCD plus DCF. In the presence of a safety loading, this increase comes at an
expense of P, i.e., DCF plus DEF. The fair insurance premium part (DCF) cancels out, so
that we are left with a net gain to shareholders of ABCD minus DEF: the removal of the
deadweight loss R0 comes at a deadweight loss of R. Insurance will be bought as long as
the gain is non-negative (R0  R)  there is our tradeo¤ again. Graphically, managers will
decide to repair the damage to its assets for a given F in every state if, and only if, triangle
DEF is no greater than tetragon ABCD. We are left with a simple decision rule:
R0  R ) buy insurance,
R0 < R ) do not buy insurance.
That is, go for whatever action yields the lower deadweight loss.
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Figure 4.6: Increase in Debt Levels
4.5 The inuence of changing debt levels on a rms decision to insure 
a graphical correction
Schnabel and Roumi (1989) go on to establish their papers main point by asking an interest-
ing question: given the presence of a safety loading, will the rms decision to buy insurance
be inuenced if the level of debt F changes?
Granted, we said that F is unchanged under the cum dividend interpretation. But the way
they mean it is: what if the initial level of debt were to be higher from the outset? If the
rm needs to raise more (less) money at the rst date, for whatever reason, then it has to
promise a higher (lower) F to its debtholders. What are the implications?
Schnabel and Roumi (1989, p. 157) o¤er the following conclusion: A visual inspection of
the gure makes clear that there is a critical value of F, call it F , where R0 = R. For
F < F , R0 < R and it is optimal for the rm not to obtain coverage, whereas for F > F ,
R0 > R and it is optimal for the rm to obtain coverage. In other words, the authors
claim that as F rises from V    I(0), it passes some critical level F , for which R0 = R or,
equivalently, areas ABCD and DEF are equal in size in Figure 4.5. Once it is greater than
F , the tetragon (the deadweight loss R0 of not investing) is said to exceed the triangle (the
deadweight loss R of insuring). Therefore, the rm should buy insurance for high enough
levels of debt.
To cut a long story short: their conclusion is wrong. First, such an F  need not necessarily
exist. Second, if it does, the conclusion should be exactly the other way round. Before we
get into the algebra involved, let us rst perform a visual inspection. Have a look at Figure
4.6, which illustrates the increase in F for the case of uniform state prices.
The graph on the left is identical to Figure 4.5. R0 and R are marked as the shaded areas.
The two remaining graphs display the impact of raising the debt level F in steps. The
resulting increases in both R0 and R are depicted as the lightly shaded areas in each graph.
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It is obvious that both ABCD (Sa is moved further to the right) and DEF (more insurance
coverage is needed) grow bigger as F increases. The crucial point is that they do not do so
at the same pace. Since states of the world are in order of decreasing L(S) and I(S), the
distance between V    I(S) and V    L(S) becomes smaller as we move up in states. Line
segment BC is exactly that di¤erence for state Sa, i.e., V    I(Sa)   [V    L(Sa)], in the
left graph in Figure 4.6. As F and, thus, Sa rise marginally, the accompanying increase in
ABCD, proportional to BC, becomes smaller and smaller. In other words, BC goes to zero
as F moves towards V , and Sa towards Sc, respectively. Conversely, the marginal increase
is the highest for low levels of risky debt. For F = V    I(0), the underinvestment problem
just commences, and ABCD is zero. So is DEF, such that R0 = R = 0. When F rises
slightly above V    I(0), BC is almost AD. The situation presents itself in reverse for the
triangle DEF. The marginal increase in size, proportional to line segment FE, grows bigger
as F keeps increasing. For F slightly above V    I(0), FE is approximately zero. Thus,
a marginal change in F has an impact on R0 that is an order of magnitude greater than
the impact on R for levels of debt close enough to V    I(0). As F approaches its highest
possible level V , FE also approaches its maximum, namely FJ. Taken together, for levels of
risky debt close enough to V    I(0), we have R0 > R, and the rm takes insurance. As F
rises further, due to the mentioned characteristics of the two geometrical gures, R grows
faster than R0 from some large-enough debt level on, so that R0   R starts to fall. There
are two possible outcomes for large F . R0 R may stay positive in value such that the rm
takes insurance even for large levels of debt. Note that this alone would prove Schnabel and
Roumis (1989) quoted statement wrong, for it means that F  does not always exist. The
alternative is that R0 R becomes negative above some F . In this case, the rm will decide
not to take insurance for high levels of debt because R0 < R. This is the case where we have
the exact opposite conclusion compared to Schnabel and Roumi (1989): the rm generally
demands insurance for low levels of risky debt, while it decides not to insure for high levels.
One question remains. What determines whether R0   R actually becomes negative? The
magnitude of the safety loading does. A look at Figure 4.6 provides some intuition. Ceteris
paribus, the bigger , the longer the line segment FE, the bigger the area of DEF, and the
more likely that R takes over R0 in size before F reaches V . Common sense will do the trick,
too: a higher safety loading leads to a bigger cost (deadweight loss) of insuring. Insurance
becomes less attractive.
Finally, having examined Figure 4.6, we can now also state the second benet of illustrating
the loading premium by triangle DEF. Note how in the graph to the right we have included
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eF as the new debt level along with the corresponding points eE and eC as well as the angles
 and  belonging triangles DEF and DCF, respectively. The major advantage is that when
we raise F to eF to obtain the (new) fair insurance premium D eC eF , the area D eE eF still
represents the (new) deadweight loss of insuring. In other words, the area of D eE eF equals
  D eC eF . By use of the corresponding line segments, this means that D eF  eF eE2 = D eF  eF eC2
or, put more simply,  =
eF eEeF eC . Since we dened  = FEFC , the proof of this assertion comes
down to showing
eF eEeF eC = FEFC . By the trigonometric function, we have tan = FEDF for triangle
DEF. Enlarging DEF to D eE eF leaves the angle  unchanged, so that we must also have
tan =
eF eE
D eF . Provided that the slopes of V    I(S) and V    L(S) are constant, it holds
true that FEDF =
eF eE
D eF . Rearranging yields eF eE = D eF FEDF . Using the same logic for angle  of
the bigger triangle DCF, we have tan = FCDF and, thus, tan =
eF eC
D eF . Hence, FCDF = eF eCD eF or,
equivalently, eF eC = D eF FCDF . All that is left to do is write out the ratio of the line segmentseF eE and eF eC and insert the equations just derived:
eF eEeF eC =
D eF FE
DF
D eF FC
DF
:
Canceling out yields
eF eEeF eC = FEFC = . This proves that the new triangle D eE eF represents the
new loading premium. It is correct to state D
eF  eF eE
2 = 
D eF  eF eC
2 .
4.6 A mathematical correction
We will proceed as follows: we will mathematically prove that Schnabel and Roumis (1989)
conclusion is wrong for two scenarios. We will start with the linear-uniform special case,
which has so far been used exclusively to justify graphical analysis of the model. We do so as
it is the most intuitive way to grasp the results that follow. This will facilitate understanding.
As this layout is arguably quite restrictive, we will show that the conclusions by and large
carry over to a general setting in a second step. We will make our case for the non-restrictive
setting by stating a theorem and proving it. The proof in the general setting represents an
extended version of Arnold and Hartl (2011).
The mathematical procedure to come to conclusions is the same in logic for both scenarios.
We are interested in nding out how the rms decision to take out insurance varies with
di¤erent levels of risky debt in the presence of a safety loading. We know the rm demands
insurance if, and only if, R0  R  0. Keep in mind that in the following we focus on risky
debt levels only, i.e., F  V    I(0). Recall that for safe debt there is no underinvestment
problem (the rm will always rebuild without insurance coverage) and, consequently, no
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tradeo¤ to be made as both R0 and R are non-existent. Therefore, we will examine R0 R
as a composite function of F over the interval [V    I(0); V ]
Before we do so, however, we have to lay ground for our claims rst. Stating that Schnabel
and Roumi (1989) provide wrong results means, by implication, that they must have made a
mistake somewhere in their paper that leads to the (wrong) conclusions. To illustrate this,
we will now go through the mathematics of the derivatives of both R0 and R with respect
to F , similar to Schnabel and Roumis (1989, fn. 1, p. 157) equations (8) and (9). Here, we
will do so rather in detail as the mathematics involved may not be easy to understand for
everyone. The derivatives require us to invoke the Leibniz integral rule. This is because the
upper limit in the integral in R0 and R is Sa, cf. (4.7) and (4.16); and Sa, given implicitly by
(4.3), is a continuously di¤erentiable function of F , i.e., Sa (F ).89 Put simply, what happens
when we increase F is that Sa increases, too (by being moved to the right, graphically).
From (4.3), we have dFdSa =  I 0 (Sa) and, thus, dSadF =   1I0(Sa) . I 0 (Sa) < 0 because I(S) is
strictly decreasing. Hence, dSadF > 0. From (4.7) and (4.16), this increase in Sa, caused by an
increase in F , has an impact on both R0 and R (which we will examine in a moment).90
This is also the reason why R0 and R are composite functions of F , i.e.,
dR0
dF =
dR0
dSa
dSa
dF and
dR
dF =
dR
dSa
dSa
dF .
Let us begin with R0. We have worked out dSadF already. From (4.7), applying the Leibniz
rule in di¤erentiating R0 with respect to Sa yields
dR0
dSa
= [L (Sa)  I (Sa)] g (Sa) .
Combining the established derivatives, the e¤ect of a marginal change in F on R0 is
dR0
dF
= [L (Sa)  I (Sa)] g (Sa)

  1
I 0 (Sa)

. (4.18)
This is the same outcome as in Schnabel and Roumis (1989) equation (8). Note that dR0dSa  0.
The only thing that may come as a little bit of a surprise is that the inequality is not strict. We
know that rebuilding is assumed to always be a positive-NPV project in all states S < Sc,
i.e., L (S)   I (S) > 0 for 0  S < Sc. For state Sc, both L (S) and I (S) become zero
(L (Sc) = I (Sc) = 0). What is the highest value that Sa can take on? Clearly, this happens
89We will stick to writing Sa instead of Sa (F ) for reasons of simplicity.
90The easiest way to intuitively grasp the mathematics involved is that increasing Sa entails two e¤ects (at
least for R). One, the upper integration limit rises, i.e. R0 and R now comprise more states. Two, the
integrand in R is a¤ected by an increase as well. The Leibniz integral rule accounts for both of these e¤ects.
Since the integrand of R0 does not depend on Sa, the latter e¤ect is of no relevance for R0.
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for the highest possible level of debt F as we said that Sa increases with F . We know this
is F = V . From (4.3), for F = V , we have I (Sa) = 0. But I (S) becomes zero only for
S = Sc. Thus, we must have Sa = Sc for F = V , and Sa < Sc for F < V  because Sa rises
with F . The highest value Sa can take on in Sc. Taken together, we have L (Sa)  I (Sa) > 0
and thus dR0dSa > 0 for Sa < Sc (i.e., F < V
) and dR0dSa  0 for Sa  Sc (i.e., F  V ). Since
dR0
dSa
 0 and dSadF > 0, it follows that dR0dF  0. Schnabel and Roumi (1989, fn.1 , p. 158) also
come to this conclusion.91
By implication, the fact that our result is the same as theirs only leaves the derivative of R
with respect to F as a possible source of error. Applying the Leibniz rule to (4.16) yields
dR
dSa
= 
Z Sa
0

g (S)
@
@Sa
[I (S)  I (Sa)]

dS + [I (Sa)  I (Sa)] g (Sa)

:
The last summand obviously cancels out. All that remains is
dR
dSa
= 
Z Sa
0

g (S)
@
@Sa
[I (S)  I (Sa)]

dS.
Regarding @I(S)@Sa , we said before that I (S) is not a function of Sa, so that
dR
dSa
=  
Z Sa
0
I 0 (Sa) g (S) dS.
We shift I 0 (Sa) outside the integral sign (we are not integrating over Sa, but S), which leaves
us with
dR
dSa
=  I 0 (Sa)
Z Sa
0
g (S) dS.
This may equivalently be written as dRdSa =  I 0 (Sa)G (Sa), where G (Sa) =
R Sa
0 g (S) dS.
Due to I 0 (Sa) < 0, we have dRdSa > 0 for positive safety loadings. Recall that
dR
dF =
dR
dSa
dSa
dF
and dSadF =   1I0(Sa) . Hence, a nal step yields
dR
dF
=  I 0 (Sa)
Z Sa
0
g (S) dS

  1
I 0 (Sa)

= 
Z Sa
0
g (S) dS. (4.19)
dR
dF > 0 for positive . As we predicted: the deadweight loss of insuring increases with F .
This is a rst important nding: we have proven, in a general setting, that both R0 and R
increase with F .
91For the sake of correctness, they state that ...equation (8) is always positive... (Schnabel and Roumi,
1989, fn. 1, p. 158). But let us not be pedantic here.
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What we are more interested in here, however, is whether we have derived the same outcome
as Schnabel and Roumi (1989, fn.1, p. 157) in their equation (9). Let us check it out. They
claim that
dR
dF
=  
Z Sa
0
dSa
dF
g (S) dS,
and conclude (correctly) that this term is negative. Obviously, their result is di¤erent in
appearance and algebraic sign from our equation (4.19). Given our derivations established
above, their derivative is incorrect. And this has far-reaching implications. Schnabel and
Roumi (1989) go on to state that because dR0dF > 0 and (their)
dR
dF < 0, R0 R must obviously
increase monotonically with F . That is, the deadweight loss of not insuring becomes greater
when F rises, while the deadweight loss associated with buying insurance becomes smaller.92
Obtaining insurance therefore becomes relatively more appealing as F rises. This leads to
the conclusion that the company should insure for low F . According to the authors, when F
rises, it always passes a critical value F  for which R0 = R, and above which R0 > R, so
that the rm buys insurance. Note that Schnabel and Roumi (1989) make a second mistake
here. Even if their statement were correct, this does not imply the existence of F . For it
may not lie within the interval [V    I(0); V ], but above F . As F reaches V , R0 may still
be smaller than R in their model. True, if V  were large enough, say innity, F at some
point would pass the level for which the tetragon ABCD and the triangle DEF have the same
surface area.93 But we cannot be sure in the current scenario. Mathematically, one cannot
make inferences about the absolute values of R0 and R from the (above) considerations of
slopes.
Let us dig just a little deeper. What would the economic intuition of Schnabel and Roumis
(1989) conclusions be? They state that a rm will buy insurance only for su¢ ciently high
levels of debt in the presence of a safety loading. That is to say managers of underwater rms
demand insurance, while those of barely levered companies will rather go without. Remind
yourself that managers are agents of shareholders. By this course of action, managers would
not be doing them any favor. When levels of risky debt are low, shareholders have a bigger
stake in the corporation relative to high levels. They should thus have an interest in protecting
their claims in the rm. On the other hand, why bother insuring when the rm basically
belongs to debtholders anyway? Therefore, shareholders should want to protect themselves
through insurance purchases only for low levels of risky debt. Again, Schnabel and Roumis
(1989) conclusion should be the other way round.
92Graphically, this implies that triangle DEF becomes smaller as we raise the horizontal F line.
93As debt keeps rising, R would have to become zero at some point according to Schnabel and Roumi
(1989). But R must be positive for such high values of F per equation (4.16). A contradiction.
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Figure 4.7: Loss and Investment Cost Function
We will provide corrections for the two aforementioned errors in the following. That is, we
will show that R0   R is not monotonic, and we will establish the conditions for which F 
actually exists in [V    I(0); V ].
4.7 The linear-uniform special case
Let us begin by stating the relevant assumptions. Assume that state prices are uniform,
i.e., g(S) = g on the entire interval

0; S

. To account for linearity, dene the loss and the
investment cost function by
L(S) =  (Sc   S) , (4.20)
I(S) =  (Sc   S) . (4.21)
Note that both L(S) and I(S) become zero for S = Sc. As stated before, the maximum
loss and rebuilding cost occur in state S = 0. The respective values are L(0) = Sc and
I(0) = Sc. To account for 0 < I(S) < L(S)  V  for all 0  S < Sc, let 0 <  <   V Sc . A
graphical representation of the two functions, akin to Garven and MacMinn (1993, p. 639),
is provided in Figure 4.7.
Equation (4.3), which denes the threshold state, becomes V   (Sc   Sa) = F . Solving for
Sa yields:
Sa = Sc   V
   F

. (4.22)
We have to work out the derivative of R0   R with respect to F . To do so, we rst write
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out R0 and R using the above equations. From (4.7), R0 becomes
R0 =
Z Sa
0
[ (Sc   S)   (Sc   S)] gdS
= (   ) g
Z Sa
0
(Sc   S) dS
We get rid of the integral sign such that
R0 = (   ) g

ScS   S
2
2
Sa
0
= (   ) g

ScSa   S
2
a
2

. (4.23)
Using (4.16) and performing the respective operations, the equation for R is
R = 
Z Sa
0
[ (Sc   S)   (Sc   Sa)] gdS
= g

SaS   S
2
2
Sa
0
= g
S2a
2
. (4.24)
What is left to do is to subtract the latter expression from the former.
R0  R = (   ) g

ScSa   S
2
a
2

  gS
2
a
2
= g
Sa
2
[(   ) (2Sc   Sa)  Sa] . (4.25)
Since we are interested in assessing the derivavtive of R0  R with respect to F , replace Sa
with the right-hand side of equation (4.22):
R0  R = g
2

Sc   V
   F


(   )

2Sc   Sc + V
   F


  

Sc   V
   F


=
g
2

Sc   V
   F


(      )Sc + (    + ) V
   F


. (4.26)
This is the equation that we will work with to support our graphical argument mathematically.
We start by examining it for the lower boundary of our interval. The lowest possible level of
risky debt is F = V    I(0) or, equivalently, F = V    Sc. From equation (4.22) above, it
follows that Sa = 0 for F = V    Sc. Using (4.7) and (4.16), we have R0 = R = 0. But
this is nothing new: for this level of debt, the underinvestment problem just commences and,
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therefore, the areas proportional to ABCD and DEF are both zero. The interesting question
is: what happens to these areas when we start to increase F? Mathematically, this means
taking the derivative.
To put things into perspective: the idea is that the derivative is positive for F = V    I(0)
as this would indeed imply that R0 > R for low levels of debt. If both areas start to grow
from an initial size of zero, but R0 grows faster than R, then it must also be larger than R
 and it must stay larger at least until d(R0 R)dF alters its mathematical sign to negative (if
it ever turns negative).
The derivative of (4.26) with respect to F is
d (R0  R)
dF
=
g
2

(      )Sc + (    + ) V
   F


+
g
2

Sc   V
   F


(    + )

 1


=
g
2

(      )Sc + (    + ) V
   F

  Sc (    + )
+
V    F

(    + )

=
g
2

2 (    + ) V
   F

  2Sc

=
g


(    + ) V
   F

  Sc

. (4.27)
How do we show that d(R0 R)dF > 0 for F = V
  Sc? The obvious way is to substitute this
level of debt into the equation above.94 The result is g [(   )Sc], which is indeed positive
as  > . But there is a smarter way to show this result (and more). Equation (4.26) tells
us that R0   R is strictly concave.95 Strict concavity in turn implies the existence of a
unique maximum. Now, all we have to do is to show that the function takes on its maximum
in (or above) the interval [V    I(0); V ] as this implies that, starting from F = V    Sc,
R0  R increases with F from a value of zero and that, consequently, R0 > R, at least for
su¢ ciently low levels of risky debt. This is a smarter waybecause showing that R0 R is
strictly concave excludes the possibility of multiple solutions F to R0 = R. In other words,
if R0 becomes smaller than R from a certain level F  on, then it will also stay smaller for
94Here is yet another benet of illustrating the deadweight loss R as introduced in Figure 4.5. One can
verify that dR0
dF
is equal to g

times line segment BC, i.e., L (Sa) I (Sa), while dRdF is equal to g

Sc   V  F

.
The former is, equivalently, g times the horizontal line segment that connects point B and the curve V  I (S),
while the latter is equal to g times FC or, equivalently, g times FE. Thus, we simply have to compare the
line segment that connects point B and V    I (S) to FE in interpreting the derivatives graphically.
95 In case one should ask why: R0   R is obviously a quadratic function of F , cf. (4.26). With that said,
rewrite it such that its appearance is in the form of aF 2 + bF + c, where a    g
22
(    + ) is negative.
This implies that R0  R appears as a parabola that opens downward, i.e., it is strictly concave.
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Figure 4.8: R0  R as a Function of F .
any greater level of debt. Figure 4.8 helps to clarify. If F  exists, that is, if R0  R crosses
theF -axis within the interval [V    I(0); V ], it will never cross the F -axis again, but will
depart from it even further. The critical level of debt F   if it exists  is unique in the
linear-uniform special case.
To determine the maximum, the term in square brackets in (4.27) becomes zero for
F = V    
2Sc
    +  . (4.28)
From this level of debt on, the increase of R with F is relatively larger than that of R0
(d(R0 R)dF Q 0 () F R V    
2Sc
 + ). Does the maximum fall into our interval? The
expression is obviously smaller than the upper limit F = V  as the second summand is
positive. For the lower limit, we have to check V    Sc  + > V    Sc? It is a true
statement because     in the denominator is positive, making the whole fraction positive,
but less than one. The extremum lies in the interval.
The nal task is to determine under which circumstances the rm switches to not taking out
insurance. To do so, we examine R0   R for F = V . If we nd that R0   R < 0, then it
must have crossed the F -axis at a unique debt level F  < V . Note that we have Sa = Sc for
F = V  by equation (4.22). Plugging this into (4.26) yields
R0  R = g
2
S2c (      ) .
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Obviously, it depends on the safety loading  whether this equation turns out positive or
negative. To make things easy, let us dene
 =
   

(4.29)
as the value of the safety loading for which R0 = R at F = V . We have to distinguish
two cases (compare Figure 4.8). R0   R  0 for   , and the rm consequently takes
out insurance for all levels of risky debt F in the interval. This is the case where we prove
Schnabel and Roumi (1989) wrong in that F  does not exist, contrary to their statement. In
fact, the result is in the fashion of Mayers and Smith (1989): for low-enough safety loadings,
the rm always insures, regardless of its indebtedness. The second case is more interesting.
For  > , we have R0  R < 0 at F = V  (compare the lower curve in Figure 4.8). Given
continuity, this implies that the function must have crossed the F -axis at F  in the interval
(V    Sc; V ). Our ndings can be summarized as follows:
The rm decides to buy insurance for low levels of risky debt, i.e., V  Sc < F  F , because
the deadweight loss in rm value is smaller with insurance than without (R0   R  0).
Conversely, for high levels of debt, i.e., F  < F  V , it is optimal not to obtain insurance
coverage as R0   R < 0  the exact opposite of Schnabel and Roumis (1989) conclusion
quoted before.
Given a high enough safety loading, the rms decision to demand insurance is inuenced by
the level of debt F . Taken together, two components jointly keep the rm from taking out
insurance: the combination of a high safety loading and high indebtedness prompts the rm
to refrain from buying insurance.
Summing up, the conclusion originally made by Schnabel and Roumi (1989) should read
correctly: generally, the rm will demand insurance coverage for low levels of risky debt. The
magnitude of the safety loading determines whether it also does so for high levels of debt.
For the sake of completeness, let us determine F . We are looking for that F = F  which
makes R0 R = 0 or, equivalently, for which the areas proportional to tetragon ABCD and
the triangle DEF, respectively, have the same surface area. (4.26) becomes zero if one of the
two factors turns out to be zero. The rst one does so for F = V    Sc. We know that this
is cannot be the debt level we are looking for as it is the lower boundary of the debt interval.
We stated before that both R0 and R are zero and that R0 R starts to increase from this
level of debt on. Thus, it must be the second factor. We are looking for the level of debt
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such that
(      )Sc + (    + ) V
   F

= 0.
A little rearranging yields the critical level from which on the rm starts to switch to not
insuring, provided  > :
F   F = V  + Sc       
    +  . (4.30)
We can easily verify that F  is in in the interval (V    Sc; V ). First, the expression is
smaller than V  as the numerator is negative due to  > . Second, writing out V  +
Sc
  
 + > V
   Sc and simplifying also yields a true statement (as  > ), so that
F  2 (V    Sc; V ). This implies that we have R0   R > 0 for F < F  and R0   R < 0
for F > F , i.e., the rm does not insure for high levels of debt. This completes the proof
for the linear-uniform special case.
4.8 The general case
Some people may argue that the assumptions imposed in the special case above are too
restrictive. Therefore, we will now relax them and discuss the model in a more general
setting. Specically, we are back to g (S) instead of g in our equations, plus L(S) and I(S)
are not linear any more. In essence, we return to where we were before turning to the linear-
uniform special case. Thus, everything we said up to that point remains unchanged. The
proof is more challenging. This is because now we will not be able to generally exclude the
possibility of R0 R crossing the F -axis just once. In other words, the equation R0 R = 0
may have multiple solutions F in the general setting, i.e., the rm may switch back and forth
between insuring and not insuring for di¤erent levels of F . That is why we started out with
the special case above. The beauty of it is was that the strict concavity of R0  R rules
out exactly this possibility. Fortunately, we have already mastered a large part of the work
needed by deriving equations (4.18) and (4.19).
The logic is similar to that applied in the linear-uniform special case. Therefore, let us rst
write out the (twice continuously di¤erentiable) function R0  R. From (4.7) and (4.16), it
follows that
R0  R =
Z Sa
0
[L(S)  I(S)] g(S)dS   
Z Sa
0
[I(S)  I(Sa)] g(S)dS. (4.31)
Let us begin by determining  for the general case. Remember that it is dened as the safety
loading for which R0   R = 0 at F = V . We have Sa = Sc for this level of debt, and the
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equation above becomes
0 =
Z Sc
0
[L(S)  I(S)] g(S)dS   
Z Sc
0
[I(S)  I(Sc)] g(S)dS.
We know that I (Sc) = 0, so it can be dropped from the equation. Solving for the safety
loading, we nd
 =
R Sc
0 [L(S)  I(S)] g(S)dSR Sc
0 I (S) g(S)dS
=
R Sc
0 L(S)g(S)dSR Sc
0 I (S) g(S)dS
  1, (4.32)
which is positive as L (S) > I (S) for 0  S < Sc. R0   R is positive for F = V  if  < ,
and negative if  > .
Theorem: (a) For  > , there are F  and F  (V  I (0) < F   F  < V ) such that the
rm takes insurance for F  F  and does not take insurance for F > F . (b) For   ,
there are F  and F  (V   I (0) < F   F  < V ) such that the rm takes insurance both
for F  F  and for F  F .
Before going on to establish the proof, let us pause here for a second and have a closer look
at the theorem and its implications. It may appear as somewhat cumbersome. The main
reason for this is the introduction of yet another debt level, namely F . Why do we need
it to begin with? Obviously, F  and F  are the levels of debt in between which the rm
may switch (multiple times) between insuring and not insuring. In other words, given a rm
switches on multiple occasions as F rises, there has to be a debt level for which it does so for
the rst time, and one for which it does so for the last time. The theorem states that these
levels are F  and F , respectively. It also states, in contrast to Schnabel and Roumi (1989),
that the rm will generally take out insurance for levels of risky debt that are su¢ ciently low
(no greater than F ), cf. (a) and (b) in the theorem. Provided that the rm switches on
several occasions, there are two possibilities. First, R0   R, as assumed in part (a) of the
theorem, may end up negative, i.e., it crosses through the F -axis at F  with negative slope.
This implies that the rm does not take insurance for debt levels greater than F . Second,
the function may cross the axis for the last time at F  with positive slope, as asserted in
(b). The rm decides to buy insurance for levels in excess of F , just like it does for levels
no greater than F . The theorem states that the former case arises for a su¢ ciently high
safety loading ( > ), while the latter occurs if it is su¢ ciently low (  ). So, again, the
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magnitude of the safety loading determines whether or not a rm insures for high levels of
debt, whereas the rm always insures for low levels of debt. We will see in the next section
that the theorem greatly simplies in that it has a rather close resemblance with the linear-
uniform case once we impose concavity of R0   R as a function of F , for this ensures that
F  = F .
From (4.32),  >  arises for a large enough loading  and large-enough rebuilding costs I (S)
relative to the casualty losses L (S). By contrast,    requires a su¢ ciently high critical
magnitude  in connection with a low .
Proof: As before, we will examine R0   R as a composite function of F over the interval
[V    I(0); V ]. From (4.3), it follows for F = V    I (0) that
V    I (Sa) = V    I (0)
I (Sa) = I (0) .
This means that Sa = 0 for F = V    I (0). Just as in the linear case, this implies that
R0 = R = 0 and, hence, R0 R = 0 for the lower boundary of the interval, cf. (4.7), (4.16)
and (4.31). The aim is to show that R0   R increases with F from this level of debt on.
Luckily, we have already done the hard work for the derivative. We merely need to combine
(4.18) and (4.19) to obtain
d (R0  R)
dF
= [L (Sa)  I (Sa)] g (Sa)

  1
I 0 (Sa)

  
Z Sa
0
g (S) dS. (4.33)
Remember that dSadF =   1I0(Sa) is positive (graphically, increasing F pushes Sa further to the
right). All that is left to do is to insert Sa = 0 such that
d (R0  R)
dF
= [L (0)  I (0)] g (0)

  1
I 0 (0)

> 0
for F = V    I (0). Just as in the linear case, both R0 and R increase with F from
R0 = R = 0, but R0 grows faster, implying that R0 must be greater than R for low-enough
levels of debt. Hence, the rm takes out insurance for such levels. Low enoughrelates to
F , it is merely another way of stating the assertion that there exists F  > V    I (0) such
that R0  R > 0 for F < F , as stated in both parts (a) and (b) of the theorem.
Let us examine R0 R for the upper boundary of the debt interval and address the question
whether it is positive or negative. Since both Sa = Sc for F = V  and I (Sc) = 0 by (4.3),
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(4.31) becomes
R0  R =
Z Sc
0
[L(S)  I(S)] g(S)dS   
Z Sc
0
I (S) g(S)dS
=
Z Sc
0
L(S)g(S)dS   (1 + )
Z Sc
0
I (S) g(S)dS:
Again, the answer is: it depends. We know from above that  =  makes the equation
zero. Greater magnitudes of the safety loading result in negative values. Relating to our
theorem, this yields the following statement: (a) R0   R < 0 for F = V , provided that
the safety loading is su¢ ciently large in that  > . This implies the existence of F  < V 
above which (F > F ) the rm will not buy insurance. Bring Figure 4.8 to mind for a
better understanding. Since the function is positive for F close to V    I(0), but negative
for F = V , it must have crossed the F -axis with negative slope at some level F  < V 
(regardless of whether the rm crosses the axis multiple times for intermediate debt levels).
(b) For a su¢ ciently small loading, i.e.,   , it follows that R0  R  0 for F = V , and
the rm buys insurance for F = V . What about function values for levels of debt slightly
lower than V ? To answer, let us check out the derivative of R0  R at the highest possible
level of debt. We have to substitute F = V  into (4.33). This implies Sa = Sc, and recall
that I (Sc) = L (Sc) = 0 such that
d (R0  R)
dF
=  
Z Sc
0
g (S) dS < 0.
The derivative is negative (R0   R is decreasing at F = V ). This means the function
R0   R takes on even higher positive values than at F = V  for levels (slightly) below
F = V . Consequently, there exists an F  such that the rm buys insurance for F  F .
This concludes the proof of the theorem.
Let us come back to F  and F  for a moment. Although most intuitive for ones under-
standing, the critical level of debt for which the rm switches form taking insurance to not
doing so generally need not be unique (such that F  6= F ). In that case, the rm will switch
between buying and not buying insurance more than once as F increases. One example is
su¢ cient to prove this assertion. As in Arnold and Hartl (2011, p. 6), set Sc = 1, V  = 1,
I(S) = 0:9004498875  0:9(S + 0:001)0:5, L(S) = I(S) + ( S3 + S2) + 0:001(1  S), and
g(S) =
e 0:5(
S 0:2
0:1 )
2
0:1
p
2
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for S in [0; 1], i.e., the distribution of state prices is truncated normal. (a) Given  = 0:1 (a
safety loading of ten percent), the function R0  R crosses the F -axis (with negative slope)
at F  = 0:1502631825 for the rst time, turns positive again at F = 0:4160717224, then
becomes negative for the second and last time at F  = 0:8714716708 and nally terminates
at R0   R =  0:01256042295 for F = V  = 1. In other words, the rm does not take
out insurance with moderate indebtedness F 2 (0:1502631825; 0:4160717224) and at high
levels F > F . The example is constructed in such a manner that L (S)   I (S) is small
and I 0 (S) is large for S small, for this implies by (4.33) that d(R0 R)dF < 0 for F and, thus,
Sa small enough. This ensures that R0   R becomes negative for the rst time at F  =
0:1502631825. (b) Redoing the calculations with  = 0:05, the function becomes negative
rst at F  = 0:1769684113 and turns positive again at F  = 0:3433426436. It terminates at
R0   R = 0:01207642332 for F = 1. That is, the rm does insure for debt levels F  F 
and F  F , but not for an intermediate range of F 2 (0:1769684113; 0:3433426436).
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4.9 Conditions for concavity
As an intermediate waybetween the restrictive linear-uniform special case and the rather
cumbersome general case, the theorem simplies signicantly once we impose concavity (cf.
Arnold and Hartl, 2011, p.4).
Theorem: Suppose d
2(R0 R)
dF 2
< 0 for all F 2 [V    I (0) ; V ]. (a) For  > , there is F 
(V    I (0) < F  < V ) such that the rm takes insurance for F  F  and does not take
insurance for F > F . (b) For   , the rm takes out insurance for all levels of risky debt
F 2 [V    I (0) ; V ].
Concavity rules out multiple solutions F to R0 R = 0 for intermediate levels of risky debt,
which implies that F  = F , as was the case in the linear-uniform special case. We have
already provided the proof for the theorem in the general setting in the section above: all we
have to do now is to set F  = F .
Linearity of L (S) and I (S) and uniformly distributed state prices are not the only means
by which one ensures concavity of the function R0   R (i.e., d
2(R0 R)
dF 2
< 0). To see this,
we rst have to establish the second derivative of R0  R with respect to F for the general
case. It follows from (4.33) that
d2 (R0  R)
dF 2
=
1
I 0 (Sa)

L (Sa)  I (Sa)
I 0 (Sa)
g0 (Sa) +
d
dSa

L (Sa)  I (Sa)
I 0 (Sa)

g (Sa) + g (Sa)

,
where use is once again made of the Leibniz rule. Next, we have to apply the quotient rule
for the explicit derivation of the derivative in the second summand, resulting in
d2 (R0  R)
dF 2
=
1
I 0 (Sa)

L (Sa)  I (Sa)
I 0 (Sa)
g0 (Sa)
+
[L0 (Sa)  I 0 (Sa)] I 0 (Sa)  [L (Sa)  I (Sa)] I 00 (Sa)
[I 0 (Sa)]2
g (Sa) + g (Sa)

.
Since we require the right-hand side to be negative, we need to establish a set of su¢ cient
conditions that warrants the generalization of the concavity result obtained in the linear-
uniform special case. Imposing the simple conditions L0 (S)   I 0 (S)  0, I 00 (S)  0 and
g0 (S)  0 for all S 2 [0; Sc] leads to such a result. The latter inequality guarantees that the
rst term in the sum in braces is non-negative, while the former two provide for the non-
negativity of the second summand. Combined with the positivity (g (S) > 0) of the third
expression, the term in braces is positive, which implies that the overall result is negative
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due to I 0 (S) < 0, so that d
2(R0 R)
dF 2
< 0.
Time for a summary. The most important point we have made is that a rm will refrain from
insuring for a combination of a high safety loading and high indebtedness. We have shown
that the outcome of the model is continuous in the sense that di¤erent model parameter
combinations will lead to di¤erent corporate decisions regarding the purchase of insurance.
Generally, a rm takes out actuarially fair casualty insurance. Once a positive safety loading
comes into play, insurance is bought if the deadweight loss of insuring (R) is less than that
of not insuring (R0). Given concavity of R0 R, the rm keeps demanding insurance for all
levels of risky debt for a low-enough magnitude of the safety loading. It will stop taking out
insurance if, and only if, both the safety loading and the level of debt surpass their respective
critical values.
4.10 Introducing bankruptcy costs
The main premise for the underinvestment problem to occur is the existence of risky debt.
Risky in the sense that bankruptcy occurs in states S < Sa if no insurance is bought. Bank-
ruptcy occurs when the xed obligations to creditors cannot be met (Haugen and Senbet,
1978, p. 384). In other words, there is a possibility that the rm will default on its debt due
to the fact that rm value is insu¢ cient to cover it even with asset reconstitution (but with-
out insurance). Shares become worthless and, ultimately, debtholders take over as the new
owners of the rm because [B]ankruptcy is merely the transfer of ownership from one securi-
tyholder to another(Haugen and Senbet, 1988, p. 32). But this process is well known to be
costly in reality (inconsistent with the notion of perfect markets). There may be controversy
about how large these costs are, but the literature leaves no doubt that they exist.96
Therefore, we will incorporate another innovation into the underinvestment model. We will
examine how the introduction of bankruptcy costs a¤ects the models conclusions. We will
focus exclusively on the linear-uniform special case as this will su¢ ce to grasp the main
idea (we will plug in the specic values once we come to the derivatives later on). Since
we are talking about bankruptcy, obviously, these costs are only encountered for states in
96Brealey et al. (2003) provide a nice textbook treatment. Generally, costs of nancial distress can be both
direct and indirect. The costs of the bankruptcy proceeding (such as Chapter 11) count towards the former
because lawyers and courts have to be paid directly. The latter are hard to quantify as they correspond to
a multiplicity of manifestations, such as deteriorating relationships with customers or suppliers. Importantly,
they may well arise before bankruptcy because nancial distress is rst and foremost a condition where rms
...cash ows are low relative to their debt obligations (Titman and Tsyplakov, 2007, p. 401). Opler and
Titman (1994) report large indirect costs. Warner (1977) is frequently quoted as the rst to try and measure
bankruptcy costs. He nds small direct costs. Bris et al. (2006) point to the di¢ culties in measuring even
bankruptcy costs, stating that ranges between 2% and 20% of asset values are easily justiable.
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Figure 4.9: The Underinvestment Problem with Bankruptcy Costs
which rm value at the second date will not be enough to cover the promised repayment to
bondholders. We will assume that rm value in bankruptcy states is depressed (even further)
by an exogenous deadweight cost of M (> 0). For simplicity, we assume that the amount of
bankruptcy costs M is xed, along the lines of Stein (1992). Before continuing, though, we
have to be clear about what bankruptcy statesactually stands for. It means S < Sa if the
rm invests to rebuild, i.e., when talking about line V    I (S) in the previous graphs. But
for the lower line, V    L (S), it does not. Have a look at Figure 4.9. Hypothetically, if the
rm never rebuilds (function V  L (S) is appropriate), bankruptcy arises in a state S > Sa
because L (S) > I (S). Thus, we dene a new state Sb for which the curve V  L (S) crosses
the horizontal F -line. This state is implicitly dened by the equation
V    L (Sb) = F .
Graphically, when we start to move down from S, rm value with and without repairing
remains unchanged to previous graphs until V    I (S) and V    L (S) reach F at Sa and
Sb, respectively. From this state on, both values are depressed by a xed amount M in every
state until S = 0 is reached. The new functions run parallel to their original counterparts
(as depicted by the dashed lines in Figure 4.9). Accordingly, the new loss function becomes
eL (S) = L (S) +M
=  (Sc   S) +M for 0  S < Sb,
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while it remains unchanged, i.e., L (S), for Sb  S  Sc. Since Sb > Sa, V    L (S) must
cross the F line at a higher state than Sa because, graphically, it is situated below V  I (S).
Similarly, the investment cost function is given by
eI (S) = I (S) +M
=  (Sc   S) +M for 0  S < Sb,
and the usual I (S) for Sa  S  Sc. Just as we assumed 0 <  <   V Sc in the case without
bankruptcy costs, we now impose 0 <  <   V  MSc . The last inequality in this sequence
makes sure that V    eL (0)  0 such that the costs accrue in full in every bankruptcy state.
Mathematically, the two functions now each have a jump discontinuity, one at S = Sb and
the other at S = Sa, respectively.
At rst sight, Figure 4.9 may appear a little unfamiliar, especially the area enclosed by the
function graphs between states Sa and Sb. Be aware that shareholders will still as before
decide to invest deliberately in those states (Sa  S  Sb). By doing so, rm value jumps
from V    eL (S) to V    I (S)  F , and stockholders are left with a non-negative residual
claim. Bankruptcy costs will not arise because rm value su¢ ces to pay o¤ debtholders
after the investment is made. As before, the damage is always repaired for states S  Sa.
Conversely, this implies that the underinvestment problem still becomes imminent only for
states S < Sa. Furthermore, note that rebuilding has the same NPV as before because
bankruptcy shifts both V    L (S) and V    I (S) downward by the same amount M . The
distance between the two (i.e., the NPV) thus stays unchanged. One can easily verify by
checking that eL (S)   eI (S) = L (S)   I (S) for all underinvestment states S < Sa. One can
also easily determine the rm value for a levered and uninsured company in the presence of
bankruptcy costs. Note that we will indicate all values in the presence of these costs with
superscript M . Since there is no insurance involved (yet), rm value is simply shareholder
value plus debtholder value. As we said that managers decide to invest for states S  Sa,
shareholder value (as the value of the residual claim) is unchanged, cf. (4.5), such that
EM0 = E0 =
Z Sc
Sa
[V    I(S)  F ] g(S)dS +
Z S
Sc
(V    F ) g(S)dS. (4.34)
Therefore, bankruptcy must a¤ect debt value. Debtholders are entitled to the insolvency
mass if bankruptcy occurs. They take over as the new owners. But since these costs depress
rm value for states S < Sa, this mass has become smaller by amountM in every bankruptcy
120 4. Underinvestment in the reconstitution of damaged assets
state. Consequently, debt value is
DM0 =
Z Sa
0
h
V    eL(S)i g(S)dS + Z S
Sa
Fg(S)dS. (4.35)
It should be clear that the value of debt is lowered by exactly the present value of the
bankruptcy costs. We can verify this by computing D0 DM0 . From (4.4), the only di¤erence
in the two equations is the respective loss function in the rst summand. Everything else
remains unchanged. This included state Sa, for F is unchanged. Thus, in calculating the
di¤erence between the two debt values, all terms cancels out except for
D0  DM0 =
Z Sa
0
heL(S)  L (S)i g(S)dS
=
Z Sa
0
Mg(S)dS,
i.e., the present value of the bankruptcy costs. Since shareholder value is the same, the value
of the levered and uninsured rm as of the rst date consequently is also lowered by the
present value of these costs. We simply have to add up (4.34) and (4.35) such that
VM0 = E0 +D
M
0 =
Z Sa
0
h
V    eL(S)i g(S)dS + Z Sc
Sa
[V    I(S)] g(S)dS +
Z S
Sc
V g(S)dS.
(4.36)
It follows that V0   VM0 =
R Sa
0 Mg(S)dS. Graphically, rm value as of the rst date is
proportional to the area of 0SHJCXW in the presence of bankruptcy costs. Compared to V0,
which was given by 0SHJCBA, it is smaller by
R Sa
0
n
V    L (Sa) 
h
V    eL (Sa)io g (S) dS,
i.e., the area proportional to the parallelogram WXBA in Figure 4.9.97 The new debt value
(which is also less by WXBA) is represented by 0SGCXW, while shareholder value is still
proportional to CGHJ.
Again, the loss in debt value is not borne by debtholders, but ultimately comes out of share-
holderspockets. In an e¢ cient market, bondholders will foresee these additional costs in
case of bankruptcy. Since they cannot demand compensation in the form of higher payo¤s in
non-bankruptcy states (as F does not change), they will pay less for the debt issue relative to
the case without bankruptcy costs, so that it becomes a zero-NPV investment to them. The
issue raises less cash for shareholders; less by the amount of the present value of bankruptcy
costs. Therefore, shareholders have an even stronger incentive to get rid of underinvestment.
Before considering safety loadings and the mathematics involved, we will show that actuarially
97Line segment XB is V    L (Sa)  
h
V    eL (Sa)i and, thus, equal to M . Accordingly, the area of the
parallelogram WXBA is equal to
R Sa
0
Mg (S) dS, the present value of the bankruptcy costs.
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fair insurance still solves the underinvestment problem. However, we need to address one
question rst. We have shown that, in comparison to V0, the area under the curve in the
underinvestment states is smaller with bankruptcy costs. So, either the deadweight loss of
not insuring (R0) or the fair insurance premium (Pi) has become bigger. Let us re-quote what
the authors of the original model have to say about the purpose of insurance: Essentially,
V    I(S) has to be raised above F ,... by purchasing some critical amount of coverage
(Mayers and Smith, 1987, p. 49). Since we are now dealing with eI (S) instead of I (S) in
bankruptcy states, one is tempted to think that the quote at present should read correctly
that the intention of buying insurance is to lift V    eI(S) above F ; which would imply that
the fair premium is more expensive, since it has to cover a higher amount (eI (S)   I (Sa)
versus the original I (S)  I (Sa)) in each underinvestment state. Hence, the deadweight loss
of not insuring would be unaltered. This reasoning is incorrect, however. Let us go back to
the denition of R. We specied it as the loss in rm value due to the existence of risky
debt in the rms capital structure relative to the (status quo) value with pure equity (or
risk-free debt) nancing, namely Vu. This is an important point. We have to be aware of
the fact that Vu still works as our benchmark. Note that the two functions I (S) and L (S)
only exhibit a discontinuity jump if there is risky debt in the capital structure (for risk-free
debt, F < V    I (0), there are no states Sa and Sb). We assume pure equity or risk-free
debt nancing in our status quo, as depicted in Figure 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. There is no
discontinuity jump involved in these two gures. The deadweight loss of not insuring must
consequently be dened as Vu   VM0 . From (4.1), (4.7) and (4.36), it follows that
RM0 =
Z Sc
0
[V    I(S)] g(S)dS +
Z S
Sc
V g(S)dS  
Z Sa
0
h
V    eL(S)i g(S)dS
 
Z Sc
Sa
[V    I(S)] g(S)dS  
Z S
Sc
V g(S)dS
=
Z Sa
0
[V    I(S)] g(S)dS  
Z Sa
0
h
V    eL(S)i g(S)dS
=
Z Sa
0
[L (S)  I(S)] g(S)dS +
Z Sa
0
Mg(S)dS
= R0 +
Z Sa
0
Mg(S)dS. (4.37)
Thus, the agency cost of the underinvestment problem and not the fair insurance premium
rises by the present value of the bankruptcy costs. Graphically, the new deadweight loss
is represented by the old loss, ABCD, plus the present value of the bankruptcy costs, pro-
portional to WXBA, combining to WXCD in Figure 4.9. Obviously, the fair premium is
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unchanged. It is still Pi, cf. (4.8).98 In other words, it is not V    eI (S), but still V    I (S)
that needs to be elevated to F . Think about it this way: solving the underinvestment prob-
lem, which shareholders now have an even bigger incentive to do, is still a mere reformulation
of the safe debtdecision. Safe debt means that insurance guarantees that rm value suf-
ces to pay o¤ debtholders in all states of the world. This in turn implies that bankruptcy
never occurs. If bankruptcy never occurs, how can there be any bankruptcy costs? If there
are no bankruptcy costs, then there is no V    eI (S). Consequently, it has to be V    I (S)
that matters in buying insurance. By writing a covenant in the bond indenture that guar-
antees the purchase of the stipulated level of insurance (the same as without bankruptcy
costs), the rm makes a credible promise to insure, i.e., it essentially makes a commitment
to rebuild the damaged assets in every state the rm su¤ers a loss. Because of this com-
mitment, nancial distress will never occur. If the rm insures, bankruptcy costs will not
be incurred. If the rm does not insure, rm value is represented by the curve V    eL(S)
in bankruptcy/underinvestment states S < Sa; without insurance, shareholders would never
invest to jump to the curve V    eI (S) as this would imply a sure loss for them: the en-
tire NPV would be absorbed by debtholders, who enjoy higher seniority. But the rm has
an incentive to remove underinvestment. It will hence always take out fair insurance and
completely eliminate the underinvestment problem.
The rm has to pay the insurance premium at the rst date. Graphically, insurance coverage
adds RM0 and Pi (as represented by WXCD and DCF, respectively) to V
M
0 , but costs Pi. As
a consequence, debtholders always receive F , even in states S < Sa. Using (4.36) and (4.37),
we have
VMi = V
M
0 +R
M
0 + Pi   Pi
=
Z Sa
0
h
V    eL(S)i g(S)dS + Z Sc
Sa
[V    I(S)] g(S)dS +
Z S
Sc
V g(S)dS
+
Z Sa
0
[V    I(S)] g(S)dS  
Z Sa
0
h
V    eL(S)i g(S)dS
+
Z Sa
0
[I(S)  I(Sa)] g(S)dS  
Z Sa
0
[I(S)  I(Sa)] g(S)dS.
The rst and the fth summand cancel out. The fourth and the sixth summand can be
98So is the deductible I (Sa): F is unchanged, so Sa is unchanged, so I (Sa) is unchanged.
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combined such that
VMi =
Z Sa
0
[V    I(Sa)] g (S) dS +
Z Sc
Sa
[V    I(S) + F   F ] g(S)dS
+
Z S
Sc
[V  + F   F ] g(S)dS  
Z Sa
0
[I(S)  I(Sa)] g(S)dS.
From (4.3), using V    I (Sa) = F , we receive
VMi =
Z S
0
Fg(S)dS +
Z Sc
Sa
[V    I(S)  F ] g(S)dS +
Z S
Sc
[V    F ] g(S)dS
 
Z Sa
0
[I(S)  I(Sa)] g(S)dS.
Compare this equation to (4.11). They are identical. Since (4.11) leads to (4.12), the rm
value with fair insurance and bankruptcy costs is thus given by
VMi = Vi = Vu,
i.e., status quo. Fair insurance completely removes the underinvestment problem (an MM-
type irrelevance of nancing holds yet again in the presence of fair insurance). Insurance
makes the liabilities risk-free. Debt value as of the rst date is once again
DMi = Di =
Z S
0
Fg(S)dS,
cf. (4.9). Lastly, we have shareholder value. Stockholders are yet again entitled to a rst-day
dividend by the fact that debt becomes safe through insuring. From (4.9) and (4.35), the
proceeds of the debt issue increase by
Di  DM0 =
Z Sa
0
[L(S)  I(S)] g(S)dS +
Z Sa
0
Mg(S)dS +
Z Sa
0
[I(S)  I(Sa)] g(S)dS.
From (4.37) and (4.8), this corresponds to RM0 + Pi, i.e., areas WXCD and DCF in Figure
4.9.99 Accounting for the cost of the insurance premium, we are left with a rst-date dividend
of RM0 + Pi   Pi ( 0) to shareholders, as proportional to the area WXCD, i.e., the original
99Alternatively, we have Di D0 = R0+Pi and D0 DM0 =
R Sa
0
Mg(S)dS. Since RM0 = R0+
R Sa
0
Mg(S)dS
by (4.37), this implies Di  DM0 = RM0 + Pi.
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dividend ABCD plus WXBA. Hence,
EMi = E0 +R
M
0 .
This is the mathematical justication that the rm will always take out fair insurance, for the
dividend, which is received on top of the present value of the residual claim on second-date
cash ows, is non-negative.
The crucial part, however, is that the increase in debt value and, hence, the dividend is
now higher than in the case without bankruptcy costs (provided F is strictly greater than
V    I (0), and not equal to it), cf. (4.13). At the rst date, the uninsured debt issue with
bankruptcy costs raisesDM0 , which is less than the proceedsD0 of the uninsured issue without
these costs. Hence, shareholders have more to gain by removing the problem.
It is important to understand that this implies that bankruptcy costs have one fundamental
implication for the model the way we have considered it so far: we stated in the case without
bankruptcy costs that the funds raised by the uninsured issue must have been enough for
whatever use they were intended for (e.g., to buy an asset). We also stated that debt may not
be supported by cash. Therefore, the proceeds must have been just enough. With bankruptcy
costs, the rm cannot a¤ord the same activity as without, for it raises a smaller amount. We
should keep this in mind when comparing the impact of insurance on the values as of the rst
date for the two scenarios. If we wanted the rm to nance the same project as before, we
would have to increase the initial F , but this would be irreconcilable with the cum dividend
interpretation.
Hence, we formally state that, in the presence of bankruptcy costs, the rm raises the money
for a di¤erent purpose, but promises to pay back the same amount at the second date to
debtholders. Luckily, the use of the debt issue proceeds is of no importance. This is why we
never specied it (except that it may not be held as cash). What matters is that we have a
rm levered with risky debt that promises the same F as before.
Thus, our research question is still as valid as before. We want to nd out how the rms
decision to buy insurance varies with the level of risky debt in the presence of both a safety
loading and bankruptcy costs. Since the fair insurance premium Pi is una¤ected by the
presence of bankruptcy costs, so is the loading premium Pi, that constitutes the deadweight
loss of insuring, cf. (4.16). Hence,
RM = R = 
Z Sa
0
[I(S)  I(Sa)] g(S)dS.
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Figure 4.10: Deadweight Losses with Bankruptcy Costs
The loading once again diminishes the dividend paid out to shareholders. Similar to E in
(4.17), the value of their shares as of the rst date becomes
EM = E0 +R
M
0  R
Methodically, the task is still to examine the tradeo¤ between the two deadweight losses, as
depicted in Figure 4.10. The rm insures if, and only if, RM0  R  0.
It is easy to see where this leads to. As the deadweight loss of not insuring is even greater
with bankruptcy costs, insurance should be more attractive for rms in the sense that they
will demand it for even higher levels of risky debt compared to the case without bankruptcy
costs. Remember that we focus on the linear-uniform special case. From (4.23) and (4.37),
it follows that
RM0 = (   ) g

ScSa   S
2
a
2

+ g
Z Sa
0
MdS
= (   ) g

ScSa   S
2
a
2

+ gMSa. (4.38)
One can see nicely that the deadweight loss of not insuring increases with the level of bank-
ruptcy costs. The derivative is dR
M
0
dM = gSa, which is strictly positive for levels of debt above
V    I (0) = V    Sc.100 Thus, the higher the bankruptcy costs, the higher the deadweight
100We said that the present value of the costs is represented by parallelogram WXBA in Figure 4.10. The
two short sides (line segment BX and AW) are M in length. This can be redrawn as a rectangle with width
M and length Sa that has the same area. Now, if the width is to increase marginally, then the increase in the
area of the rectangle is proportional to length Sa.
126 4. Underinvestment in the reconstitution of damaged assets
loss of not insuring. Graphically, the tetragon representing RM0 increases, making it harder
for triangle DEF to catch upas F increases. Insuring becomes more attractive for higher
levels of debt. The derivative also tells us that the increase is larger for higher Sa or, equiva-
lently, for higher F : an Sa that is graphically situated further to the right implies that there
are more underinvestment states for each of which bankruptcy costs are incurred, increasing
the present value of these costs. Thus, leverage a¤ects their present value even though we
assume M to be xed.
Combining (4.38) and (4.24) yields
RM0  R = (   ) g

ScSa   S
2
a
2

  gS
2
a
2
+ gMSa
= g
Sa
2
[(   ) (2Sc   Sa)  Sa] + gMSa.
The rst summand is equal to (4.25) such that RM0  R = R0 R+ gMSa. We know that
(4.25) leads to (4.26). Therefore, we skip the math and state that
RM0  R =
g
2

Sc   V
   F


(      )Sc + (    + ) V
   F


+gM

Sc   V
   F


=
g
2

Sc   V
   F


(      )Sc + (    + ) V
   F

+ 2M

(4.39)
The rst line of the equation above shows that the new function is the old (R0  R) plus a
non-negative term. This facilitates determining the derivative of RM0  R with respect to F .
We already know the derivative of R0   R from (4.27). So, all we need to do is determine
the second summand in the equations rst line such that
d
 
RM0  R

dF
=
g


(    + ) V
   F

  Sc

+
g

M
=
g


(    + ) V
   F

  Sc +M

. (4.40)
For every level of risky debt other than F = V    Sc, the curve depicting RM0  R is now
positioned at a higher level than to R0  R in Figure 4.8.
As in the case without bankruptcy costs, for the lowest level of risky debt, i.e., F = V   
Sc and, consequently, Sa = 0, equation (4.39) becomes zero. From (4.37) and (4.16), we
have RM0 = R = 0 because the underinvestment problem just commences. Examining the
derivative for that level of debt, we once again nd that is positive ( g [(   )Sc] + gM) 
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and even more so (by the second summand) than before. In other words, RM0   R rises
to positive levels from F = V    Sc in a steeper way than R0   R, so that RM0 > R,
and the rm buys insurance for low enough levels of risky debt. RM0   R is a strictly
concave function, too. This implies the existence of a unique maximum such that RM0   R
crosses, if ever, the F -axis just once. To nd this maximum, we have to determine that level
of F for which the expression in square brackets in (4.40) becomes zero. The solution is
F = V    2Sc + + M + . A comparison with (4.28) reveals that the rst two summands
constitute the value of F for which the function R0   R takes on its maximum in the case
without bankruptcy costs. The last summand is positive (    > 0), which implies that
RM0  R does not stop to rise until a larger F is reached.
One question we now have to ask ourselves is whether the new extremum is still within the
feasible interval of risky debt levels? The old value is greater than V  Sc. Since the new F
for which the function takes on its maximum is larger, it must be greater than V  Sc, too.
The upper boundary V  is more interesting. The question is whether V   2Sc ++ M + <
V . The old value, i.e., the rst two summands, are smaller than V , but we are now adding
a positive term such that there is a critical value of M for which the inequality is not fullled
any longer. Solving for M , we have M < Sc. If we want the new extremum to be within
the interval, this is what we have to assume. We will do so for the remainder of this section,
i.e., M < Sc.101
So far, one result is the same qualitatively: the rm takes insurance for F small enough
(where small enough is not the same in the two scenarios, as we will see). Let us go on
to examine whether F M exists (within the interval of feasible debt levels), i.e., whether the
rm switches from insuring to not insuring in the presence of bankruptcy costs. Following
the same logic as before, we inspect RM0   R for F = V  and check whether it terminates
in a positive or a negative value. For F = V , (4.39) becomes
RM0  R =
g
2
Sc [(      )Sc + 2M ]
=
g
2
S2c (      ) + gMSc.
Figure 4.11 provides a graphical representation of the new situation in the fashion of Figure
4.8. The rst summand in the equation above is the old, i.e., the value of R0 R for F = V .
101 If M  Sc (which does not contradict 0 <  <   V  MSc as long as we assume V
 large enough in that
V  > Sc ( + )), then the curve representing function RM0   R would start to decline only after it passes
F = V , which is an unfeasible debt level. But note that this would by no means make our research question
obsolete. It would rather provide an answer in itself. In that case, the rm would always insure irrespective
of the magnitudes of the risky debt and, respectively, the safety loading because the high deadweight loss of
not insuring (induced by high costs of bankruptcy) would make insuring attractive per se.
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Figure 4.11: R0  R as a Function of F in the Presence of Bankruptcy Costs
It now increases by gMSc > 0 for RM0  R. That is,
RM0  RjF=V  = R0  RjF=V  + gMSc.
Comparing the old and the new function value at F = V  tells us that the curve including
bankruptcy costs always terminates in a higher value than its counterpart without these costs
(irrespective of its mathematical sign). Whether this also precludes negative termination
values still remains to be answered. Checking if the right-hand side of the previous equation
is positive or negative comes down to
Sc
2|{z}
>0
(      )| {z }
0 for 
<0 for >
+ M|{z}
>0
? 0.
Obviously, the critical safety loading  =   from (4.29), for which R0 = R at F = V
 in
the case without bankruptcy costs, still makes the rst summand zero. But not the entire
term.  >  now is the necessary condition for the mathematical sign to be negative in the
inequality above; but it is not su¢ cient. There are three possible scenarios, each of which
corresponds to one of the curves depicted in Figure 4.11102. The scenarios are:
   : while the rst summand in the inequality above is non-negative, the fact that
102Of course, we could compute a new critical value for the safety loading (
M
=  

+2 M
Sc
), but this would
miss the point as it would only tell us that the critical value that makes RM0   R = 0 for F = V  increases
with M . We are interested in how the presence of bankruptcy costs changes the outcome relative to the case
without these costs. That is why we keep considering   to be able to compute a critical level of M given .
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M > 0 makes the second summand and, thus, the entire term positive. This is the
case where R0   R never becomes negative. RM0   R takes on even larger values,
i.e., it is situated above the old curve for all levels of risky debt F 2 (V    Sc; V ].
The function terminates at a positive value and never crosses the F -axis. F M does
not exist within the interval of risky debt levels, just like F  did not exist in the case
without bankruptcy costs. This result is of the type of Mayers and Smith (1989). For
low enough levels of the safety loading, the rm demands insurance for all levels of
risky debt irrespective of the magnitude of the bankruptcy costs (as long as they are
less than Sc due to the assumption made above).
  >  in conjunction with high enough costs of bankruptcy: even though the rst
summand turns out negative because of  > , the entire term may still be positive if
M is large enough. The rm would decide not to insure at F = V  without bankruptcy
costs (F  exists), but in their presence it opts for insurance. RM0   R stays positive
all along and does not pass through the F -axis in the interval. As for the critical level
of bankruptcy costs for this to happen, we must solve Sc2 (      ) +M > 0 for
M , which yields M >  Sc2 (      ). Note that the right-hand side is positive as
the expression in brackets is negative. We set M =  Sc2 (      ), conditional on
 >  (otherwise we would have a contradiction to M > 0). This scenario relates
to our statement that bankruptcy costs provide a greater incentive to insure. Under
normalcircumstances, the function would end up negative at F = V  such that the
rm would switch to not insuring at F . Bankruptcy costs move the curve back into
the rst quadrant, and the rm always insures. Thus, what formerly kept the rm from
insuring for high enough levels of debt (F > F ) does not do so anymore now. Despite
a high safety loading ( > ), the rm will buy insurance regardless of its indebtedness
if bankruptcy costs are high enough. The result is also of the Mayers and Smith (1989)
type.
  >  and M < M: this the case where the second summand is positive, but insu¢ -
ciently so to compensate the negative value of the rst. Therefore, the entire expression
becomes negative. In other words, RM0  R < 0 for F = V . This is the only constel-
lation for which there exists a F M (< V
) such that the function crosses the F -axis.
Graphically, the function ends in a higher, yet still negative value and is situated above
its no-bankruptcy-cost equivalent for all F 2 (V    Sc; V ]. The rm switches from
insuring to not insuring for F M < F  V . The result is summarized in the following
130 4. Underinvestment in the reconstitution of damaged assets
statement: what keeps the rm from demanding casualty insurance is the combination
of high leverage, high safety loading and low costs of bankruptcy.
This outcome is still in such a manner that it is contrary to Schnabel and Roumi (1989).
Given su¢ ciently high  and su¢ ciently low M , the rm nds it optimal not to buy
insurance for high levels of risky debt, as opposed to the authorssuggestion to seek
coverage for high levels. Finally, coming back to our comment about the necessary ver-
sus su¢ cient condition, low enoughbankruptcy costs, i.e., M < M, is the su¢ cient
condition for RM0  R < 0 at F = V .
Note that the function will end exactly at RM0  R = 0 for M =M (which implies  > ).
Without bankruptcy costs, R0  R is zero at F = V  for  = . Now, RM0  R is positive
at F = V  for  =  because the costs of bankruptcy push the curve above the F -axis.
Mathematically, two tasks remain. First, we have to prove that, given  > , M is feasible.
In case one should wonder why it should not be: We have to reconcile the assumption
M < Sc (that we established for the maximum of the function RM0  R to lie within the
interval of risky debt levels) with M >  Sc2 (      ), i.e., M > M, since the second
bullet point above is only valid for the latter inequality. We need to verify that
Sc >  Sc
2
(      )
is a true statement such that M between the two is feasible. Simplifying leads to  >   .
This is a true statement: the right-hand side is negative due to  > , while the left-hand
side is positive.103
Second, we have not dened F M so far. F

M is the debt level for which R
M
0  R becomes zero
in the third bullet point above. The procedure is similar to the derivation of F  in (4.30).
From RM0   R in (4.39), the rst factor becomes zero for F = V    Sc. We know this
cannot be the F we are looking for. Therefore, the solution is once again the F which makes
the second factor, i.e.,
(      )Sc + (    + ) V
   F

+ 2M ,
103There is no problem for the third bullet point. M < Sc implies that all bankruptcy costs for which
M < M are also less than Sc.
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zero. Solving for F and using (4.30), we nd F M to be
F M = V
 + Sc
      
    +  + 
2M
    + 
= F  + 
2M
    +  . (4.41)
Remember that        in the numerator in the rst line is negative as  >  in the
case of the third bullet point. Let us conclude by showing that the value is within the
interval (V    Sc; V ). The second summand in the second line in (4.41) is positive. Hence,
F M > V
 Sc as F  > V  Sc. Concerning the upper boundary of the interval, we would
like to show that
V  + Sc
      
    +  + 
2M
    +  < V
.
The second summand is negative, while the third is positive. Dividing by  + leaves us
with Sc (      ) + 2M < 0. Solving for M yields
M <  Sc
2
(      ) .
The right-hand side should look familiar, for it is M, dened it in the second bullet point
above. It follows that the inequality is fullled by assumption as we have M < M in the
third bullet point. This proves F M < V
.
Finally, note from (4.41) that F M is strictly greater than F
. This comes as no big surprise
as we said that bankruptcy costs push the curves upwards graphically. Thus, if the former
curve crossed the F -axis, and if the curve still crosses it (bullet point three) in the presence
of bankruptcy costs, it does so at a higher level of risky debt.
This completes the examination of the impact of bankruptcy costs on the rms decision to
buy insurance. The innovation is that bankruptcy costs may lead a rm to insure for such
(high) levels of debt for which it formerly decided not to seek insurance as the curve is pushed
back up above the F -axis graphically. Insurance coverage is bought if the deadweight loss
of insuring (R) is less than that of not insuring (RM0 ). In sum, bankruptcy costs make
the model outcome more complex. More parameters have to be dealt with, allowing for a
broader range of possible results. Fair insurance will always be sought. In the presence of
a positive safety loading, the rm generally demands insurance for su¢ ciently low levels of
risky debt. If the safety loading is small enough, it even does so for all levels of risky debt.
This outcome also arises when the safety loading is in fact above its (formerly) critical level,
but large enough bankruptcy costs keep persuading the rm to buy insurance, for the loss
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in value would be greater if it did not do so. Insuring becomes unattractive if, and only
if, bankruptcy costs are low enough while both the safety loading and the level of debt are
su¢ ciently high. Bankruptcy costs do not constitute a su¢ cient deterrent to not insuring in
this case.
4.11 The underinvestment problem with the nancing condition
We come to cover the last big section in relation the underinvestment problem  and to this
dissertation. We disregard costs of bankruptcy and return to the model as discussed before
that. Garven and MacMinn (1993) do not consider the cum dividend interpretation of the
underinvestment problem. As a matter of fact, they state that this approach to the problem
is ... a somewhat articial supplement to the Mayers and Smith model that confounds
the dividend and nancing decisions unnecessarily (Garven and MacMinn, 1993, p. 640).
The quote alludes to the circumstance that F is assumed xed, which with insurance 
introduces a rst-date cash ow to shareholders in the form of a dividend received on top
of the residual claim on second-date payo¤s. Their point is: why assume a xed F in the
rst place? It is not economic (and, as we will show, not e¢ cient once a safety loading is
considered) to do so because, in the cum dividend case, the rm raises more money than
it needs when it buys insurance. It also makes the interpretation somewhat cumbersome as
one has to distinguish between rst-date and second-date cash ows to shareholders. That
is why the authors introduce a nancing condition. In other words, they allow F to change
along with the insurance/no-insurance decision.
The money (D0) the rm raises in the uninsured case must be just enough for whatever it is
intended for. It constitutes our benchmark in the sense that the rm still needs to have this
money at its free disposal through the debt issue with a di¤erent promised repayment.104
As insurance makes the debt safe, it generally allows a rm to promise a lower repayment
at the second date for a given amount of money it needs to raise. Potential bondholders
do not require compensation for the risk of default of the rm because there is no risk.
Thus, what a rationally-acting rm will do in such a situation is to promise a repayment
(less than the original F ) that will allow it to raise the same amount that the uninsured
issue raised plus enough to cover the insurance premium (with and without a safety loading,
respectively) to make the debt safe. This is the nancing condition. To ensure this promise
104This is also the reason why we consider the bankruptcy cost scenario only for the cum dividend interpre-
tation. There, we care about F being xed which imposes us to state that the rm needs the debt issue to
nance a di¤erent activity than in the case without theses costs. Here, rather than xing the repayment, we
x the amount of money the rm needs at its free disposal in order to nance the same activity as before.
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is trustworthy, the rm incorporates the nancing condition as a covenant into the bonds
indenture, guaranteeing the purchase of the required level of insurance coverage (explained
below) to make the debt free of risk. This should also tell us that we will need to consider
two di¤erent debt levels in what follows. One is for the fair insurance premium ( = 0). If,
on the other hand, the insurance company charges a safety loading ( > 0), the overall cost
of the insurance package is raised, forcing the rm to raise more money on its part at the
rst date by promising a repayment to future bondholders that is higher than in the case
without a safety loading (but still lower than the original F ). We will label the former F 00
and the latter simply F 0. The corresponding boundary states are S0a0 and S
0
a. We will be
more concerned with F 0, for we will examine extensively the inuence of changing debt levels
on the decision to buy (unfair) insurance.105
This is how we proceed: rst, we will show that the model has the same result in the sense
that shareholders enjoy the same gains (just not in the form of a dividend) in the presence
of a fair insurance premium. Furthermore, the underinvestment problem is removed entirely.
Under this scenario, we will work with F 00. After that, we will introduce a safety loading
once again. The innovation we provide is that we show that our conclusion from the cum
dividend model also holds for the most part under the nancing condition. Admittedly,
Garven and MacMinns (1993) main focus is not on the safety loading, they merely sketch
its implications in their paper. They do not go into depth in this regard. We try to close this
gap. However, they do note one important thing. Once  > 0 is considered, the ...nancing-
constrained model has di¤erent net value implications than a cum dividend interpretation
of Schnabel and Roumi (Garven and MacMinn, 1993, p. 644). More precisely, the net
present value of the shareholdersclaim is higher. Because the nancing condition allows for
an F 0 < F , it directly a¤ects the deadweight loss that comes with insuring. Since this loss is
proportional (by the factor ) to the fair insurance premium (which in turn increases with the
promised repayment), a lower F 0 causes a lower deadweight loss than in the cum dividend
interpretation. Because of this, shareholders have an incentive to minimize the promised
repayment rather than leaving it xed. They gain by doing so. The deadweight loss comes
out of their pockets. Therefore, shareholders themselves would prefer this interpretation of
the model.
We focus on the linear-uniform special case once again. For now, this allows us to compare
the areas in the graphs, while still keeping the formulas rather general. Once we get involved
105Some of the new insights presented below were contained in an earlier version of Arnold and Hartl (2011).
They are not presented in the published version of the paper.
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Figure 4.12: Financing Condition
with the mathematics later on, it will facilitate derivations, too. Have a look at Figure 4.12
to begin with. It sketches the new situation with fair insurance coverage, as considered by
Garven and MacMinn (1993).
Fair insurance makes risky debt safe such that the rm can promise to repay F 00 (< F ). This
results in a boundary state S0a0 that is further to the left in the gure. The state is implicitly
dened by the equation V   I  S0a0 = F 00. One can easily see that the maximum deductible
consistent with solving the (new) underinvestment problem, I(S0a0), is greater than before
(I (Sa)) because the debt level has become lower. In other words, the minimum coverage
needed is less than before. The exact amount of promised repayment necessary is implicitly
dened by the (fair) nancing condition
D0i0 = D0 + P
0
i0 . (4.42)
The condition states that the repayment promised in the insured debt issue, F 00, has to be
selected such that its proceeds D0i0 are just enough to raise the same amount D0 that the
uninsured issue raised plus enough to cover the expenditures for the actuarially fair insurance
premium P 0i0 in order to make the debt safe. Since the insured debt is risk-free, we have
D0i0 =
Z S
0
F 00g(S)dS. (4.43)
P 0i0 is the fair insurance premium provided we have F
0
0 as the second-date repayment to bond-
holders. Lowering the debt level from F to F 00 implies that there are fewer underinvestment
states (S0a0 < Sa). Therefore, the minimum fair insurance premium required to make the
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debt safe (and to be able to promise F 00 in the rst place) is less than the fair premium Pi
that we had before, i.e.,
P 0i0 =
Z S0a0
0

I(S)  I(S0a0)

g(S)dS. (4.44)
P 0i0 as the (risk adjusted) present value of the insurance payo¤ is proportional to the lightly
shaded triangle in Figure 4.12. It is obviously smaller than triangle DCF, which represents Pi.
As we know from the prior analysis, fair insurance completely removes the underinvestment
problem. We want to nd out, however, whether doing so under the nancing condition has
the same implications for shareholder value and, thus, for the decision to acquire insurance
coverage. In other words, we want to prove that shareholders under this interpretation of the
model gain the same R0 in the presence of fair insurance as before. Let us start by rewriting
the nancing condition in (4.42). Breaking up the integral in D0i0 in (4.43) and plugging in
the other values using (4.4) and (4.44), we get
Z Sa
0
F 00g(S)dS +
Z S
Sa
F 00g(S)dS =
Z Sa
0
[V    L(S)] g(S)dS +
Z S
Sa
Fg(s)dS
+
Z S0a0
0

I(S)  I(S0a0)

g(S)dS.
This equation can be simplied:
Z S
Sa
 
F   F 00

g(S)dS =
Z S0a0
0
F 00g(S)dS +
Z Sa
S0a0
F 00g(S)dS  
Z Sa
0
[V    L(S)] g(S)dS
 
Z S0a0
0

I(S)  I(S0a0)

g(S)dS.
Using the equation that implicitly denes S0a0 , substitute F
0
0 in the rst summand with
V    I  S0a0 or, equivalently, V    I (S) + I (S)  I(S0a0) and combine the rst and the
fourth summand on the right-hand side:
Z S
Sa
 
F   F 00

g(S)dS =
Z S0a0
0
[V    I (S)] g(S)dS+
Z Sa
S0a0
F 00g(S)dS 
Z Sa
0
[V    L(S)] g(S)dS.
There is a clever way to merge the rst two summands in the equation above. Have a look
at Figure 4.12 again. We have F 00 > V    I (S) in all underinvestment states S 2 [0; S0a0),
and F 00  V    I (S) in all remaining loss states S 2 [S0a0 ; Sc]. Note that the right-hand side
of the two inequalities just stated appears in the rst summand in the equation above, while
the left-hand side is contained in the second. We can combine these two summands into one
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by stating them as
R Sa
0 [min fV    I (S) ; F 00g] g(S)dS. From the graph, the smaller term is
V    I (S) for the underinvestment states S < S0a0 , while this assertion applies to F 00 for the
states remaining until Sa is reached (as we move up the states). Now, both the new integral
and the integral in the third summand in the equation above run from 0 to Sa. Combining
them, the nancing condition (4.42) is nally restated as
Z S
Sa
 
F   F 00

g(S)dS =
Z Sa
0

min

V    I (S) ; F 00
	  [V    L(S)] g(S)dS. (4.45)
Both sides of this equation have a graphical representation as areas in Figure 4.12. The
right-hand side is proportional to the heavily shaded pentagon denoted by N. The left-hand
side is represented by the heavily shaded rectangle labeled O. The nancing condition states
that areas N and O are equal. Why? Area O is dened over states Sa to S, i.e., the states for
which there is no underinvestment problem under the cum dividend interpretation (so that
bondholders are paid back in full). The width of the rectangle is F  F 00, which is the amount
by which the promised repayment is less than before. Therefore, area O can be interpreted
as the loss su¤ered by bondholders due to the fact that F is not assumed xed anymore,
but lowered to F 00 because it is chosen to raise just enough to cover what the uninsured issue
covered plus the insurance premium. Area N represents the gain to debtholders from being
promised a safe F 00 in repayment. In the uninsured case in the cum dividend interpretation,
there is no investment to reconstitute damaged assets in states S < Sa, and the rms payo¤
is V  L (S) in these states. In the presence of the nancing condition, debt becomes safe by
lowering the promised repayment through purchasing insurance such that the rm is able to
repay F 00 to its bondholders in all states; this includes S < Sa, where bondholders now also
receive F 00 (as opposed to V   L (S)). That is, bondholders are better o¤. Because the rm
now invests in every state (including S < Sa), the gain in value is proportional to the areas
denoted by N and P 0i0 . But this cannot be the gain of bondholders entirely.
106 We know that
the insurance company has to be paid o¤, so that we must subtract P 0i0 . We are left with
area N as the net gain in debtholder value caused by lowering the face value of debt from a
risky F to a safe F 00.
That said, equation (4.45) simply states that the rst-date value of debtholdersclaims is left
106A word of caution. Do not get confused at this point with the cum dividend interpretation. Its downside
is that we have to assume that the increase in value is distributed to shareholders via dividends. This forces us
to make a distinction between rst-date and second-date payo¤s to shareholders. There is no such distinction
with the nancing condition. Neither N nor P 0i0 goes to shareholders. The increase in equity value is expressed
through a higher present value of shareholdersresidual claim caused by lowering the promised repayment to
F 00. There is no rst-date component to shareholder value. Graphically, the area between the line specifying
the rms payo¤ (starting from state S0a0 , rst V
   I (S) and then V  from state Sc on) and the horizontal
line indicating the promised repayment has become larger.
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unchanged in the presence of a nancing condition because their loss (O) equals their gain
(N). Think about it this way: the new debt issue raises the same amount of disposable funds
as the old issue, while face value is lower. Thus, debtholders are no worse o¤. They lose just
as much as they gain by being promised a sure F 00 instead of a risky F . Therefore, they do not
mind the new structure of the debt contract, but will accept the bond indenture that species
the new level of debt and guarantees the purchase of insurance. The advantage of accepting
the new debt structure is that the nancing condition does not change debtholdersvalue
position, while both raising P 0i0 more in funds than the uninsured issue and guaranteeing
reconstitution in every state of the world at the same time, so that the underinvestment
problem is solved.
We have shown that debtholders are no worse o¤ than before. The crucial point for the
decision to invest, however, is whether the same holds true for shareholdersgains that come
with insuring. Managers will only decide to invest if shareholder value is not lowered by doing
so. To answer the question whether the increase in equity value through insuring is the same
R0 as in the cum dividend interpretation, let us start by writing out the shareholder value
in the presence of the nancing condition:
E0i0 =
Z Sc
S0a0

V    I(S)  F 00

g(S)dS +
Z S
Sc
 
V    F 00

g(S)dS. (4.46)
There is no more rst-date component to shareholder value. It is determined exclusively as
the present value of the second-date residual claim, which now is larger than in the case
without a nancing condition because the promised repayment to debtholders is lower. From
the equation, shareholder value as of the rst date is greater for two reasons. First, we now
deduct a lower face value of debt in the two integrals. Second, the rst integral now starts
at S0a0 < Sa, meaning that there are more states in which shareholders are entitled to a
second-date residual claim. To compute the increase in value through insuring and, thus,
solving the underinvestment problem, we need to compare shareholder value under the fair
nancing condition to that of risky uninsured debt in the rms capital structure. In short,
we have to compute E0i0   E0. Using (4.46) and (4.5), we start o¤ with
E0i0   E0 =
Z Sc
S0a0

V    I(S)  F 00

g(S)dS +
Z S
Sc
 
V    F 00

g(S)dS
 
Z Sc
Sa
[V    I(S)  F ] g(S)dS  
Z S
Sc
(V    F ) g(S)dS.
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Figure 4.13: Gain in Shareholder Value
We can perform several modications to simplify the equation above:
E0i0   E0 =
Z Sa
S0a0

V    I(S)  F 00

g(S)dS +
Z S
Sc
 
V    F 00
  (V    F ) g(S)dS
+
Z Sc
Sa
 
V    I(S)  F 00
  (V    I(S)  F ) g(S)dS
=
Z Sa
S0a0

V    I(S)  F 00

g(S)dS +
Z S
Sa
 
F   F 00

g(S)dS.
The last summand,
R S
Sa
(F   F 00) g(S)dS, also appears in the fair nancing condition (4.45),
and we know that its graphical representation is the heavily shaded area O in Figure 4.12.
Therefore, let us substitute the last summand with the right-hand side from (4.45) to get
E0i0  E0 =
Z Sa
S0a0

V   I(S)  F 00

g(S)dS +
Z Sa
0

min

V   I (S) ; F 00
	  [V   L(S)] g(S)dS.
(4.47)
The new term just substituted is proportional to area N. The rst summand is represented
by the newly shaded area denoted by T in Figure 4.13. The gure also contains the original
capital letters we utilized to label the areas in the cum dividend interpretation for reasons of
better comparison.
The increase in shareholder value that comes with insuring is thus represented graphically
by areas N and T in the case of the nancing condition. From Figure 4.13, however, these
two areas should appear familiar to us. N plus T is exactly the tetragon ABCD, which rep-
resents the deadweight loss in rm value (R0, cf. (4.7)) associated with the underinvestment
problem in the cum dividend interpretation. Therefore, at this point we can conclude from
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the graphical inspection that the answer to the question posed whether shareholders gain
the same amount under the nancing condition is yes. A closer look at Figure 4.13 also
explains why. The new underinvestment boundary state is S0a0 . Shareholders are entitled to
a second-date residual claim only in higher states. The present value of these second-date
gains is now higher than in the cum dividend interpretation as S0a0 < Sa. One can verify from
the gure that the rise in shareholder value under the nancing condition (relative to not
having insurance coverage) is proportional to areas T and O. The respective gain in the cum
dividend case (R0) is proportional to ABCD, which we now know to be N plus T. Finally,
we understand from (4.45) that area N is of the same size as O. Thus, it is a true statement
that N and T are equal to T and O. The gain in shareholder value is irrespective of the mode
of interpretation.
Mathematically, V    I  S0a0 = F 00 and the fact that I (S) is strictly decreasing imply that
V    I (S)  F 00 for 0  S  S0a0 and that V    I (S) > F 00 for S0a0 < S  Sc. Therefore,
restate the second integral containing the min operator in equation (4.47) above such that
E0i0   E0 =
Z Sa
S0a0

V    I(S)  F 00

g(S)dS +
Z S0a0
0
f[V    I (S)]  [V    L(S)]g g(S)dS
+
Z Sa
S0a0

F 00   [V    L(S)]
	
g(S)dS
=
Z Sa
0
[L (S)  I (S)] g(S)dS.
Compare (4.7) to verify that the last equality is the deadweight loss of not insuring, i.e.,
E0i0   E0 = R0. (4.48)
This proves that the gain to shareholders in the presence of actuarially fair insurance is the
same regardless of whether we use the cum dividend interpretation or the nancing condition
setup; the agency cost of the underinvestment problem R0 is the gain to shareholders that
comes with buying fair insurance. In the former interpretation, shareholders receive it as
a dividend at the rst date. In the latter, shareholders receive it via a higher second-date
residual claim. As long as the insurance premium is actuarially fair, either interpretations
value implications are the same for shareholders.
Before we go on to examine the value implications of an unfair insurance, there is one further
point worth noting. In Figures 4.12 and 4.13, F 00 intersects the line V    L(S) at a state
that is higher than Sa. But there may be a second case, as noted (but not displayed) by
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Figure 4.14: Financing Condition Second Case
Garven and MacMinn (1993, p. 642, fn. 6). Depending on the parameters, one cannot rule
out the possibility that buying insurance under the nancing condition lowers the promised
repayment to the point that that F 00 passes through V    L(S) at a state equal to or lower
than Sa. We will not go into detail here. The derivation is very similar and conclusions are
the same (E0i0   E0 = R0). We merely provide a graphical representation in Figure 4.14.
Note that we need to characterize a new state S0b0 in this case, dened by V
  L(S0b0) = F 00.
The gure is drawn such that S0b0 < Sa. The di¤erence to the former two gures is that area
O now is not a rectangle, but a pentagon. One can verify that the equivalent to the nancing
condition in (4.45) is
Z S0b0
0

min

V    I (S) ; F 00
	  [V    L(S)] g(S)dS = Z Sa
S0b0

V    L (S)  F 00

g(S)dS
+
Z S
Sa
 
F   F 00

g(S)dS,
which states that areas N (left-hand side) and O (right-hand side) in Figure 4.14 are equal
in size. Furthermore, the equivalent to (4.47), which makes use of the equation above, can
be expressed as
E0i0   E0 =
Z Sa
S0a0

V    I(S) maxV    L(S); F 00	 g(S)dS
+
Z S0b0
0

min

V    I (S) ; F 00
	  [V    L(S)] g(S)dS.
The rst summand is represented by the lightly shaded area T and the second by area N in
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Figure 4.15: Loading Premium
Figure 4.14. The result in this setup is identical. The gain in shareholder value is proportional
to N plus T, which equals ABCD (i.e., R0). For the model conclusions it is irrelevant whether
we have S0b0  Sa or S0b0 > Sa.
4.11.1 Safety loading
Before getting involved with the mathematics, the case should be clear from the start 
at least graphically. If insurance companies want a piece of the pie by demanding a safety
loading, they take it from shareholders. After all, they are the ones who enjoy the gains
that come with insuring and, therefore, they also have to cover the costs accompanying it.
Incorporating a positive loading makes the insurance premium more expensive. Since the
nancing condition is chosen such that the bond issue raises all that the uninsured issue
raised plus enough to pay for the insurance premium, the rm obviously has to raise more
money now in order to pay for the increased premium that makes the debt safe. Consequently,
it does so by guaranteeing a higher second-date repayment than F 00 (which is still less than
F ). The rm now issues debt with a face value of F 0. Compared to the nancing condition
gures above, the horizontal line indicating the promised repayment to bondholders must
now be located above line F 00. In other words, areas T and O in Figure 4.13, which constitute
the gain in shareholder value given fair insurance, are diminished. The heavily shaded area
in Figure 4.15 represents the prot to insurance companies which comes out of shareholders
pockets.
If we are correct in our assessment, then this area should reect the equity value lost because
it is transferred to insurance companies. Since the value lost by shareholders is the loading
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premium, we expect the heavily shaded area to be  times the fair insurance premium pre-
vailing at debt level F 0. Thus, we expect that area to be the deadweight loss of insuring,
i.e., the equivalent to R. But since the promised repayment under the nancing condition
changes, so does the deadweight loss. Therefore, we will denote it by R0. Assuming our
conjecture is correct, we have the same gain R0 to shareholders, but a di¤erent deadweight
loss of insuring (R0). This is what is meant by di¤erent net value implicationsin the quote
above. Another implication is that the loading premium is no longer portrayed as a part of
the triangle representing the fair insurance premium, like in the cum dividend case,107 but
directly as (the heavily shaded) part of the increase in shareholder value given fair insurance
coverage, i.e., areas T and O in Figure 4.13. This graphical analysis leads to the conclusion
that since managers will only decide to invest if it is benecial to the companys owners 
the rm will opt for reconstitution as long as the heavily shaded area in Figure 4.15 is less
than or equal to areas T and O (see Figure 4.13), i.e., as long as R0  R0.
Let us proceed by mathematically proving the statements just made on the basis of the
gures. First, we have to address the issue of increasing the promised repayment due to the
inclusion of a safety loading by adjusting the nancing condition in (4.42) such that
D0 = D0 + P
0

= D0 + (1 + )P
0
i . (4.49)
The di¤erence to the case without a loading is that the rm needs to raise D0 > D
0
i0
because
it now has to nance the unfair insurance premium. In order to do so, the rm has to promise
F 0 > F 00 in repayment due at the second date. The loading premium is as before  times
the fair premium at the relevant debt level. Here, we have F 0 such that the loading premium
is P 0i , where
P 0i =
Z S0a
0

I(S)  I(S0a)

g(S)dS. (4.50)
and S0a
 
> S0a0

is implicitly dened by V    I (S0a) = F 0, following the same logic as for Sa
and S0a0 . Given P
0
i , we can now formally dene R
0
, the deadweight loss of insuring under the
nancing condition, which we know to be P 0i :
R0 = 
Z S0a
0

I(S)  I(S0a)

g(S)dS.
107There, we had triangle DEF as the loading premium within triangle DCF as the fair insurance premium.
Compare, e.g., Figure 4.5. Of course, we could still illustrate the loading premium in that manner, but then
we would not have the nice direct comparison of the deadweight loss R0 as a part of shareholdersgain R0 in
the gures.
4. Underinvestment in the reconstitution of damaged assets 143
Comparing this equation to the original R dened in (4.16), it is apparent that one merely
needs to replace Sa with S0a in the equation to obtain R0.
The unfair insurance purchased makes the debt safe such that
D0 =
Z S
0
F 0g(S)dS. (4.51)
Since F 0 > F 00, the insurance contracts deductible I(S0a) is lower relative to I
 
S0a0

of the
fair insurance premium or, equivalently, the minimum coverage to solve the underinvestment
problem is higher in the presence of a safety loading. Obviously, the di¤erence in debt
values for unfair and fair insurance is D0   D0i0 =
R S
0 (F
0   F 00) g(S)dS, and its graphical
representation is the sum of the lightly and heavily shaded area in Figure 4.15. From the
nancing conditions (4.42) and (4.49), we can express the increase in debt value as D0 D0i0 =
P 0i + P
0
i   P 0i0 . P 0i   P 0i0 is the increase in the fair insurance premium induced by the need
to promise a higher repayment and corresponds to the lightly shaded area: beginning with
P 0i   P 0i0 =
R S0a
0 [I(S)  I(S0a)] g(S)dS  
R S0a0
0

I(S)  I(S0a0)

g(S)dS from (4.50) and (4.44),
one rst has to split up the integral in (4.50) into two, one running from 0 to S0a0 and the
other from S0a0 to S
0
a. Then we merge the former with (4.44) and, nally, substitute the
formulas implicitly dening states S0a0 and S
0
a (i.e., V
   I  S0a0 = F 00 and V    I (S0a) = F 0)
to receive P 0i  P 0i0 =
R S0a0
0 (F
0   F 00) g(S)dS +
R S0a
S0a0
fF 0   [V    I(S)]g g(S)dS. A comparison
with Figure 4.15 reveals that the right-hand side indeed corresponds to the lightly shaded
area. It is implied by D0 D0i0 = P 0i+P 0i P 0i0 that the heavily shaded area in fact represents
P 0i , i.e., the deadweight loss of insuring R
0
  our conjecture from the graphical analysis
above holds true.
We also stated before that the gain in shareholder value given a fair insurance premium
shrinks by the heavily shaded area (i.e., the very area we just identied as R0) once we start
to consider a safety loading. Thus, shareholder value given  > 0 (E0) should be lower than
E0i0 by the deadweight loss R
0
. We now prove this claim, i.e., E
0
i0
  E0 = R0, formally.
The owners of the rm are entitled to a residual claim worth E0 =
R Sc
S0a
[V    I(S)  F 0] g(S)dS+R S
Sc
(V    F 0) g(S)dS. It follows from (4.46) that
E0i0   E0 =
Z Sc
S0a0

V    I(S)  F 00

g(S)dS +
Z S
Sc
 
V    F 00

g(S)dS
 
Z Sc
S0a

V    I(S)  F 0 g(S)dS   Z S
Sc
 
V    F 0 g(S)dS,
144 4. Underinvestment in the reconstitution of damaged assets
which can be simplied to
E0i0   E0 =
Z S0a
S0a0

V    I(S)  F 00

g(S)dS +
Z Sc
S0a
 
F 0   F 00

g(S)dS +
Z S
Sc
 
F 0   F 00

g(S)dS
=
Z S0a
S0a0

V    I(S)  F 00

g(S)dS +
Z S
S0a
 
F 0   F 00

g(S)dS.
Substituting the fair nancing condition D0 = D0i0   P 0i0 from (4.42) into its unfair counter-
part (4.49) yields D0 = D
0
i0
 P 0i0+(1 + )P 0i or, equivalently,
R S
0 F
0g(S)dS =
R S
0 F
0
0g(S)dS 
P 0i0 + (1 + )P
0
i with the help of (4.43) and (4.51). This in turn may be expressed asR S
0 (F
0   F 00) g(S)dS = (1 + )P 0i P 0i0 , which is identical to
R S
S0a
(F 0   F 00) g(S)dS = (1 + )P 0i 
P 0i0  
R S0a
0 (F
0   F 00) g(S)dS. Additionally, by use of the equations specifying the boundary
states under the nancing conditions, i.e., V    I (S0a) = F 0 and V    I
 
S0a0

= F 00, restate
F 0   F 00 as I
 
S0a0
   I (S0a) in the last summand on the right-hand side of the equation just
established. Plugging this back into E0i0   E0, we have
E0i0   E0 =
Z S0a
S0a0

V    I  S0a0  F 00 + I  S0a0  I (S) g(S)dS + (1 + )P 0i   P 0i0
 
Z S0a
0

I
 
S0a0
  I  S0a g(S)dS:
Since we added I
 
S0a0
  I  S0a0 in the rst integral, V    I  S0a0  F 00 cancels out. Further
modications yield
E0i0   E0 =
Z S0a
S0a0

I
 
S0a0
  I (S) g(S)dS + (1 + )P 0i   P 0i0
 
Z S0a0
0

I
 
S0a0
  I  S0a g(S)dS   Z S0a
S0a0

I
 
S0a0
  I  S0a g(S)dS
=
Z S0a
S0a0

I
 
S0a
  I (S) g(S)dS + (1 + )P 0i   P 0i0
+
Z S0a0
0

I (S)  I  S0a0 g(S)dS   Z S0a0
0

I (S)  I  S0a g(S)dS.
The rst and the last integral merge to   R S0a0 [I (S)  I (S0a)] g(S)dS, which is equal to  P 0i
by (4.50). From (4.44), at last we are left with E0i0  E0 =  P 0i + (1 + )P 0i   P 0i0 + P 0i0 and,
thus,
E0i0   E0 = P 0i . (4.52)
This completes the proof. Graphically, shareholders will decide to invest as long as the
heavily shaded area in Figure 4.15 is smaller than or equally large as areas T and O in Figure
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4.13. Mathematically, we can easily infer E0   E0 from (4.48) and (4.52). It follows that
E0   E0 =
 
E0i0   E0
   E0i0   E0 = R0   P 0i . Because R0 = P 0i , it follows that
E0   E0 = R0  R0:
As long as the gain through insuring is greater than the loss associated with insuring, the
rm will opt for coverage. This is qualitatively the same result as in the cum dividend
interpretation, but value implications are somewhat di¤erent because R0 < R as long as
F 0 < F . Shareholders are better o¤ under the nancing condition because debtholders are
promised a lower repayment, and the deadweight loss of insuring is proportional to the fair
insurance premium (which increases with the level of debt). Hence, a smaller deadweight
loss is subtracted from the value gains that come with insuring. Economically, it makes more
sense to use the nancing condition interpretation of the model.
4.11.2 Changing debt levels and the decision to insure
After having explained the model as reconsidered by Garven and MacMinn (1993), we now
show that our main result derived above also holds under the nancing condition. We focus
on the linear-uniform special case and show that  having the same  =   and F
, cf.
equation (4.30), as in the cum dividend case  for   , it is optimal to buy insurance,
while for  > , the rm takes out insurance if, and only if, F  F . Only for large enough
debt values, F > F , the rm decides not to insure.
A simplifying assumption we make is that the upper bound of the support of S is unity
(S = 1), so that state prices are uniform (g (S) = g) on [0; 1]. This facilitates derivations. As
is the case with F under the cum dividend interpretation, we are solely interested in risky debt
levels under the nancing condition interpretation. There is no underinvestment problem for
safe levels of debt. Therefore, we merely consider F 0 2 [V    I (0) ; V ] or, equivalently for
the linear-uniform special case, F 0 2 [V    Sc; V ], cf. (4.21). It was mentioned before that
one simply has to replace Sa with S0a in the denition of R to get R0. Hence, it follows from
(4.24) that R0 = g
(S0a)
2
2 . We will need to work with the derivatives
dR0
dF and
dR0
dF shortly.
S0a in the specication of R0 thus needs to be substituted such that we have a function of F
0.
Using (4.21), we solve the equation V    I (S0a) = F 0, which implicitly denes the boundary
state S0a, for S0a = Sc   V
 F 0
 in the linear-uniform special case, cf. (4.22). The reduction in
rm value given unfair insurance coverage compared to pure equity nancing is consequently
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given by
R0 =
g
2

Sc   V
   F 0

2
. (4.53)
Before we go on, let us pause here for a moment to understand the bigger picture. What are
we trying to do? It should be clear that F 0 changes when F changes due to the nancing
condition. From (4.49), altering F a¤ects the uninsured debt value D0 on the equations
right-hand side. To maintain the equality sign, the funds raised in debt under the nancing
condition have to be adjusted accordingly. This happens through changing the promised
repayment F 0 such that the money raised is enough to cover the uninsured issue plus the
insurance premium needed to make the debt safe. Generally, increasing F should lead to a
rise in F 0 to make economic sense. If the rm wants to raise more money in the uninsured
case, it must promise to repay more at the second date (and will repay more if it nds
itself in the position, i.e., in a non-underinvestment state, to actually make the payment).108
Increasing F implies a higher insurance premium necessary to make the debt safe. Thus, in
order to obey the nancing condition, the rm needs more fresh money in the insured case,
too. It accomplishes so by promising the face value of debt F 0. The higher the face value,
the higher the proceeds with insurance. Accordingly, R0 changes when R0 changes with F .
In the cum dividend case, we were interested in nding the unique debt level F  for which
the rm switches from insuring to not insuring, i.e., for which R0 = R. But we are dealing
with R0 in the presence of the nancing condition. And for di¤erent levels of F there must
exist di¤erent (lower) levels of F 0 for which R0 = R0 such that the two deadweight losses
are commensurate. In a rst step, what we will do is to gure out all these combinations of
F and F 0 within the interval of feasible debt levels [V    Sc; V ] for which the rm is just
indi¤erent between taking out and not taking out insurance. By doing so, the locus of points
(F; F 0) such that R0 = R0 will partition the area spanning the feasible debt levels into two
subareas in an (F; F 0)-diagram, one for which the rm demands insurance and the other for
which it decides not to insure any losses, respectively.
However, this graphical partition of space will not tell us anything per se. Note that the
debt levels F 0 for which R0 = R0 just mentioned need not be the repayment that the rm
actually promises to pay back for di¤erent F . The e¤ective promised repayment for a given
F is determined by the nancing condition. Thus, think of the two subareas in terms of an
auxiliary means for partitioning space to nd that F 0 which would make R0 = R0. Therefore,
in a second step, what we need to establish is a another locus of points which, in combination
108We will take on this point more specically shortly. Unfortunately, this interdependency is not readily
provided by the model setup.
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with the rst, provides us with instructions in that it tells us whether to insure or not. This
is where the nancing condition comes into play, which evidently needs to be satised: we
will draw a second curve into the (F; F 0)-diagram that stands for all combinations of feasible
debt levels F and F 0 for which the condition is fullled. We are interested in its path through
the two subareas just mentioned, so that we can determine for which combinations the rm
decides to insure, and for which it does not. This will allow for the validation of the claim
made in the beginning of this section, namely that the results derived in the cum dividend
case also hold under the nancing condition interpretation of the model.
By plugging Sa into (4.22) into (4.23), the agency cost of the underinvestment problem may be
stated as R0 = (   ) g

Sc

Sc   V  F

  12

Sc   V  F
2
. Furthermore, this expression
can be simplied. Factoring out and rearranging lead to R0 as a function of F :
R0 = (   ) g

Sc   V
   F


Sc   1
2

Sc   V
   F


=
(   ) g
2

Sc   V
   F


Sc +
V    F


=
(   ) g
2
"
S2c  

V    F

2#
.
With the help of this equation and (4.53), R0 = R0 if, and only if,
(   ) g
2
"
S2c  

V    F

2#
=
g
2

Sc   V
   F 0

2
. (4.54)
Before we go on to explicitly analyze the e¤ects of changing F and, consequently, F 0 to keep
the equation above valid, we can already make some important statements by considering the
pair of equations (4.54) and F = F 0.109 If the cum dividend and the nancing condition debt
levels are one and the same, i.e., F = F 0, then R0 = R0 must obviously become R0 = R.
In that case, we are back to our analysis of the linear-uniform special case under the cum
dividend interpretation established initially. And from there we know that the lowest possible
risky debt level F = F 0 = V  Sc solves the pair of equations (the underinvestment problem
just commences at that level of debt such that we have R0 = R = 0). The curve representing
the locus of points (F; F 0) such that R0 = R0 commences at point F = F
0 = V    Sc.
We can make yet another inference. Remember that in the cum dividend case we said that
109F = F 0 may arise for two reasons economically. First, they are the same when there is no safety loading,
i.e.,  = 0. Second, increasing  increases F 0 relative to F 00 for a given F because a bigger safety loading needs
to be nanced with the issue. Thus, the loading may be so high that it pushes F 0 back to level F , so that
there would be no gain in applying the nancing condition. Graphically, it simply is the 45-degree line in an
(F; F 0) diagram.
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(F 0 =) F = V  Sc cannot be the solution we are looking for, i.e., it cannot be the promised
repayment for which the rm starts to switch to not taking out insurance precisely because
the problem just commences at that level of debt. The correct answer is/was F = F 0 = F , cf.
(4.30). Therefore, it should not come as surprise that the locus of points for which R0 = R0
passes through (F = F 0 =)F , for that is the level of debt above which the rm no longer
takes out insurance in the cum dividend case, i.e., for which R0 = R. Importantly, recall
further that F  only exists provided that the safety loading is high enough. In other words,
we know that there is no solution to the pair of equations in the interval (V    Sc; V ) if
    . By contrast, F = F 0 = F  on the 45-degree line in an (F; F 0)-diagram is the unique
solution given that  >   . The fact that the solution is unique implies graphically that
the locus of points (F; F 0) such that R0 = R0 intersects the 45-degree line only once.
What we need to establish in order to describe the entire shape of the curve is the derivative
dF 0
dF such that R0 = R
0
 is preserved. In order to do so, one has to construct the di¤erential
of R0 = R0 such that
dR0
dF
dF =
dR0
dF 0
dF 0,
and then rearrange it for
dF 0
dF
=
dR0
dF
dR0
dF 0
.
This derivative tells us by how much F 0 must vary in order to maintain R0 = R0 given a
marginal increase in F . From the left-hand side of (4.54), the derivative of R0 with respect
to F is
dR0
dF
=
(   ) g

V    F

,
and for R0 it follows by the right-hand side that
dR0
dF 0
= g

Sc   V
   F 0


.
Dividing the two above equations nally allows us to express the derivative dF
0
dF as
dF 0
dF
=
(   ) V  F


Sc   V  F 0
 . (4.55)
This allows us to illustrate the curve representing the locus of points (F; F 0) such that R0 =
R0, as can be seen in Figure 4.16 for both cases    and  > .
Evaluating (4.55) at the lowest feasible debt level reveals that dF
0
dF is innity for F = F
0 =
V    Sc. This means that, in either case, the curve starts to ascend from its starting
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Figure 4.16: Insurance Versus No Insurance (left panel:  > , right panel   )
point (V    Sc; V    Sc), so that it is initially situated above the 45-degree line (on which
F = F 0). Whether it ever crosses that line depends on the safety loading. For   
(right panel in Figure 4.16), the curve never falls below the 45-degree line over the interval
[V    Sc; V ].110 For  > , it intersects the 45-degree line at F = F 0 = F ; and because it
does so only once, the curve must hence terminate (F = V ) at a point below the 45-degree
line, as can be seen in Figure 4.16 in the left panel.
Now, there remains only one question. The curve parts space into two subareas in both panels
in Figure 4.16. But which of the two areas represents the insurance and the non-insurance
part, respectively? Compare equation (4.54), which represents R0 = R0. Obviously, an
(F; F 0) combination that satises the equation stands for a point on the line (regardless of
the magnitude of the safety loading). Now, if we were to increase F 0 from that point on while
keeping F unchanged, we would graphically move upwards into the shaded area in Figure
4.16. Mathematically, R0 on the equations right-hand side increases with F
0 (while dR0dF 0 = 0)
such that we would no longer have an equality, but an inequality stating R0 < R0. In other
words, the deadweight loss from insuring outweighs the one from not buying insurance in the
shaded area. The rm decides not to purchase insurance coverage in that area. Hence, the
rm takes insurance if, and only if, (F; F 0) is on or below the curve.
We may utilize this insight to check more precisely for the shape of the curve in Figure
4.16, too. Let us calculate the values of R0 and R0 for the highest possible level of debt
F = F 0 = V . Recall that states Sa and Sc coincide for this level of debt, cf. (4.22).
The same holds true for S0a

= Sc   V  F 0

. Thus, from (4.23) and (4.53), it follows that
110For  = , the curve intersects the 45-degree line exactly at F = F 0 = F  = V , cf. equation (4.30).
150 4. Underinvestment in the reconstitution of damaged assets
R0 =
( )g
2 S
2
c and R
0
 =
g
2 S
2
c for F = F
0 = V . Which deadweight loss is bigger? The
answer is: it depends  on the safety loading in the equation for R0. The rm will decide
not to buy insurance, i.e., R0 < R0, at F = F
0 = V  if, and only if,  >   or, equivalently,
 > . In other words, if the safety loading is su¢ ciently high in that  > , then R0 <
R0 on the 45-degree line at F = F
0 = V . But we know that R0 < R0 only holds above
the curve representing R0 = R0 in Figure 4.16 (left panel). It follows that the curve must
terminate at a point below the 45-degree line at F = V  for  > . This also implies that it
crosses the 45-degree line at a lower value, which we know to be F = F 0 = F .111 Following
the same logic, we have R0 > R0 ()  <  at F = F 0 = V . Accordingly, the curve
indicating R0 = R0 never crosses the 45-degree line because the rm only decides to insure
(R0 > R0) below the curve. See the right panel in Figure 4.16 for an illustration.
This completes the derivation of the rst curve. But remember that we said that we need a
second one  one that depicts the nancing condition.
The nancing condition says that the amount of money the insured debt issue raises (D0) is
just enough to cover the proceeds from the uninsured issue (D0) plus the (unfair) insurance
premium ((1 + )P 0i ) to make the debt safe. We know from (4.4) that the amount of money
raised with the uninsured debt issue is D0 =
R Sa
0 [V
   L(S)] g(S)dS + R SSa Fg(s)dS. This
expression still appears in its general form. So far, we have not adapted it to our linear-
uniform special case which will facilitate calculations later on. Therefore, using g (S) = g,
S = 1 and the function L(S) from (4.20), D0 presents itself as
D0 = g
Z Sa
0
(V    Sc + S) dS + g
Z 1
Sa
FdS.
Next, the equation is simplied such that
D0 = g [(V
   Sc)S]Sa0 + g

S2
2
Sa
0
+ gF [S]1Sa :
The value of the uninsured debt issue is thus given by
D0 = g

(V    Sc)Sa + 
2
S2a + F (1  Sa)

:
We will need to work with the derivative with respect to F . Hence, we need a function of F .
111Uniqueness is also proved by the fact that dF
0
dF
does not become negative. From (4.55), the numerator
would be negative for F > V  only, which is not included in the interval of feasible debt levels. Similarly, the
denominator is less than zero only for F 0 < V    Sc, which is also inadmissible. Additionally, from (4.55),
dF 0
dF
< 1 for F > V    2Sc
 + . This is the level of debt for which R0  R takes on its maximum value in the
linear-uniform special case.
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Once again, let us replace Sa with Sc   V  F , cf. (4.22), yielding
D0 = g
"
(V    Sc)

Sc   V
   F


+

2

Sc   V
   F

2
+ F

1  Sc + V
   F

#
.
(4.56)
The derivative is given by
dD0
dF
= g

(V    Sc) 1

+



Sc   V
   F


+

1  Sc + V
   F


  F


:

Sc in the rst and second summand cancel out. Furthermore,
V 
 in the rst and
F
 in the
last summand can be merged to V
 F
 , resulting in 2
V  F
 when combined with the term in
the third summand. Factoring out this term then leads to the expression
dD0
dF
= g

V    F


2  


+ 1  Sc

.
Some more minor cosmeticsprovide us with the nal form of the derivative, namely
dD0
dF
= g

2   

V    F

+ 1  Sc

. (4.57)
So, we have got the derivative, but what do we need it for exactly? The answer is twofold:
rst, it is part of the derivation of the curve representing all (F; F 0)-combinations satisfying
the nancing condition to be established later on. Second, and more importantly, the inter-
relation between promised repayment F and the value of uninsured debt D0 in the model
is not as clear and simple as one might hope, unfortunately. Evidently, if as a rm you
promise to pay back more to bondholders at the second date, you do so because you want
to raise more money at the rst date because you are in need of a bigger amount of cash to,
say, make an investment. If promising a higher repayment would result in a lower or equal
debt value, one would not do so as it would be ine¢ cient. Before we go into mathematical
details, check out Figure 4.17, which depicts the situation we face from the derivative.
Initially, the gure needs some explanation (additionally, see Remark 1 at the end of this
chapter for an explanation of why Figure 4.17 is illustrated for a given combination of  and
Sc, as stated in its caption. For now, take it as granted). First, note that in the graph, unlike
in Figure 4.16, the function does not start at the lowest level of risky debt, F = V    Sc,
but rather at the lowest overall-level F = 0. In other words, it explicitly depicts all riskless
levels of debt (i.e., 0  F < V    Sc) in addition to the risky ones. Second, the function
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Figure 4.17: Possible Shapes of D0g for a Given Combination of  and Sc.
D0
g is represented by the 45-degree line for the risk-free levels of promised repayment. It
may not be clear right away why there should be a one-to-one relationship between the
two. Equation (4.4) denes the value of risky uninsured debt only. How can we reconcile
D0 =
R Sa
0 [V
   L(S)] g(S)dS + R SSa Fg(s)dS with the value of safe debt? Provided a safe
promised repayment F < V    Sc, the value of debt becomes
R S
0 Fg(S)dS, cf. (4.2). The
latter equation is the former without its rst summand, but with the integral running from
0 to S. This is due to the fact that the rst summand in D0 reects the depressed debt
value in all underinvestment states. But there is no underinvestment when debt is safe. The
repayment promised at the rst date equals the amount actually paid back to debtholders
at the second date in each state. In other words, with safe (uninsured) debt, there exists no
underinvestment boundary state Sa (the lowest value Sa can take on is zero, which happens
for F = V    Sc). Therefore, there is no rst summand and, consequently, the second
comprises all states.112
Concerning its functional form in this linear-uniform special case, D0 becomes gF
R S
0 dS 
= gFS

for levels of debt F < V    Sc. Taking the antiderivative yields gF for F 2
(0; V    Sc). Economically, since you are repaid F at the second date as a bondholder in
112The picky reader might still raise an objection. At the beginning of the model, we dened D0 in (4.4) as
the rst-date value of risky debt explicitly, i.e., for debt levels F  V  Sc. Debt value for the rm nanced
with safe debt (F < V  Sc), as corresponding to the straight line leading up to point (V    Sc; V    Sc)
in Figure 4.17, is dened as Du, cf. equation (4.2). Hence, strictly speaking, is denoting the ordinate D0g over
all levels of debt not wrong? The answer is: it depends on the point of view. If one nds that D0 and Du
are two di¤erent functions corresponding to two di¤erent intervals of debt levels, then yes. If, on the other
hand, one argues, as we did, that Du becomes D0 as debt becomes risky, then one might pull through with
labelling the ordinate D0
g
. Either way, the appearance is neater the way we chose it in Figure 4.17.
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any case, all there is to do is to discount the safe payment to get the (time) value as of the
rst date, which is done via multiplying by g. Hence, we have D0g = F , which justies the
appearance as the 45-degree line for all safe debt levels in Figure 4.17.113
The gure indicates that, once we cross into underinvestment space, the function D0g may
follow one of four di¤erent paths (labeled by (i)-(iv)). As we will see shortly, it depends on
the constellation of parameters which one it actually takes on. What we can state already,
however, is that every single path pictured must be situated entirely below the 45-degree
line. For a given promised repayment, debt as of the rst date is most valuable when it is
safe because there is no risk of default that investors require to be compensated for. And we
have just learned that safe debt is represented by the the 45-degree line in Figure 4.17. Debt
becomes risky for levels of debt in excess of V    Sc. Hence, D0g must be located below the
dashed line in Figure 4.17 once debt becomes risky.
To gure out exactly why the function may take on these di¤erent shapes starting from the
level of debt of V    Sc, the obvious thing to do is to examine the derivative of D0 with
respect to F at that (initial) level of risky debt. For F = V    Sc, (4.57) becomes
dD0
dF
= g

2   

Sc + 1  Sc

= g

1  Sc    


: (4.58)
Whether the derivative is positive or negative, i.e., whether the function D0 (and thus D0g )
starts to ascend or descend from F = V  Sc, apparently depends on whether Sc   is less
than or greater than one.
4.11.2.1 (Partly) ine¢ cient debt levels First, suppose that Sc   > 1, which implies
 > 2.114 Then dD0dF < 0 (or, equivalently,
d(D0=g)
dF < 0 ) for F = V
   Sc, and the function
starts to descend once debt becomes risky. What about the curvature? From (4.57), the
second derivative is d
2(D0=g)
dF 2
=  2 
2
for F > V    Sc. The expression is positive because
the numerator is negative due to the implied  > 2. The function is convex.
Before we go on, however, there is one important point. Even though dD0dF < 0 for F =
113Of course, we could have made the ordinate depict D0 instead of D0g . Then, however, we would not have
had the neat appearance as the 45-degree line, but a line that runs slightly atter up until F = V    Sc. It
might help to still think in terms of debt value. When D0 starts to drop, so does D0g as g is always positive.
That is, results remain unchanged qualitatively. Technically, D0
g
is the rst-date debt value compounded for
one period such that it may be compared to second-date cash ows in this linear-uniform special case. This
means that D0
g
is actually given by area 0SGCBA in Figure 4.3, as opposed to being proportional to it.
114We have S = 1 and 0 < Sc < S. Thus, Sc < 1. Therefore, it must be that   > 1 and, thus,  > 2 in
order for Sc   > 1 to be true.
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V  Sc is possible from a mathematical point of view (which is the reason why we examine
it here), note that it is not rational from an economic standpoint. Why? The fact that the
function starts to descend from F = V    Sc implies that there exist levels of risky debt 
at least for F slightly above V    Sc such that D0g < V    Sc for F > V    Sc. This is
ine¢ cient. Ine¢ cient in that there exists a level of debt below V    Sc that generates the
same debt value without ever facing the prospects of the underinvestment problem (as debt
is safe). Graphically speaking, for both shapes of the function (i) and (ii) in Figure 4.17,
there is a lower level of (safe) debt which yields the same value D0g (as long as (i) and (ii)
are located below the horizontal line D0g = V
   Sc) that is situated on the 45-degree line.
Rational individuals would always opt for the safe level of debt  why promise more when
you can have the same amount for less?
Convexity of (i) and (ii) in Figure 4.17 given our assumption Sc
 
 > 1 gives rise to two
possible scenarios. The function D0g may never reach V
   Sc over the entire range of risky
debt levels, or it may at some point rebound and take on values greater than V    Sc.
(i) D0g  V   Sc for all risky F up to V . This is the case where it is always irrational
to promise a repayment greater than V    Sc. In other words, there is no point in issuing
debt beyond the point where its repayment becomes uncertain. Due to its ine¢ ciency, we
rule out this case in the current setup.
(ii) This scenario is more interesting. Debt is merely partly ine¢ cient. The function
rst dips into the ine¢ cient area, but later takes on values in excess of V    Sc such
that rationally acting managers could indeed choose such a level of (relatively high) promised
repayment if they are in need of fresh capital amounting to more than what is achievable
with safe debt. In other words, there exists bF 2 (V    Sc; V ) such that D0g  V    Sc
for risky debt F in (V    Sc; bF ] and D0g > V    Sc for F in  bF ; V i. Again, we rule out
F in the former interval (while allowing for the ones in the latter) due to their ine¢ ciency:
there are safe levels of debt for which the outcome is the same without having to face the
discomfort of underinvestment.
To formally show that both (i) and (ii) are possible, we need to evaluate D0g at F = V

(where Sa = Sc, cf. (4.22)) and nd two solutions  one below, and one above V    Sc.
All V
 F
 terms in (4.56) cancel out such that uninsured debt value because
D0 = g

(V    Sc)Sc + 
2
S2c + V
 (1  Sc)

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for F = V . This ultimately leads to
D0
g
= V    S
2
c
2
, (4.59)
which is obviously less than V  as the second term on the right-hand side is positive. For
case (i), we need a solution D0g that satises V
   S2c2  V    Sc or, equivalently, Sc  2 .
Conversely, the condition is Sc <
2
 for (ii) to arise.
This tells us one thing right away. Parameters matter. Their constellation matters in that 
even though it is exogenous the magnitude of Sc decides over whether the function follows
shape (i) or (ii). A high enough Sc leads to (i), and all risky debt levels are ine¢ cient 
and whether a given Sc actually surpasses the threshold
2
 depends on parameters  and .
We have to make sure, however, that the constraint that this new threshold imposes on state
Sc does not contradict any other restriction on Sc that we have in place already: Sc
 
 > 1
implies for both (i) and (ii) that Sc >

  must be satised. Accordingly, the constraints
one is faced with for the respective shape of the function in Figure 4.17 are:
(i) Sc  2 and Sc >   . To nd the lower of the two thresholds, try 2 >   .
Rearranging yields 2   22 > , which leads to  > 2. This is a true statement because,
as mentioned before, Sc
 
 > 1 implies  > 2. Hence,

  is the minimum value such that
Sc must be equal to or greater than
2
 in order for both inequalities to be satised. However,
is this also reconcilable with the upper limit? We know that 0 < Sc < S and S = 1. The
highest value Sc can take on is (slightly below) one. To verify that shape (i) may arise, we
must have 2 < 1 or, equivalently,  > 2. Since this is a true statement, scenario (i) is
feasible for Sc 2
h
2
 ; 1

.
(ii) Sc <
2
 and Sc >

  . We know from (i) that

  is the lower of the two thresholds.
Hence, Sc must thus lie in the interval


  ;
2


. Feasibility is accounted for because 2 < S
still holds. D0g becomes greater than V
   Sc at some unique we have shown that the
function is convex in cases (i) and (ii) level of debt bF which is less than V , cf. (4.59).115
115The derivation of bF is cumbersome. For the interested reader, we sketch the procedure here. bF is the level
of debt in (V    Sc; V ) for which D0g = V    Sc. Therefore, dividing by g and replacing the resulting D0g
with V  Sc on the right-hand side in (4.56) yields V  Sc = (V    Sc)

Sc   V  F

+ 
2

Sc   V  F
2
+
F

1  Sc + V  F

. We are obviously dealing with a quadratic function in F . Quite a bit of rearranging
yields 0 =  2
22
V  + F

2 
2
V  + 1  Sc

+ F 2  2
22
. The discriminant turns out to be [Sc( )+]
2
2
> 0.
Hence, there are two real solutions, i.e., there are two real levels of debt for which D0
g
= V    Sc. This
should not come as a surprise. The quadratic function does not discriminate between feasible and infeasible
debt levels. Hence, one of the solutions should be F = V   Sc because this is the level of debt for which the
function starts to descend at D0
g
= V    Sc, cf. Figure 4.17. Some calculations reveal that this is indeed the
case. We, however, exclude this debt level precisely because the function here passes through V    Sc with
negative slope. We are looking for that level for which the function returns to the e¢ cient area (so that it
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From this level of debt on, F is e¢ cient in that it leads to a rst-date debt value D0 in excess
of g (V    Sc). The proceeds further increase with F , and the rm is now able to nance
an investment that is more expensive than the utmost amount issuable in safe debt.
In sum, whether all risky debt levels or just some (lower ones) are ine¢ cient, depends on
state Sc. More precisely, if the exogenously given Sc is su¢ ciently large in that it is greater
than a given 2 , then the function
D0
g never rises above V
   Sc as F increases, but ends
at a value below that at F = V  because the term V    S2c2 in (4.59) takes on a value lower
than V    Sc for F = V  in case (i).
Before turning to e¢ cient levels of risky debt, let us dig a little deeper here. The new
insights just presented have implications for the way the graph is depicted in the original
underinvestment problem. Regarding (i), we know from (4.59) that we must have D0g =
V    S2c2 < V    Sc at F = V , implying that all risky debt levels are ine¢ cient and,
accordingly, the rst-date value of safe debt at F = V  Sc is higher than the value of risky
debt for any (uncertain) promised repayment. But under what circumstances does this case
occur graphically? We gured out that it is for su¢ ciently high Sc. On top of that, compare
the two sides of the inequality just put forward. In order for the right-hand side to be large,
 should be small (relative to ) on the left side. And for the left-hand side to be small, we
require  to take on a large value.116 However, cases (i) and (ii) both impose the condition
 > 2, i.e., L (S) must at least be twice as steep as I (S) to begin with. Therefore, loosely
speaking, for case (i) to arise, it is best to picture a  that is considerably larger than 2, as
illustrated in Figure 4.18.
The left panel depicts the original graph for some  which is signicantly greater than 2,
where F = V  Sc such that Sa = 0, and debt is only just safe. Accordingly, debt value as of
the rst date is proportional to the area of the tetragon 0SGF, cf. equation (4.2). The right
panel in Figure 4.18 illustrates the situation for the same  and , but for F = V , i.e., debt is
most risky. Since debt is also uninsured, the rms managers will decide not to invest in any
underinvestment state. And because F = V  implies Sa = Sc, this is equivalent to asserting
that the rm will not invest to reconstitute its damaged assets in any state S < Sc. Therefore,
as we know, for example, from equation (4.4) for Sa = Sc, the value of the uninsured debt
crosses with positive slope). Thus, the second solution is the level of debt we are looking for. One can verify
that this level is given by bF = V (2 )+(2 Sc)
2  . To prove that
bF lies within the interval of admissible debt
levels, rst set V
(2 )+(2 Sc)
2  > V
   Sc. This ultimately leads to   Sc > 1. This is a true statement
per assumption. Then, let V
(2 )+(2 Sc)
2  < V
. This yields Sc < 2 , a true statement in case (ii).
116Alternatively, recall that Sc  2 for (i). In order to make sure that this condition is fullled,  must be
small, and  large.
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Figure 4.18: Scenario (i) (left panel: F = V    Sc, right panel F = V )
upon issue graphically is proportional to the area of the pentagon 0SHJA.117
As can be seen in Figure 4.18, scenario (i) is characterized by the fact that the area 0SGF in
the left panel is larger than 0SHJA in the right due to  being signicantly greater than 2,
i.e., line V    L (S) is signicantly steeper than V    I (S). In such a scenario, there is no
point in promising a risky F because even if the rm pushes it to the limit by o¤ering F = V ,
it could still raise more funds at the rst date by promising to repay a safe F = V    Sc at
the second date.118 This is because the gain in debt value by switching from a safe repayment
amounting to V   Sc to a risky one of V , as represented by the lightly shaded area in the
right panel of Figure 4.18, is less than the loss in debt value accompanying such an action,
as depicted by the heavily shaded area. You gain less than you lose.
When characterizing the underinvestment problem, one should not draw the graph the way
we did in Figure 4.18 as this implies ine¢ cient risky debt levels altogether, and we stated
before that we rule out such values of F . This concludes scenario (i).
Conversely, case (ii) requires that (D0g =) V
   S2c2  V    Sc at F = V . Remember that
(ii) allows for some e¢ cient risky debt levels (it is the higher ones, i.e., above bF , that are
e¢ cient). For the left-hand side to be large and the right to be small, this time we require ,
the slope of L (S), to be relatively small and , the slope of I (S), to be large, respectively.
However,  may not be arbitrarily small as we have to take into account the fact that  > 2.
Hence, in order to reconcile these requirements, it is best to assume a  that is only marginally
117Do not get confused with Figure 4.18 (and 4.19) because it does not show F 0 as in, say, Figure 4.12,
for example. We are still interested in the relationship between F and F 0. Our objective is to examine the
underinvestment problem under the nancing condition. However, the value of uninsured debt D0 that we are
currently analyzing is part of that condition, cf. (4.49). And we are in the process of explaining that some
initial levels of risky debt F may be ine¢ cient in the rst place (before being concerned with F 0), depending
on the constellation of parameters. Thus, in order to exclude such levels, one has to make sure from the
beginning that the model and, hence, the graphs depicting it are designed accordingly (such that they do not
appear as in Figures 4.18). Once this is taken care of, then we can proceed to give thought to F 0.
118This is true for any level of risky debt, cf. Figure 4.17.
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Figure 4.19: Scenario (ii) (left panel: F = V    Sc, right panel F = V )
greater than 2. Graphically, this means that lines V    L (S) and V    I (S) are situated
as closely together as admissible. See Figure 4.19 for a visualization.
Note that the gure is generally constructed in the same manner as Figure 4.18. That is, the
left-hand panel depicts the original underinvestment graph for F = V    Sc. The panel on
the right side shows the same graph, except that the maximum level of promised repayment
F = V  is illustrated. The major di¤erence is that the two lines V  L (S) and V  I (S) are
much closer together (compared to Figure 4.18) in that we have some  which is merely about
twice the size of . The rst-date value of safe debt is once again represented by the area
0SGF in the left panel, while the value of risky debt is proportional to area 0SHJA in the
right panel in Figure 4.19. The decisive qualitative distinction is that, as opposed to Figure
4.18, the heavily shaded area now is smaller in size compared to the lightly shaded area in
the right panel such that, this time, 0SGF on the left is smaller than 0SHJA on the right. In
other words, the loss in rst-date debt value due to switching from a sure F = V   Sc to a
risky F = V  is more than o¤set. This time, you gain more than you lose. The rm thus is
able to issue more than g (V    Sc) in funds, so that bigger investments may be undertaken.
One last point regarding case (ii): remember that it is the lower levels of risky debt that are
not e¢ cient. Graphically, imagine an F -line that is situated only slightly above the dashed
line representing V    Sc in the right panel. In that case, the heavily shaded area would
remain unchanged, while the lightly shaded area would shrink to become only a narrow strip.
The latter would be smaller than the heavily shaded area, i.e., F is ine¢ cient. From that
level of debt on, consider an increase in F such that the lightly shaded area becomes bigger
and bigger. At some point, both shaded areas would be of the same size. That happens at
debt level bF (illustrated in Figure 4.17). All bF < F  V  are e¢ cient as they allow the rm
to raise more funds compared to a safe issue. This concludes scenario (ii).
Summing up cases (i) and (ii), we have touched on an important issue. The way the standard
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underinvestment gure is depicted does matter. Simply drawing the lines such that L (S) >
I (S) in all loss states is typically not enough. Provided that Sc
 
 > 1, whether V
  L (S)
and V   I (S) stay closely together or drift apart rather quickly matters for the (ine¢ cient)
shape that the function D0g will take on in Figure 4.17. We have therefore provided specic
graphical representations for both cases (i) and (ii) in the form of Figures 4.18 and 4.19 in
order to stress the signicance of the far-reaching implications a simplegraph may have.
Both of them lead to ine¢ cient risky debt levels (at least partly). Hence, one is generally
advised to exercise caution when depicting the gures. Even though the model at rst sight
appears fairly simple, it is the details that matter and that make it challenging.
4.11.2.2 E¢ cient debt levels To analyze paths (iii) and (iv) in Figure 4.17, let us
return to the derivative of D0 with respect to F at F = V    Sc in equation (4.58). Unlike
for (i) and (ii), now let Sc
 
  1, which implies that the expression d(D0=g)dF = 1   Sc  
is non-negative: this time, function D0g starts to ascend (or at least not descend) when debt
becomes risky. Contrary to the case with ine¢ cient debt levels, not only  > 2, but also
  2 is now reconcilable with Sc    1: we know that Sc < 1 and   > 0. However,
in addition to being positive,   may be either greater or less than one (and still fulll the
inequality). It follows from   > 1 that  > 2, while
 
  1 implies   2. Either way,
the assumption Sc
 
  1 is su¢ cient for monotonicity of the relationship between D0 and
F and, thus, ensures that D0g > V
 Sc for F > V  Sc. That is, ine¢ cient debt levels do
not exist. Generally, we prove monotonicity by showing that the derivative dD0dF , cf. (4.57), is
positive over the entire interval of risky debt levels. When the function starts to ascend from
F = V  Sc and keeps a positive slope through its shape altogether, it cannot terminate at
a value lower than the one it started to increase from (i.e., D0g = V
   Sc). Let us validate
case by case that dD0dF > 0:
(iii)  > 2. From (4.57), a little rearranging yields (2   ) V  F > (Sc   1) . When
dividing by (2   ) in the next step, one has to pay attention to changing the inequality
sign because 2    < 0 per assumption. Thereafter, all that is left to do is solving for F
such that we have
d (D0=g)
dF
> 0 for F > V    2 (1  Sc)
(   2) .
Luckily, the condition Sc
 
  1 ensures that the right-hand side of this inequality is no
greater than V    Sc, which guarantees monotonicity: set V    2 (1 Sc)( 2)  V    Sc.
This leads via Sc  (1 Sc) 2 to (   2) Sc   (1  Sc). After combining the Sc-terms, the
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result is Sc
 
  1  a true statement by assumption. Hence, we have d(D0=g)dF > 0 for
F > V  2 (1 Sc)( 2) , which is itself less than V  Sc such that d(D0=g)dF > 0 for F > V  Sc.
This proves monotonicity.
What about the curvature? As before, from (4.57), the second derivative is given by d
2(D0=g)
dF 2
=
 2 
2
. Since the numerator is (once again) negative, the whole term is positive for risky
debt levels. The function is convex. This is illustrated by (iii) in Figure 4.17.
(iv)   2. Monotonicity of the relation between D0 (and thus D0g ) and F is evident
for   2. From (4.57), the derivative is given by d(D0=g)dF = 2  V
 F
 + 1   Sc. The term
1   Sc is obviously positive. The rst of the two factors in brackets is non-negative due to
  2. As is the second because the maximum value F can take on is V . Therefore, the
entire term is positive for all levels of risky debt, i.e., D0g > V
   Sc for F > V    Sc.
Regarding the curvature, due to   2 the second derivative,  2 
2
, is negative for levels
of debt above V    Sc. Pictured as path (iv) in Figure 4.17, this is the only constellation
that leads to a concave function D0g .
Once again, parameters matter. Here, however, they only matter in that  and  determine
whether the function is convex or concave. Debt levels are e¢ cient in either case.
The above conclusion implies that, for both (iii) and (iv), the function D0g ends at a value
greater than V    Sc at F = V   and from (4.59) we know that this value is less than
V . This is a situation that makes economic sense. Promising an extreme F = V  leads to a
high debt value, but one that is less than gV . This accounts for the risk of default. If there
are states in which the rm cannot deliver on its promise, potential debtholders will factor
this into the price formation. Upon issue, they will only be willing to pay an amount that is
less than gV .
Finally, as in cases (i) and (ii), let us perform a quick compatibility check on the restrictions
imposed on state Sc. First, Sc    , which follows from Sc    1. Second, we have just
explained that, in either case, the function D0g terminates at a value between V
   Sc and
V .119 In other words, the termination value, cf. (4.59), satises V    S2c2 > V    Sc. This
implies the second restriction, namely Sc <
2
 (as in (ii)). All we have to do now is to check
for each scenario which of the thresholds is the lower one.
(iii)  > 2.   <
2
 implies  > 2, which is a true statement. Thus, Sc must not
be greater than   (< 1) in this case. The higher the critical value

  , the more easily the
restriction is satised. For   to be high,  needs to be rather large, and  must be relatively
119Unlike with ine¢ cient debt levels. There, the same holds true only for (ii). The function terminates below
V    Sc in case (i).
4. Underinvestment in the reconstitution of damaged assets 161
Figure 4.20: Scenario (iii) for Some Low Level of Risky Debt
small. As in cases (i) and (ii), it must also be assured that the condition  > 2 is satised.
This is accomplished, similar to case for (ii) (the one with partly e¢ cient debt levels), by
assuming that functions V    L (S) and V    I (S) are as closely together graphically as
possible: picture a  that is once again only slightly above 2.
The comparison of the two cases (ii) and (iii) is insightful because they share the same
boundary level   .
120 The di¤erence between the two is that state Sc must be located
above that boundary in (ii), while it must be on or below it in (iii). Apparently, when Sc
becomes su¢ ciently small in this scenario, all risky debt levels turn out e¢ cient. Going back
to the graphical illustration of the original underinvestment problem, if we were to move state
Sc keeping the slopes of the functions L (S) and I (S) constant su¢ ciently far to the left
in Figure 4.19 (which implies case (ii)), then debt would become e¢ cient altogether. Figure
4.20 visualizes just that. One can nicely make out the e¤ect of choosing a low enough Sc.
The gure shows, for an arbitrarily chosen low level of risky debt, that the lightly shaded
area representing the gain in debt value accompanied by making the issue risky (relative to
safe debt F = V  Sc, as indicated by the horizontal dashed line) is now larger in size than
the heavily shaded area.121 Unlike in (ii), even low levels of risky debt are e¢ cient in (iii).
(iv)   2. Remember that this is the only scenario for which D0g is concave. It is also
120Note that this circumstance does not need to be signicant per se, as we know that di¤erent scenarios,
i.e., (i)-(iv), go hand in hand with di¤erent parameter constellations. True, for (i)-(iii) there is  > 2 as a
joint element. But there is more to it.  > 2 leaves open a whole lot of possibilities for the values of  and 
and, thus, 
  (for example,  may be slightly, modestly or a lot bigger than 2). Cases (ii) and (iii), however,
have  close to 2 in common. Thus, assuming that both parameters take on the same values in cases (ii) and
(iii), they are nicely comparable.
121As it is for even lower levels of risky debt than the one pictured. Obviously, the statement continues to
be valid for higher levels of F .
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Figure 4.21: Scenario (iv) for Some Low Level of Risky Debt
the only opportunity for V    L (S) and V    I (S) to be trulyclose together graphically
as the distance between them may be arbitrarily small (of course, V    I (S) must still be
located above V    L (S) in all underinvestment states). Regarding the two restrictions on
Sc, this time try

   2 . Rearranging leads to   2, which is true by assumption. Now,
unlike in (iii), 2 is the boundary that Sc must stay below. However, there is one problem 
a problem for which we need to invoke the third constraint imposed on Sc, namely Sc < 1.
The condition   2 implies that 2 (and, thus,   ) is itself greater than (or equal to) one.
Since we limited the highest state to S = 1, we must conne our analysis to states Sc < 1:
given that   2, Sc may take on any state (except for S = 1), and all levels of risky debt
remain e¢ cient. Speaking graphically, for e¢ ciency it does not matter how far to the left or
to the right state Sc is located. As long as the distance between the two functions is close
enough, F will always be e¢ cient. Unlike in scenario (ii), the heavily shaded area is smaller
than the lightly shaded area even for levels of debt only slightly above V    Sc. Figure
4.21 provides a graphical representation for some random Sc, where functions V  L (S) and
V    I (S) are located very closely together. Put di¤erently, the net gain in rst-date debt
value from switching from the highest level of safe debt, F = V    Sc, to a risky one is
always positive. As F increases further, the imbalance becomes even greater in favor of the
gain in value. The lightly shaded area is always bigger.
Finally, a short reminder may be useful: in cases (i)-(iv), when we speak of the distance
between V    L (S) and V    I (S) in the underinvestment gures, we are really talking
about the investment projects NPV, as dened by L (S)   I (S). Interestingly, there never
arises a problem concerning e¢ ciency when NPV from rebuilding is su¢ ciently small, see case
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(iv). On the other hand, for very large NPVs see case (i) debt may become ine¢ cient
(depending on whether state Sc is large enough, which in turn depends on the parameter
setting). This may come as a surprise at rst sight because one would suspect that this
situation is especially desirable. It tells us that, while a large NPV generally is preferable,
there are more issues to take into consideration in this linear-uniform special case of the
model. As pictured in Figure 4.18, a large NPV may lead to a loss in debt value that is not
compensated by the gain that comes with making the debt risky by promising an F that
surpasses V    Sc.
Monotonicity of (iii) and (iv) makes sure that all risky debt levels are e¢ cient. Given both
e¢ ciency and no insurance, rms nd themselves in the position to raise more funds at the
rst date by promising a repayment that may not be honored.122
No underinvestment problem arises for ine¢ cient risky debt levels (which is why we exclude
them). Managers of the rm would always stick to riskless nancing, implying that rm value
is always enough to pay o¤ debtholders. Hence, if one wants to focus on underinvestment,
e¢ cient debt levels are a necessary assumption to begin with. That way, it is guaranteed
that D0g > V
   Sc for F > V    Sc.
This completes the rather extensive (but necessary) detour to the relationship between D0
and F in the model. Once again, ine¢ cient debt levels are ruled out in the following. Let
us now return to Figure 4.16 and construct the second curve, which represents all feasible
combinations of F and F 0 for which the nancing condition is fullled. As it makes its ways
through the two subareas it tells us for which combinations of debt levels the rm decides
to insure (and vice versa). Establishing its shape through the (F; F 0)-space will thus be the
rst task in what follows.
Remark 1: By now, it might be clear why Figure 4.17 is depicted for given  and Sc.
We have worked out that it depends on several restrictions imposed on state Sc which one of
the paths (i)-(iv) the function follows. For each scenario, there is a threshold that Sc must be
above or below (or an interval that it must lie in) for a given restriction on the slopes of the
functions L (S) and I (S) (either  > 2 or   2). The threshold itself is dependent on 
and , however. Thus, for di¤erent (feasible) combinations of the two, some given Sc may be
either below or above it. The point is that changes in the values of  and/or  are responsible
for a possible switch from one path to another for a given Sc. We would therefore actually
have to provide four gures, each one corresponding to one of the four cases (i)-(iv), i.e., with
a di¤erent constellation of parameters feasible for the respective path  unless we x  and
122This also applies to e¢ cient levels F > bF in (ii).
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Sc. For if we did not, we would also have to start out by drawing a di¤erent straight line
through the origin (representing safe debt) that leads up to the point (V    Sc; V    Sc)
in Figure 4.17 for each case. This would be required by the di¤erent values of  and Sc (and
thus V    Sc) in every respective scenario (i)-(iv) if these parameters were not xed. Since
we postulated that they are, however, di¤erent values of  are responsible for the path of the
function as F rises in Figure 4.17.
An example might help: Consider paths (iii) and (iv) in Figure 4.17. At rst sight, one might
be tempted to think that the convex and the concave function must end in the same terminal
value, since for both paths we have D0g = V
   S2c2 for F = V  by (4.59).123 This is not the
case, however. Remember that the restriction on the functionsslopes is given by  > 2 for
(iii) and   2 for (iv), respectively. Since we xed  and Sc, we have a higher  for (iii),
implying that V    S2c2 terminates at a lower value in (iii). The convex function terminates
at a lower value than the concave function, as pictured in Figure 4.17.
4.11.3 Insuring versus not insuring
The approach to establishing the curve that represents the nancing condition is similar
to that of nding the curve depicted in Figure 4.16 (for which R0 = R0). We have to
determine the derivative dF
0
dF such that the nancing condition is fullled. As with the rst
curve, we are only interested in debt levels F and F 0 within the interval of feasible debt
levels [V    Sc; V ]. From (4.49), the nancing condition in its general form is given by
D0 = D0 + (1 + )P
0
i . Insured debt is chosen such that it raises the combined amount of
the uninsured issue and the (unfair) insurance premium. To establish the derivative, we
have to convert the general condition to the linear-uniform case rst. Luckily, the great
majority of the mathematical work involved has been done already. D0 is given by equation
(4.56). Remember that P 0i equals R
0
, the deadweight loss of insuring. R
0
 is given by
g
2

Sc   V  F 0
2
in (4.53), where S0a = Sc  V
 F 0
 has already been inserted. Consequently,
P 0i equals
g
2

Sc   V  F 0
2
. It follows that (1 + )P 0i = (1 + )
g
2

Sc   V  F 0
2
. The
only term remaining is the value of the insured debt D0, cf. (4.51). Debt becomes safe
by buying (unfair) insurance. Hence, the rm is able to pay o¤ debtholders in whichever
state materializes. For them, there is no more risk involved. Therefore, the rst-date value
D0 is simply the time value of the second-date repayment F
0. Discounting is achieved by
multiplying the payment by the uniform state price g

=
R 1
0 gdS

. Mathematically, taking
the antiderivative of D0 in (4.51) yields gF
0.
123Such as in scenarios (i) and (ii) as well, by the way.
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Accordingly, the nancing condition in the linear-uniform special case is given by
gF 0 = g
"
(V    Sc)

Sc   V
   F


+

2

Sc   V
   F

2
+ F

1  Sc + V
   F

#
+g (1 + )

2

Sc   V
   F 0

2
. (4.60)
Deriving dF
0
dF is the nal major mathematical task of this chapter  and of this dissertation,
too. In a rst step, a little rearranging (and dividing by g) leaves us with
F 0 F = (V    Sc   F )

Sc   V
   F


+

2

Sc   V
   F

2
+(1 + )

2

Sc   V
   F 0

2
.
Using this equation, we establish the derivative dF
0
dF . Below, some important steps in the
derivation are provided:
dF 0   dF =  

Sc   V
   F


dF +
1

(V    Sc   F ) dF + 


Sc   V
   F


dF
+(1 + )

Sc   V
   F 0


dF 0
=

   


Sc   V
   F


+
V    F

  Sc


dF + (1 + )

Sc   V
   F 0


dF 0
=

2   

V    F

  Sc

dF + (1 + )

Sc   V
   F 0


dF 0.
In a next step, dividing by dF yields
dF 0
dF
= 1 +
2   

V    F

  Sc + (1 + )

Sc   V
   F 0


dF 0
dF
.
All that is left to do is factoring out dF
0
dF and rearranging. The derivative that tells us by
how much F 0 must change in response to a marginal increase in F in order for the nancing
condition to remain valid is given by
dF 0
dF
=
1 + 2 
V  F
   Sc
1  (1 + )

Sc   V  F 0
 .
First, it is easily veried that plugging in F = F 0 = V    Sc into (4.60) leads the nancing
condition to being satised as all the

Sc   V  F

-terms cancel out. In other words, the
curve representing the condition has its origin at the point (V    Sc; V    Sc), just like
the curve splitting up space into an insurance and a non-insurance area in Figure 4.16. This,
too, should not come as a surprise: uninsured debt D0 is only just safe at F = V    Sc
166 4. Underinvestment in the reconstitution of damaged assets
as Sa = 0. There is no underinvestment problem to insure against yet.124 Thus, there is
just no need to acquire insurance to make the debt safe because there is no threat of default.
Hence, the rm in this case does not nd itself in the situation to raise D0 plus the insurance
premium P 0 by promising a lower repayment F
0 simply because the repayment cannot be
reduced. Consequently, F 0 must equal F , i.e., F = F 0 = V    Sc and, thus, Sa = S0a = 0.
The insurance premium P 0, which is dened over the underinvestment states 0 to S
0
a, is
zero accordingly, cf. (4.49) and (4.50). Put di¤erently, there is no di¤erence between the
two promised repayments as long as there is no need to purchase insurance, i.e., F = F 0 as
long as F  V    Sc. In an (F; F 0)-diagram with both axes ranging from 0 to V , this
would mean that the relationship between F and F 0 coincides with the 45-degree line up to
point (V    Sc; V    Sc). From there on, we now establish the subsequent shape of the
curve and depict it in the diagram as shown by Figure 4.16, where (V    Sc; V    Sc) is
illustrated as the origin.
To nd the curves shape, we invoke the derivative and evaluate it at F = F 0 = V    Sc,
which gives us dF
0
dF = 1   ( )Sc (< 1). This expression is well known. A comparison with
(4.58) reveals that this is exactly the slope of the function D0g at F = V
   Sc, and we
have already dealt with the shape of that function extensively in the previous section. As we
know from there, the derivative may be negative or positive, depending on whether Sc
 
 is
greater or non-greater than one. As before, this requires a case distinction. In short, when
D0
g starts to descend from its point of origin, so does the curve representing the nancing
condition, and vice versa:
d

D0
g

dF

F=V  Sc
< 0 () dF
0
dF

F=F 0=V  Sc
< 0, and
d

D0
g

dF

F=V  Sc
> 0 () dF
0
dF

F=F 0=V  Sc
> 0.
Let us start with Sc
 
 > 1. This is the case we do not prefer economically (at least
for its ine¢ cient debt levels). Here, as F rises above V    Sc, the promised repayment
with insurance, F 0, starts to descend. Graphically, if one were to imagine a second curve
in Figure 4.16, having the same point of origin as the one pictured, it would rst start
to decline below the F -axis such that F 0 would fall below V    Sc. However, we cannot
allow F 0 < V    Sc for F > V    Sc. If the nancing condition results in a risk-free
124Put di¤erently, the insurance is free at the considered level of debt.
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F 0 < V    Sc, then the rm could have issued uninsured debt with the same safe promised
repayment F (= F 0 < V    Sc) in the rst place and achieved the same outcome. All debt
levels F for which this holds true are ine¢ cient.
Given Sc
 
 > 1, ine¢ ciency need not be the case necessarily. If Sc
 
 > 1, then it holds
true that F 0 > V    Sc for all F above a unique level of debt. And that unique level turns
out to be bF , i.e., that F from the discussion of (partly) ine¢ cient debt levels above which
D0
g becomes e¢ cient, cf. path (ii) in Figure 4.17. From the earlier discussion of
bF , we know
that it lies within the interval of feasible levels of risky debt (V    Sc; V ), cf. fn. 115.
Remember that we do not consider promised repayments V    Sc < F  bF because we
stated in the previous section that we rule out such ine¢ cient debt levels. Uniqueness follows
from the fact that when we set F 0 equal to V    Sc in the nancing condition (4.60)
and solve the ensuing quadratic function for F , the two solutions are V    Sc and bF =
V (2 )+(2 Sc)
2  .
125 The former cannot be the level of debt we are looking for, since the
curve representing the nancing condition only starts to descend at F = V    Sc (cf. fn.
115). This solely leaves bF . Graphically, since the function descends from its origin rst,
it follows that it must cross the F -axis at F = bF with positive slope, which implies that
F 0 > V    Sc for all admissible debt levels F > bF .
Finally, we now come to the consideration of Sc
 
  1, the case for which monotonicity of
D0 in F is guaranteed. An illustration is provided in Figure 4.22, where the second curve
representing the nancing condition is drawn into the setup of Figure 4.16. The function now
starts to ascend from the origin (with a slope of less than one). For the reasons mentioned,
this is the case to be preferred from an economic standpoint. Fortunately, it is straightforward
to handle mathematically. Recall the nancing condition in (4.60):
gF 0 = g
"
(V    Sc)

Sc   V
   F


+

2

Sc   V
   F

2
+ F

1  Sc + V
   F

#
+g (1 + )

2

Sc   V
   F 0

2
:
The rst summand on the right-hand side is simply D0, cf. (4.56). And since Sc
 
  1
holds, we know from the discussion of e¢ cient debt levels in the last chapter that we have
D0
g > V
   Sc for F > V    Sc (see paths (iii) and (iv) in Figure 4.17). Therefore, after
dividing the whole equation by g, the rst term on the right-hand side exceeds V    Sc for
all debt levels F > V    Sc. Concerning the insurance premium in the second summand,
125The derivation follows fn. 115.
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Figure 4.22: The Decision to Insure (left panel:  > ; right panel:   )
recall that the quadratic expression is simply (S0a)
2. The lowest value the boundary state can
take on is S0a = 0 (for F 0 = V    Sc). By implication, the lowest value the entire term can
take on is zero, too. Hence, it holds true for F 0 on the left-hand side of the equation that
F 0 > V    Sc for all F > V    Sc when Sc    1.
Let us go on to check whether the new curve crosses the 45-degree line, i.e., whether there is a
solution to the pair of equations (4.60) and F = F 0. We do so by plugging the latter into the
former. In a rst step, this yields F = V    Sc + 2

Sc   V  F

+ (1 + ) 2

Sc   V  F

.
Rearranging and solving for F then gives us the result:
F = F 0 = V  + Sc
      
    +  .
In case this does not look familiar, compare equation (4.30) to see that the value equals F  
the debt level for which the rm starts to switch to not buying insurance in the cum dividend
case, and for which the curve in Figure 4.16 crosses the 45-degree line. Thus, the curve
representing the nancing condition also goes through point (F ; F ). However, one has to
exercise caution in making that statement. Remember that it only holds given that the safety
loading is high enough. We already made it clear in previous sections that F  only exists for
 > 

=  

within the interval of feasible debt levels.126 Therefore, we once again need
126Our explanation allows for a neat side e¤ect: Garven and MacMinn (1993, p. 642) state that the promised
payment Bc must satisfy equation (10) but such a Bc < Bu always exists. Their equation (10) is our fair
nancing condition (4.42), while Bc corresponds to our F 00 and B
u equals the uninsured F . The authors do
not prove their claim explicitly. As they do not consider safety loadings either, consider  = 0 (such that
F 0 = F 00), so that the right panel in Figure 4.22 is relevant to us. The level of debt F = F
0
0 = F
 turns into
V  + Sc, which is clearly not in the interval of feasible debt levels. Graphically, the two curves would not
cross the 45-degree line in the same point until some debt level F = F 00 > V
 is reached. Hence, it follows
that F 00 < F for all feasible debt levels because the lower curve in Figure 4.22 stays below the 45-degree line.
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a case distinction, as accommodated graphically by the left and the right panel in Figure
4.22: for   , there is no solution to (4.60) and F = F 0 in the interval (V    Sc; V ),
i.e., the curve representing solutions to (4.60) does not rise above the 45-degree line over the
interval [V    Sc; V ]. For  > , the unique positive solution in the interval (V    Sc; V )
is F = F 0 = F : the curve intersects the 45-degree line at F , as shown in the left panel of
Figure 4.22.127 Both curves cross the 45-degree line at F = F 0 = F  (the level of debt above
which the rm switches to not purchasing insurance in the cum dividend case if  > ).
Finally, we have reached the point where we are in the position to check on our objective
set out originally. That is, we can now verify whether the theorem established in the cum
dividend case also holds under the nancing condition. We can infer the validity of our
assertion that the cum dividend conclusion also holds under the current scenario from an
inspection of Figure 4.22. The two curves in the respective panels provide the answer. Recall
that the curve representing (F; F 0)-combinations for which R0 = R0 merely divides space into
a buy insurance and a do not buy insurance area (the latter being represented by the
heavily shaded surface). The actual guidance on which action to take comes from the curve
representing the nancing condition as it passes through these two areas. Since we obviously
require the nancing condition to be satised, we simply have to check if and how the curve
passes through the respective areas in order to provide the following concluding statement:
For   , it is optimal for the rm to buy insurance in the presence of a nancing condition,
while for  > , the rm takes out insurance if F  F , but not otherwise. This is exactly
the same result as in the cum dividend case: only the combination of a high safety loading
and high leverage will lead the rms managers not to purchase insurance.128
From the left panel in Figure 4.22, it is apparent that the rm stops demanding insurance at
the same level of debt (F ) at which it also does so in the cum dividend case. At F = F 0 =
F , the lower curve enters the no-insurance-area. This is also justied from an economic
standpoint: if the rm were to follow the nancing condition even above the 45-degree line,
then F 0 would become greater than F . In other words, buying insurance would lead to an
increase in promised repayment, as opposed to a decline. As a consequence, the deadweight
loss of insuring would be larger than in the cum dividend scenario, i.e., R0 > R. This would
render taking out insurance useless. Shareholders cannot have an interest in this.
127 It can be checked that for large values of 
 
> 

there is no solution F 0 to (4.60) for large enough debt
levels F (in that F 0 would exceed V , the maximum admissible level of debt). We omit the (cumbersome)
derivation.
128For  = ; it follows that F = F 0 = F  = V , cf. (4.30). That is, the two curves in Figure 4.22 both cross
the 45-degree line at the maximum level of risky debt.
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The explanations given above also conrm Garven and MacMinns (1993, p. 644-45) nding
that, whenever the rm opts for insurance (see above), the net value of the current share-
holders claim in the presence of loading is higher under our nancing-constrained model
compared to a cum dividend interpretation of Schnabel and Roumi. In other words, it does
a¤ect shareholder value which interpretation of the model is selected  even though the rm
stops to demand loss insurance at the same level F  (provided  > ). This follows from
the observation that F 0 < F and, hence, R0 < R for each point on the curve representing
the nancing condition that lies below the R0 = R0-curve (for  > 0) in Figure 4.22. Our
analysis applies generally to (F; F 0) on and above the nancing condition curve: in principle,
the rm could choose a higher repayment than F 0 and still generate all the funds necessary
(and more).129 However, as pointed out by Garven and MacMinn (1993, p. 645), the rm has
an incentive to minimize the insurance purchase by minimizing the face value of debt, i.e., to
satisfy the nancing condition. This is because (F; F 0) on the nancing condition lead to the
lowest possible repayment F 0 for a given risky F (< F ). This in turn leads to the highest
possible deductible130 and, hence, the lowest possible loading premium/deadweight loss of
insuring P 0i = R
0
. Regardless of whether considering the cum dividend interpretation or
the nancing condition, shareholders generally trade o¤ the deadweight loss of insuring (R
and R0, respectively) against the loss of not insuring (R0) in determining whether equity
value is higher with or without insurance. As long as the deadweight loss caused by insuring
is lower, shareholders will acquire coverage because their claimsvalue will be higher. Thus,
the lower R0 compared to R, the better for shareholders. This concludes the proof.
This also concludes the analysis of the underinvestment problem in the reconstitution of
damaged assets. We have presented considerable new insights that hopefully extend our
understanding of the problem and, importantly, solutions to it. Most importantly, we have
proved Schnabel and Roumi (1989) wrong in that it is not the high levels of risky debt for
which the rm generally decides to insure, but rather the low levels. Furthermore, given a
su¢ ciently high safety loading, the rm will not take out insurance for high levels of debt.
Again, this result makes more sense from an economic point of view: roughly speaking, if the
rm basically belongs to bondholders anyway, due to its high leverage, and if the insurance
company asks for a high safety loading along with its insurance service, there is no point in
129Going lower than F 0 is not an option as it would result in less money than necessary to raise all that the
uninsured issue raised plus enough to cover the insurance premium.
130Note, parenthetically, that Garven and MacMinn (1993, p. 645) accidentally state that ...loading creates
an incentive to reduce the deductible..., as opposed to correctly explicating that there exists an incentive to
maximize the deductible. Given their clear and thorough understanding of the model, this unquestionably is
merely a typo.
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trying to save the company from a shareholder point of view.
172
Part IV
Conclusion
5 Summary
We have come to the end of this dissertation. Hopefully, its readers have acquired a thorough
understanding of corporate underinvestment and the real-life relevance of the theory involved.
We have addressed in depth the circumstances under which rms decide to pass up protable
investment opportunities, both in the presence of asymmetric and symmetric information.
One commonality under both informational setups is that managements behavior is sub-
ject to certain requirements that induce underinvestment in the rst place. In Myers and
Majluf (1984), managers defend the interests of existing shareholders against potential new
claimholders (be it debt or equity), while management represents the interests of stockhold-
ers in their conict with bondholders in Mayers and Smith (1987). By implication, new
investment is undertaken only if it does not decrease the value of the existing equity. The
second feature that both setups have in common is that risky debt is a prerequisite for the
underinvestment problem. In the case of asymmetric information, we have come to know
that risk-free debt is as good as nancial slack (cash) in that it leads the rm to invest in
every positive-NPV project; there is no dilution of shareholdersequity claim because there
is no scope for mispricing due to the fact that the new security is not subject to the risk of
default. For this reason, the rm rst exhausts its capacity to issue risk-free debt before it
issues risky bonds. Given symmetric information, risk-free liabilities ensure that rm payo¤s
(with investment) are su¢ cient to cover the promised repayment to debtholders in every state
of nature. Consequently, the rm always decides to rebuild (without needing insurance) as
the NPV to shareholders is non-negative.
One di¤erence between the two is that, with asymmetric information, the issue of risky debt
may lead to underinvestment, whereas it is preexisting risky debt that prompts rms to pass
up a worthwhile investment opportunity in the presence of symmetric information.
Concerning underinvestment and asymmetric information, Myers and Majlufs (1984) model
does very well in explaining observed security issue announcement e¤ects. By contrast, it fails
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to explain actual corporate nancing behavior in the sense that real-world corporations do
not follow the pecking order for the most part. As to Myers(1977) debt overhang, we have
provided an extensive overview regarding the multitude of areas in which debt overhang is
found (the corporate sector, the banking sector, development economics, etc.). It is safe to say
that debt overhang matters in reality. Unfortunately, there is only little empirical evidence
in relation to the inuence of the underinvestment problem on the corporate demand for
insurance. This is due to data availability; rms in most developed countries are generally
not required to report insurance purchases. If data availability should change in the future,
this is certainly an interesting area of future research, for it would enable the empirical
validation of the conclusions of Mayers and Smith (1987)  as well as our own.
Both models clearly represent a deviation from the famous MM theorem stating the irrel-
evance of corporate nancing. Capital structure matters. It is relevant because it alters
the rms investment scheme in that risky debt induces rms to invest suboptimally. As a
consequence, rm value departs from its status quo benchmark.
Lastly, with respect to the underinvestment problem in the reconstitution of damaged assets,
we have contributed to the existing literature in that we have identied a longstanding error
in connection with corporate casualty insurance that comes with a safety loading. The
rectication of this error is important because it signicantly changes the conclusions of the
model it builds on, namely Schnabel and Roumi (1989)  actually, it turns them upside
down (for a high enough safety loading). By doing so, we provide theoretical results that
have economic meaning. In the correct outcome of the model, shareholders prefer not to
insure if the company is highly levered and has to pay dearly for insurance coverage. That is,
if a rm is deeply underwater such that its shareholders hardly have a claim in it, they have
no incentive to save it, since it basically does not belong to them. Finally, we have further
contributed to a better understanding of the underinvestment problem by proving that the
results by and large persist both in the presence of bankruptcy costs and in a nancing
condition environment (that is favored from a shareholder point of view): faced with the risk
of incurring a loss to its assets, the rm generally takes insurance for low levels of risky
debt(Arnold and Hartl, 2011, p. 1).
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